Mcp (mcp.eztexting.com) MCP Server
https://mcp.eztexting.com/mcp/admin
Remote
v1.0
Published by mcp.eztexting.com — no publish provenance and no public repository, so the publisher could not be verified and the source cannot be independently located.
Official EZTexting MCP server: SMS/MMS messaging, contacts, workflows, and account administration.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 6 = 94. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 3
critical Completed toxic-flow trifecta across toolsMTC-FLOW-002
This server (without client built-ins) exposes a complete data-exfiltration chain: webhook_list → webhook_create → stat_get. Untrusted input is ingested, private data is read, and it can be sent to an external sink via the agent composing the tools (→). Static analysis proves the primitive exists, not that a specific run will occur.
Fix: Remove one leg of the trifecta: isolate untrusted-input tools from secret-reading tools and from egress tools, or require human approval between them.
Location: flow webhook_list → webhook_create → stat_get
high Read-and-egress in one tool: "webhook_create"MTC-FLOW-003
Tool "webhook_create" can both read sensitive data and send data to an external destination. Even without an explicit untrusted-input leg, this is a single-call data-exfiltration path if the model is ever manipulated.
Fix: Separate reading from sending; require explicit user confirmation before egress of file/secret contents.
Location: flow webhook_create
medium Open-world tool "webhook_create" also reads sensitive dataMTC-CAP-004
Tool "webhook_create" declares openWorldHint=true — it interacts with entities outside the trust boundary — while also reading sensitive data. That combination is a canonical lethal-trifecta indicator.
Fix: Separate outward-facing tools from sensitive-data reads; require confirmation between them.
Location: tool webhook_create
Tools 8
Each tool and what it can reach — enumerated from the running server.
webhook_createnetwork egressreads sensitive datastat_getnetwork egresswebhook_deletenetwork egresswebhook_listingests untrusted inputaccount_detailsno sensitive capabilitybuy_creditsno sensitive capabilitykeyword_listno sensitive capabilityphone_number_listno sensitive capability
Toxic flows 2
Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.0 latest |
A 94/100 | 3 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-06 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan https://mcp.eztexting.com/mcp/admin --onlineOther implementations of Mcp 4
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