Mcp — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.13.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.
{
"tool": {
"name": "mcptrustchecker",
"version": "1.13.0",
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"target": {
"id": "https://mcp.eztexting.com/mcp/admin",
"source": {
"kind": "http",
"origin": "https://mcp.eztexting.com/mcp/admin"
},
"server": {
"name": "eztexting-admin",
"version": "1.0"
}
},
"grade": "A",
"score": {
"score": 94,
"threatScore": 100,
"grade": "A",
"band": "A",
"categorySubtotals": {
"injection": 0,
"exfiltration": 0,
"permissions": 0,
"supply-chain": 0,
"network": 0,
"hygiene": 0
},
"vector": [
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "capability-exposure",
"level": "high",
"label": "capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated",
"appliedPenalty": 6
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "coverage-honesty",
"level": "live",
"label": "inspection depth (live) — how much of the target the scan could see",
"appliedPenalty": 0
}
],
"gatesFired": [],
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"capability": {
"level": "high",
"reasons": [
"ingests untrusted external content (a prompt-injection entry point)",
"can send data / act on an external service",
"reads sensitive or local data",
"has a read → egress path (a data-exfiltration surface)",
"untrusted-input, sensitive-source and egress co-exist across tools (toxic-flow surface)"
],
"tags": [
"external-sink",
"sensitive-source",
"untrusted-input"
]
},
"coverage": {
"level": "live",
"inputs": {
"toolSurface": true,
"implementationSource": false,
"packageMetadata": false,
"liveTransport": true
},
"caveats": []
},
"findings": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-FLOW-002",
"title": "Completed toxic-flow trifecta across tools",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "critical",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "This server (without client built-ins) exposes a complete data-exfiltration chain: webhook_list → webhook_create → stat_get. Untrusted input is ingested, private data is read, and it can be sent to an external sink via the agent composing the tools (→). Static analysis proves the primitive exists, not that a specific run will occur.",
"remediation": "Remove one leg of the trifecta: isolate untrusted-input tools from secret-reading tools and from egress tools, or require human approval between them.",
"location": {
"kind": "flow",
"name": "webhook_list → webhook_create → stat_get"
},
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"references": [],
"data": {
"untrusted": [
"webhook_list"
],
"sources": [
"webhook_create"
],
"sinks": [
"stat_get",
"webhook_create",
"webhook_delete"
],
"path": [
"webhook_list",
"webhook_create",
"stat_get"
],
"edges": [
{
"from": "webhook_list",
"to": "webhook_create",
"kind": "agent-mediated"
},
{
"from": "webhook_create",
"to": "stat_get",
"kind": "agent-mediated"
}
],
"wired": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-FLOW-003",
"title": "Read-and-egress in one tool: \"webhook_create\"",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "Tool \"webhook_create\" can both read sensitive data and send data to an external destination. Even without an explicit untrusted-input leg, this is a single-call data-exfiltration path if the model is ever manipulated.",
"remediation": "Separate reading from sending; require explicit user confirmation before egress of file/secret contents.",
"location": {
"kind": "flow",
"name": "webhook_create"
},
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"references": [],
"data": {
"tags": [
"external-sink",
"sensitive-source"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-004",
"title": "Open-world tool \"webhook_create\" also reads sensitive data",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"webhook_create\" declares openWorldHint=true — it interacts with entities outside the trust boundary — while also reading sensitive data. That combination is a canonical lethal-trifecta indicator.",
"remediation": "Separate outward-facing tools from sensitive-data reads; require confirmation between them.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "webhook_create"
},
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"tags": [
"external-sink",
"sensitive-source"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-NET-005",
"title": "Remote HTTP MCP endpoint",
"category": "network",
"severity": "info",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "Remote endpoint mcp.eztexting.com. MCP Trust Checker does not test server-side authentication/authorization; verify the endpoint requires auth.",
"location": {
"kind": "transport"
}
}
],
"toxicFlows": [
{
"id": "flow-1",
"severity": "critical",
"confidence": "strong",
"untrustedInput": [
"webhook_list"
],
"sensitiveSource": [
"webhook_create"
],
"externalSink": [
"stat_get",
"webhook_create",
"webhook_delete"
],
"selfContained": false,
"path": [
"webhook_list",
"webhook_create",
"stat_get"
],
"pathWired": false,
"description": "A cross-tool exfiltration chain exists: webhook_list → webhook_create → stat_get."
},
{
"id": "flow-2",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"untrustedInput": [],
"sensitiveSource": [
"webhook_create"
],
"externalSink": [
"webhook_create"
],
"selfContained": true,
"description": "Tool \"webhook_create\" both reads sensitive data and can send it externally."
}
],
"capabilities": [
{
"tool": "account_details",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "buy_credits",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "phone_number_list",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "stat_get",
"tags": [
"external-sink"
],
"reasons": {
"external-sink": [
"keyword \"sms\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "webhook_create",
"tags": [
"external-sink",
"sensitive-source"
],
"reasons": {
"external-sink": [
"keyword \"webhook\""
],
"sensitive-source": [
"parameter \"secret\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "webhook_delete",
"tags": [
"external-sink"
],
"reasons": {
"external-sink": [
"keyword \"webhook\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "webhook_list",
"tags": [
"untrusted-input"
],
"reasons": {
"untrusted-input": [
"keyword \"fetch\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "keyword_list",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
}
],
"surfaceDigest": "cbc80a15550b50797452c8355c7c7f732a8d05626bdd02dd5f4a3ce62203850c",
"stats": {
"tools": 8,
"prompts": 0,
"resources": 0,
"findingsBySeverity": {
"critical": 1,
"high": 1,
"medium": 1,
"low": 0,
"info": 1
}
}
}