Maya (chadrik) MCP Server
maya-mcp-server
PyPI
v0.1.0
Published by chadrik — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
MCP server for interacting with Autodesk Maya sessions
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 8
high Tool "execute_code" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "execute_code" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "execute code" in tool name). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool execute_code
high Dynamic code execution in server code (src/maya_mcp_server/maya_mcp_helper.py)MTC-SRC-001
In the server's implementation (`src/maya_mcp_server/maya_mcp_helper.py:188`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ) exec(compile(modified_code, "<mcp>", "exec"), context) if was_modified: resu
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/maya_mcp_server/maya_mcp_helper.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/maya_mcp_server/bootstrap.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/maya_mcp_server/bootstrap.py:24`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ust be executed via exec(code, globals()) to persist definitions in Maya's global namespace. Returns: P
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/maya_mcp_server/bootstrap.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/maya_mcp_server/client.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/maya_mcp_server/client.py:466`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: bootstrap_cmd = f"exec({bootstrap_code!r}, globals())" await self._send_receive(bootstrap_cmd) # W
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/maya_mcp_server/client.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/maya_mcp_server/maya_bootstrap.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/maya_mcp_server/maya_bootstrap.py:7`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: e code is executed via: exec(open(__file__).read(), globals()) """ def create_module(name: str, code: str, overwrite:
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/maya_mcp_server/maya_bootstrap.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/maya_mcp_server/maya_mcp_helper.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/maya_mcp_server/maya_mcp_helper.py:188`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ) exec(compile(modified_code, "<mcp>", "exec"), context) if was_modified: resu
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/maya_mcp_server/maya_mcp_helper.py
low Mutating tool "execute_code" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "execute_code" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool execute_code
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_prepare_code.py)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_prepare_code.py:438`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: namespace = {} exec(transformed_code, namespace) assert namespace["_mcp_result"] == 2 def test_tr
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/test_prepare_code.py
Tools 4
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
execute_coderuns code / shelladd_sessionno sensitive capabilitylist_sessionsno sensitive capabilitywrite_moduleno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (4 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.1.0 latest |
A 93/100 | 8 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-25 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan maya-mcp-server --online --registry pypiOther implementations of Maya 2
Independent packages implementing the same tool, scanned with the same engine. Compare all 3 side by side →
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