Atlassian (Jira & Confluence) (PyPI) MCP Server
mcp-atlassian
PyPI
v0.23.1
Published by an unidentified publisher — no publish provenance and no public repository, so the publisher could not be verified and the source cannot be independently located.
Community Atlassian server: Jira issues and Confluence pages over MCP.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 5 = 95. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −3 | capability blast radius (moderate) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −2 | publisher verification (unlinked) — no provenance/repo link, but the shipped source was fully read |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 5
low Reads a sensitive credential path or dumps the environment in packaging/dev tooling (tests/unit/confluence/test_client.py)MTC-SRC-006
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/unit/confluence/test_client.py:338`): Reading private keys / cloud credentials, or serializing the whole environment, is a sensitive-data source that becomes exfiltration when combined with any egress. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: les trust_env to prevent .netrc override (#860).""" with ( patch("mcp_atlassian.confluence.client.Confluence
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/unit/confluence/test_client.py
low Reads a sensitive credential path or dumps the environment in packaging/dev tooling (tests/unit/jira/test_client.py)MTC-SRC-006
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/unit/jira/test_client.py:447`): Reading private keys / cloud credentials, or serializing the whole environment, is a sensitive-data source that becomes exfiltration when combined with any egress. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: les trust_env to prevent .netrc override (#860).""" with ( patch("mcp_atlassian.jira.client.Jira") as mock_j
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/unit/jira/test_client.py
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/unit/jira/test_attachments.py)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/unit/jira/test_attachments.py:1391`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: n_value = [b"import os; os.system('id')\n"] mock_response.raise_for_status = MagicMock() attachments_mix
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/unit/jira/test_attachments.py
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/unit/test_stdin_monitoring_fix.py)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/unit/test_stdin_monitoring_fix.py:42`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: pt result = subprocess.run( [sys.executable, test_script], capture_output=Tr
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/unit/test_stdin_monitoring_fix.py
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/unit/test_stdio_lifecycle.py)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/unit/test_stdio_lifecycle.py:34`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: } ) result = subprocess.run( ["uv", "run", "--frozen", "mcp-atlassian"], input=_build_probe_p
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/unit/test_stdio_lifecycle.py
Tools 57
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
download_attachmentingests untrusted inputdownload_attachmentsingests untrusted inputdownload_content_attachmentsingests untrusted inputget_pageingests untrusted inputget_page_childreningests untrusted inputget_page_diffingests untrusted inputget_page_historyingests untrusted inputget_page_imagesingests untrusted inputget_page_restrictionsingests untrusted inputget_page_templateingests untrusted input
Show 47 more tools ↓
get_page_viewsingests untrusted inputbatch_get_changelogsno sensitive capabilitycheck_content_permissionsno sensitive capabilityget_agile_boardsno sensitive capabilityget_all_projectsno sensitive capabilityget_attachmentsno sensitive capabilityget_board_issuesno sensitive capabilityget_commentsno sensitive capabilityget_create_fieldsno sensitive capabilityget_cross_project_dependenciesno sensitive capabilityget_field_optionsno sensitive capabilityget_inline_commentsno sensitive capabilityget_issueno sensitive capabilityget_issue_datesno sensitive capabilityget_issue_development_infono sensitive capabilityget_issue_imagesno sensitive capabilityget_issue_proforma_formsno sensitive capabilityget_issue_slano sensitive capabilityget_issue_watchersno sensitive capabilityget_issues_development_infono sensitive capabilityget_labelsno sensitive capabilityget_link_typesno sensitive capabilityget_proforma_form_detailsno sensitive capabilityget_project_componentsno sensitive capabilityget_project_epic_hierarchyno sensitive capabilityget_project_fieldsno sensitive capabilityget_project_issue_typesno sensitive capabilityget_project_issuesno sensitive capabilityget_project_versionsno sensitive capabilityget_queue_issuesno sensitive capabilityget_request_type_fieldsno sensitive capabilityget_request_typesno sensitive capabilityget_service_desk_for_projectno sensitive capabilityget_service_desk_queuesno sensitive capabilityget_space_page_treeno sensitive capabilityget_space_permissionsno sensitive capabilityget_sprint_issuesno sensitive capabilityget_sprints_from_boardno sensitive capabilityget_transitionsno sensitive capabilityget_user_profileno sensitive capabilityget_worklogno sensitive capabilitylist_page_templatesno sensitive capabilitysearchno sensitive capabilitysearch_assignable_usersno sensitive capabilitysearch_fieldsno sensitive capabilitysearch_projectsno sensitive capabilitysearch_userno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (57 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 2
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.23.1 latest |
A 95/100 | 5 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-25 |
v0.23.0 |
A 95/100 | 5 | 1.12.1 | 2026-07-27 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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