Atlassian (Jira & Confluence) — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.13.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.
{
"tool": {
"name": "mcptrustchecker",
"version": "1.13.0",
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"target": {
"id": "mcp-atlassian",
"source": {
"kind": "package",
"origin": "mcp-atlassian"
},
"server": {
"name": "mcp-atlassian"
}
},
"grade": "A",
"score": {
"score": 95,
"threatScore": 100,
"grade": "A",
"band": "A",
"categorySubtotals": {
"injection": 0,
"exfiltration": 0,
"permissions": 0,
"supply-chain": 0,
"network": 0,
"hygiene": 0
},
"vector": [
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "capability-exposure",
"level": "moderate",
"label": "capability blast radius (moderate) — client exposure if the model is manipulated",
"appliedPenalty": 3
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "verification-discount",
"level": "none",
"label": "publisher verification (unlinked) — no provenance/repo link, but the shipped source was fully read",
"appliedPenalty": 2
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "coverage-honesty",
"level": "source",
"label": "inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see",
"appliedPenalty": 0
}
],
"gatesFired": [],
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"capability": {
"level": "moderate",
"reasons": [
"ingests untrusted external content (a prompt-injection entry point)"
],
"tags": [
"untrusted-input"
]
},
"coverage": {
"level": "source",
"inputs": {
"toolSurface": true,
"implementationSource": true,
"packageMetadata": true,
"liveTransport": false
},
"caveats": [
"Tools were statically extracted from the published source (57 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
]
},
"findings": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-006",
"title": "Reads a sensitive credential path or dumps the environment in packaging/dev tooling (tests/unit/confluence/test_client.py)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/unit/confluence/test_client.py:338`): Reading private keys / cloud credentials, or serializing the whole environment, is a sensitive-data source that becomes exfiltration when combined with any egress. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "tests/unit/confluence/test_client.py"
},
"evidence": "les trust_env to prevent .netrc override (#860).\"\"\" with ( patch(\"mcp_atlassian.confluence.client.Confluence",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-006",
"file": "tests/unit/confluence/test_client.py",
"line": 338,
"nonRuntime": true
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-006",
"title": "Reads a sensitive credential path or dumps the environment in packaging/dev tooling (tests/unit/jira/test_client.py)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/unit/jira/test_client.py:447`): Reading private keys / cloud credentials, or serializing the whole environment, is a sensitive-data source that becomes exfiltration when combined with any egress. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "tests/unit/jira/test_client.py"
},
"evidence": "les trust_env to prevent .netrc override (#860).\"\"\" with ( patch(\"mcp_atlassian.jira.client.Jira\") as mock_j",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-006",
"file": "tests/unit/jira/test_client.py",
"line": 447,
"nonRuntime": true
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/unit/jira/test_attachments.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/unit/jira/test_attachments.py:1391`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "tests/unit/jira/test_attachments.py"
},
"evidence": "n_value = [b\"import os; os.system('id')\\n\"] mock_response.raise_for_status = MagicMock() attachments_mix",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "tests/unit/jira/test_attachments.py",
"line": 1391,
"nonRuntime": true
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/unit/test_stdin_monitoring_fix.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/unit/test_stdin_monitoring_fix.py:42`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "tests/unit/test_stdin_monitoring_fix.py"
},
"evidence": "pt result = subprocess.run( [sys.executable, test_script], capture_output=Tr",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "tests/unit/test_stdin_monitoring_fix.py",
"line": 42,
"nonRuntime": true
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/unit/test_stdio_lifecycle.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/unit/test_stdio_lifecycle.py:34`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "tests/unit/test_stdio_lifecycle.py"
},
"evidence": "} ) result = subprocess.run( [\"uv\", \"run\", \"--frozen\", \"mcp-atlassian\"], input=_build_probe_p",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "tests/unit/test_stdio_lifecycle.py",
"line": 34,
"nonRuntime": true
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SUP-012",
"title": "Package has no license",
"category": "hygiene",
"severity": "info",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "\"mcp-atlassian\" has no declared license. This is a legal/reuse concern, not a security finding.",
"location": {
"kind": "package",
"name": "mcp-atlassian"
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SUP-011",
"title": "Package declares no source repository",
"category": "supply-chain",
"severity": "info",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "\"mcp-atlassian\" declares no repository URL, so its published artifact cannot be compared against reviewable source.",
"remediation": "Prefer packages that link to public, reviewable source.",
"location": {
"kind": "package",
"name": "mcp-atlassian"
}
}
],
"toxicFlows": [],
"capabilities": [
{
"tool": "search",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_page",
"tags": [
"untrusted-input"
],
"reasons": {
"untrusted-input": [
"keyword \"get_page\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "get_page_children",
"tags": [
"untrusted-input"
],
"reasons": {
"untrusted-input": [
"keyword \"get_page\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "get_space_page_tree",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_comments",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_labels",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_inline_comments",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "search_user",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_page_history",
"tags": [
"untrusted-input"
],
"reasons": {
"untrusted-input": [
"keyword \"get_page\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "get_page_diff",
"tags": [
"untrusted-input"
],
"reasons": {
"untrusted-input": [
"keyword \"get_page\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "get_page_views",
"tags": [
"untrusted-input"
],
"reasons": {
"untrusted-input": [
"keyword \"get_page\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "get_attachments",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "download_attachment",
"tags": [
"untrusted-input"
],
"reasons": {
"untrusted-input": [
"keyword \"download\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "download_content_attachments",
"tags": [
"untrusted-input"
],
"reasons": {
"untrusted-input": [
"keyword \"download\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "get_page_images",
"tags": [
"untrusted-input"
],
"reasons": {
"untrusted-input": [
"keyword \"get_page\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "list_page_templates",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_page_template",
"tags": [
"untrusted-input"
],
"reasons": {
"untrusted-input": [
"keyword \"get_page\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "get_page_restrictions",
"tags": [
"untrusted-input"
],
"reasons": {
"untrusted-input": [
"keyword \"get_page\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "check_content_permissions",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_space_permissions",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_user_profile",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "search_assignable_users",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_issue_watchers",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_issue",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "search_fields",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_field_options",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_project_issues",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_transitions",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_worklog",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "download_attachments",
"tags": [
"untrusted-input"
],
"reasons": {
"untrusted-input": [
"keyword \"download\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "get_issue_images",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_agile_boards",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_board_issues",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_sprints_from_board",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_sprint_issues",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_link_types",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "batch_get_changelogs",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_project_issue_types",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_create_fields",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_project_versions",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_project_components",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_all_projects",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "search_projects",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_project_fields",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_service_desk_for_project",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_service_desk_queues",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_queue_issues",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_request_types",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_request_type_fields",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_issue_proforma_forms",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_proforma_form_details",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_issue_dates",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_issue_sla",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_issue_development_info",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_issues_development_info",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_project_epic_hierarchy",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_cross_project_dependencies",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
}
],
"surfaceDigest": "f94799d68c37bc30faea710338ed4747d4fcb3d0b8b9ebbf83159743110cf117",
"stats": {
"tools": 57,
"prompts": 0,
"resources": 0,
"findingsBySeverity": {
"critical": 0,
"high": 0,
"medium": 0,
"low": 5,
"info": 2
}
}
}