Conductor (darkiceinteractive) MCP Server
@darkiceinteractive/mcp-conductor
npm
v3.1.1
Published by @darkiceinteractive — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
MCP server that orchestrates code execution in a sandboxed Deno environment with access to all MCP servers
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 15
high Tool "execute_code" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "execute_code" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "execute code" in tool name). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool execute_code
high Tool "add_server" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "add_server" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (parameter "command"). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool add_server
high Tool "update_server" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "update_server" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (parameter "command"). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool update_server
high Dynamic code execution in server code (dist/runtime/pool/worker.js)MTC-SRC-001
In the server's implementation (`dist/runtime/pool/worker.js:93`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: scope const __fn = new Function('mcp', '__ctx', \`return (async () => { \${job.code} })()\`); result = await __
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/runtime/pool/worker.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/cli/daemon.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/cli/daemon.js:30`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: rt { spawn } from 'node:child_process'; import { DaemonClient } from '../daemon/client.js'; // -------------------------
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/cli/daemon.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/daemon/discovery.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/daemon/discovery.js:17`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { execFile } from 'node:child_process'; import { logger } from '../utils/logger.js'; /** * Runs the Tailscale CLI and r
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/daemon/discovery.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/runtime/executor.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/runtime/executor.js:6`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: rt { spawn } from 'node:child_process'; import { writeFileSync, unlinkSync, mkdirSync, existsSync, readdirSync, statSync
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/runtime/executor.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/runtime/pool/worker.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/runtime/pool/worker.js:15`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: rt { spawn } from 'node:child_process'; import { writeFileSync, unlinkSync } from 'node:fs'; import { join } from 'node:
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/runtime/pool/worker.js
medium Untrusted input can drive an external actionMTC-FLOW-005
Untrusted-input tools ([brave_web_search]) co-exist with external-action tools ([execute_code, add_server, update_server, export_to_claude]). A prompt injection could cause unwanted external actions, though no direct sensitive-data leak path was found.
Evidence: untrusted [brave_web_search] → sinks [execute_code, add_server, update_server, export_to_claude]
Fix: Require confirmation for state-changing/egress actions triggered after processing untrusted content.
Location: flow brave_web_search → execute_code
medium Unconstrained command parameter "code" on "execute_code"MTC-CAP-006
Tool "execute_code" takes a command-shaped parameter "code" with no enum/pattern constraint. Free-form, model- or attacker-controlled arguments reaching a shell is the command-injection precondition.
Fix: Constrain the parameter (enum/pattern), or build the command from a fixed template with escaped args.
Location: tool execute_code · inputSchema.properties.code
medium Unconstrained command parameter "command" on "add_server"MTC-CAP-006
Tool "add_server" takes a command-shaped parameter "command" with no enum/pattern constraint. Free-form, model- or attacker-controlled arguments reaching a shell is the command-injection precondition.
Fix: Constrain the parameter (enum/pattern), or build the command from a fixed template with escaped args.
Location: tool add_server · inputSchema.properties.command
medium Unconstrained command parameter "command" on "update_server"MTC-CAP-006
Tool "update_server" takes a command-shaped parameter "command" with no enum/pattern constraint. Free-form, model- or attacker-controlled arguments reaching a shell is the command-injection precondition.
Fix: Constrain the parameter (enum/pattern), or build the command from a fixed template with escaped args.
Location: tool update_server · inputSchema.properties.command
low Mutating tool "execute_code" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "execute_code" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool execute_code
low Mutating tool "add_server" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "add_server" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool add_server
low Mutating tool "update_server" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "update_server" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool update_server
Tools 24
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
add_serverruns code / shellbrave_web_searchingests untrusted inputexecute_coderuns code / shellexport_to_claudenetwork egressupdate_serverruns code / shellcompare_modesno sensitive capabilitydiagnose_serverno sensitive capabilitydiscover_toolsno sensitive capabilityget_capabilitiesno sensitive capabilityget_hot_pathsno sensitive capability
Show 14 more tools ↓
get_memory_statsno sensitive capabilityget_metricsno sensitive capabilityimport_servers_from_claudeno sensitive capabilitylist_serversno sensitive capabilitypassthrough_callno sensitive capabilitypredict_costno sensitive capabilityrecommend_routingno sensitive capabilityrecord_sessionno sensitive capabilityreload_serversno sensitive capabilityremove_serverno sensitive capabilityreplay_sessionno sensitive capabilityset_modeno sensitive capabilitystop_recordingno sensitive capabilitytest_serverno sensitive capability
Toxic flows 1
Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (24 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v3.1.1 latest |
A 93/100 | 15 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan @darkiceinteractive/mcp-conductor --onlineOther implementations of Conductor 4
Independent packages implementing the same tool, scanned with the same engine. Compare all 5 side by side →
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