Mailchimp (alien-lifestyles) MCP Server
@alien-lifestyles/mailchimp-mcp
npm
v0.4.1
Published by @alien-lifestyles — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
The only local-first, AI-native Mailchimp assistant. Get CSM intelligence, marketing analytics, and campaign execution—all through Claude Desktop conversations. Free read-only tier available. Upgrade for full automation.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 9
high Sensitive-source and external-sink co-existMTC-FLOW-004
Tools that read sensitive data ([mc_listFiles]) and tools that can send data out ([mc_getWebhook, mc_uploadFile, mc_createWebhook, mc_updateWebhook, mc_deleteWebhook]) are exposed together. An agent can move private data to the sink.
Evidence: sources [mc_listFiles] → sinks [mc_getWebhook, mc_uploadFile, mc_createWebhook, mc_updateWebhook, mc_deleteWebhook]
Fix: Keep secret-reading and egress capabilities on separate, separately-approved servers.
Location: flow mc_listFiles → mc_getWebhook
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/index.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/index.js:1954`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: spawn } = await import("child_process"); const { platform: platform2 } = await import("os"); const { existsS
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/index.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/setup/server.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/setup/server.js:82`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: execSync } = __require("child_process"); try { const listOutput = execSync("npm list -g @alien-lifestyles/mail
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/setup/server.js
medium Unconstrained URL/host parameter "url" on "mc_createWebhook"MTC-CAP-007
Tool "mc_createWebhook" takes a URL/host parameter "url" with no allowlist/pattern. An outbound-request tool with an unbounded destination enables SSRF and cloud-metadata access (e.g. 169.254.169.254).
Fix: Allowlist destinations or constrain the parameter; block private/link-local addresses server-side.
Location: tool mc_createWebhook · inputSchema.properties.url
medium Unconstrained URL/host parameter "url" on "mc_updateWebhook"MTC-CAP-007
Tool "mc_updateWebhook" takes a URL/host parameter "url" with no allowlist/pattern. An outbound-request tool with an unbounded destination enables SSRF and cloud-metadata access (e.g. 169.254.169.254).
Fix: Allowlist destinations or constrain the parameter; block private/link-local addresses server-side.
Location: tool mc_updateWebhook · inputSchema.properties.url
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (scripts/installer.js)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`scripts/installer.js:14`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: execSync, spawn } from 'child_process'; import { existsSync } from 'fs'; import { join } from 'path'; import { fileURLTo
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server scripts/installer.js
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (scripts/post-install-sync.js)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`scripts/post-install-sync.js:17`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: import { spawn } from 'child_process'; import { fileURLToPath } from 'url'; import { dirname } from 'path'; const __fi
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server scripts/post-install-sync.js
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (scripts/setup-cli.js)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`scripts/setup-cli.js:11`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: import { spawn } from 'child_process'; const __filename = fileURLToPath(import.meta.url); const __dirname = dirname(__
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server scripts/setup-cli.js
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (scripts/sync-from-web.js)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`scripts/sync-from-web.js:134`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: spawn } = await import('child_process'); const { promisify } = await import('util'); // For now, implement
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server scripts/sync-from-web.js
Tools 166
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
mc_createWebhooknetwork egressmc_deleteWebhooknetwork egressmc_getWebhooknetwork egressmc_listFilesreads sensitive datamc_updateWebhooknetwork egressmc_uploadFilenetwork egressaccount-health-checkno sensitive capabilitychurn-risk-analysisno sensitive capabilityfeature-adoptionno sensitive capabilitylist-healthno sensitive capability
Show 156 more tools ↓
marketer-campaign-benchmarksno sensitive capabilitymarketer-content-analysisno sensitive capabilitymarketer-quarterly-performanceno sensitive capabilitymc_addMemberEventno sensitive capabilitymc_addNoteToMemberno sensitive capabilitymc_addTagToMemberno sensitive capabilitymc_archiveAutomationno sensitive capabilitymc_archiveMemberno sensitive capabilitymc_cancelCampaignno sensitive capabilitymc_createAudienceno sensitive capabilitymc_createBatchOperationno sensitive capabilitymc_createCampaignno sensitive capabilitymc_createFileFolderno sensitive capabilitymc_createInterestno sensitive capabilitymc_createLandingPageno sensitive capabilitymc_createMemberno sensitive capabilitymc_createMergeFieldno sensitive capabilitymc_createSegmentno sensitive capabilitymc_createStoreno sensitive capabilitymc_createStoreCartno sensitive capabilitymc_createStoreCustomerno sensitive capabilitymc_createStoreOrderno sensitive capabilitymc_createStoreProductno sensitive capabilitymc_createSurveyno sensitive capabilitymc_createTagno sensitive capabilitymc_createTemplateno sensitive capabilitymc_createTemplateFolderno sensitive capabilitymc_createVerifiedDomainno sensitive capabilitymc_deleteAudienceno sensitive capabilitymc_deleteAutomationEmailno sensitive capabilitymc_deleteCampaignno sensitive capabilitymc_deleteFileno sensitive capabilitymc_deleteFileFolderno sensitive capabilitymc_deleteInterestno sensitive capabilitymc_deleteInterestCategoryno sensitive capabilitymc_deleteLandingPageno sensitive capabilitymc_deleteMemberno sensitive capabilitymc_deleteMergeFieldno sensitive capabilitymc_deleteNoteno sensitive capabilitymc_deleteSegmentno sensitive capabilitymc_deleteStoreno sensitive capabilitymc_deleteStoreCartno sensitive capabilitymc_deleteStoreCustomerno sensitive capabilitymc_deleteStoreOrderno sensitive capabilitymc_deleteStoreProductno sensitive capabilitymc_deleteSurveyno sensitive capabilitymc_deleteTagno sensitive capabilitymc_deleteTemplateno sensitive capabilitymc_deleteTemplateFolderno sensitive capabilitymc_deleteVerifiedDomainno sensitive capabilitymc_getAbuseReportno sensitive capabilitymc_getAccountno sensitive capabilitymc_getAudienceno sensitive capabilitymc_getAutomationno sensitive capabilitymc_getAutomationEmailno sensitive capabilitymc_getBatchOperationno sensitive capabilitymc_getCampaignno sensitive capabilitymc_getCampaignClickDetailsno sensitive capabilitymc_getCampaignContentno sensitive capabilitymc_getCampaignReportno sensitive capabilitymc_getConnectedSiteno sensitive capabilitymc_getConversationno sensitive capabilitymc_getFileno sensitive capabilitymc_getFileFolderno sensitive capabilitymc_getInterestno sensitive capabilitymc_getInterestCategoryno sensitive capabilitymc_getLandingPageno sensitive capabilitymc_getListGrowthHistoryno sensitive capabilitymc_getMemberno sensitive capabilitymc_getMemberActivityno sensitive capabilitymc_getMergeFieldno sensitive capabilitymc_getSegmentno sensitive capabilitymc_getStoreno sensitive capabilitymc_getStoreCartno sensitive capabilitymc_getStoreCustomerno sensitive capabilitymc_getStoreOrderno sensitive capabilitymc_getStoreProductno sensitive capabilitymc_getSurveyno sensitive capabilitymc_getSurveyResponseno sensitive capabilitymc_getTagno sensitive capabilitymc_getTemplateno sensitive capabilitymc_getTemplateFolderno sensitive capabilitymc_getVerifiedDomainno sensitive capabilitymc_listAbuseReportsno sensitive capabilitymc_listAudienceActivityno sensitive capabilitymc_listAudiencesno sensitive capabilitymc_listAutomationEmailsno sensitive capabilitymc_listAutomationsno sensitive capabilitymc_listBatchOperationsno sensitive capabilitymc_listCampaignsno sensitive capabilitymc_listCampaignSubscribersno sensitive capabilitymc_listConnectedSitesno sensitive capabilitymc_listConversationMessagesno sensitive capabilitymc_listConversationsno sensitive capabilitymc_listFileFoldersno sensitive capabilitymc_listInterestCategoriesno sensitive capabilitymc_listInterestsno sensitive capabilitymc_listLandingPagesno sensitive capabilitymc_listLocationsno sensitive capabilitymc_listMemberEventsno sensitive capabilitymc_listMemberNotesno sensitive capabilitymc_listMembersno sensitive capabilitymc_listMergeFieldsno sensitive capabilitymc_listReportsno sensitive capabilitymc_listSegmentMembersno sensitive capabilitymc_listSegmentsno sensitive capabilitymc_listStoreCartsno sensitive capabilitymc_listStoreCustomersno sensitive capabilitymc_listStoreOrdersno sensitive capabilitymc_listStoreProductsno sensitive capabilitymc_listStoresno sensitive capabilitymc_listSurveyResponsesno sensitive capabilitymc_listSurveysno sensitive capabilitymc_listTagsno sensitive capabilitymc_listTemplateFoldersno sensitive capabilitymc_listTemplatesno sensitive capabilitymc_listVerifiedDomainsno sensitive capabilitymc_listWebhooksno sensitive capabilitymc_openConfigno sensitive capabilitymc_pauseAutomationno sensitive capabilitymc_pauseAutomationEmailno sensitive capabilitymc_pauseCampaignno sensitive capabilitymc_pingno sensitive capabilitymc_publishLandingPageno sensitive capabilitymc_removeTagFromMemberno sensitive capabilitymc_replicateCampaignno sensitive capabilitymc_resumeCampaignno sensitive capabilitymc_scheduleCampaignno sensitive capabilitymc_sendCampaignno sensitive capabilitymc_sendDomainVerificationEmailno sensitive capabilitymc_setCampaignContentno sensitive capabilitymc_startAutomationno sensitive capabilitymc_startAutomationEmailno sensitive capabilitymc_testCampaignno sensitive capabilitymc_unpublishLandingPageno sensitive capabilitymc_unscheduleCampaignno sensitive capabilitymc_unsubscribeMemberno sensitive capabilitymc_updateAudienceno sensitive capabilitymc_updateAutomationEmailno sensitive capabilitymc_updateCampaignno sensitive capabilitymc_updateInterestno sensitive capabilitymc_updateInterestCategoryno sensitive capabilitymc_updateLandingPageno sensitive capabilitymc_updateMemberno sensitive capabilitymc_updateMergeFieldno sensitive capabilitymc_updateNoteno sensitive capabilitymc_updateSegmentno sensitive capabilitymc_updateStoreno sensitive capabilitymc_updateStoreCartno sensitive capabilitymc_updateStoreCustomerno sensitive capabilitymc_updateStoreOrderno sensitive capabilitymc_updateStoreProductno sensitive capabilitymc_updateSurveyno sensitive capabilitymc_updateTemplateno sensitive capabilitymonthly-summaryno sensitive capabilityroi-assessmentno sensitive capability
Toxic flows 1
Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (166 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.4.1 latest |
A 93/100 | 9 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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