Conductor (npm) MCP Server
mcp-conductor
npm
v1.0.16
Published by an unidentified publisher — no publish provenance and no public repository, so the publisher could not be verified and the source cannot be independently located.
A Node.js testing library for Model Context Protocol (MCP) servers
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 8 = 92. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −2 | publisher verification (unlinked) — no provenance/repo link, but the shipped source was fully read |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 8
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/cli/commands/init.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/cli/commands/init.js:9`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: import { spawn } from 'child_process'; const __filename = fileURLToPath(import.meta.url); const __dirname = dirname(__
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/cli/commands/init.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/core/ProcessManager.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/core/ProcessManager.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: import { spawn } from 'child_process'; import { EventEmitter } from 'events'; /** * ProcessManager handles the lifecy
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/core/ProcessManager.js
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (examples/server-tests-that-fail/run-failing-tests.mjs)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`examples/server-tests-that-fail/run-failing-tests.mjs:10`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: import { spawn } from 'child_process'; import process from 'process'; const DEBUG = process.env.FAILING_SUITES_DEBUG ==
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server examples/server-tests-that-fail/run-failing-tests.mjs
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (test/cli/cli.test.js)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`test/cli/cli.test.js:3`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: import { spawn } from 'child_process'; import { writeFile, unlink, mkdir } from 'fs/promises'; import { join } from 'pa
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server test/cli/cli.test.js
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (test/cli/init.test.js)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`test/cli/init.test.js:3`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ort { exec } from 'node:child_process'; import { promisify } from 'node:util'; import { existsSync, rmSync, mkdirSync, w
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server test/cli/init.test.js
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (test/engine/testRunner.test.js)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`test/engine/testRunner.test.js:271`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: import { spawn } from 'child_process'; class PatternTestServer { constructor() { this.initialized = false; }
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server test/engine/testRunner.test.js
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (test/fixtures/runner/pattern-test-server.js)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`test/fixtures/runner/pattern-test-server.js:3`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: import { spawn } from 'child_process'; class PatternTestServer { constructor() { this.initialized = false; }
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server test/fixtures/runner/pattern-test-server.js
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (test/helpers.js)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`test/helpers.js:33`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: import { spawn } from 'child_process'; class MinimalMCPServer { constructor() { this.initialized = false; }
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server test/helpers.js
What this scan could not see
- No tools were enumerated, so prompt-injection, capability and toxic-flow analysis had no tool surface to inspect. To grade a package’s real runtime tools, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.0.16 latest |
A 92/100 | 8 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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