Magic Api MCP Server
magic-api-mcp-server
PyPI
v0.1.7
Published by dwsy — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
Magic-API MCP Server - A Model Context Protocol server for Magic-API development
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 2
high Shell/command execution in server code (magicapi_tools/utils/ws.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`magicapi_tools/utils/ws.py:784`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ss result = subprocess.run([ sys.executable, extract_script, '--url', 'http:
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server magicapi_tools/utils/ws.py
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (test/test_docker.py)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`test/test_docker.py:22`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: try: result = subprocess.run(cmd, capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=30) if result.returncode ==
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server test/test_docker.py
Tools 57
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
call_magic_apino sensitive capabilitycall_magic_api_with_debugno sensitive capabilitycopy_resourceno sensitive capabilitycreate_full_backupno sensitive capabilitydelete_resourceno sensitive capabilityexecute_debug_sessionno sensitive capabilityexport_resource_treeno sensitive capabilitygenerate_api_from_exampleno sensitive capabilitygenerate_crud_apino sensitive capabilitygenerate_database_queryno sensitive capability
Show 47 more tools ↓
generate_error_handlingno sensitive capabilitygenerate_lambda_operationsno sensitive capabilitygenerate_transaction_codeno sensitive capabilityget_api_details_by_pathno sensitive capabilityget_assistant_metadatano sensitive capabilityget_backup_contentno sensitive capabilityget_backup_historyno sensitive capabilityget_best_practicesno sensitive capabilityget_common_pitfallsno sensitive capabilityget_debug_statusno sensitive capabilityget_development_workflowno sensitive capabilityget_documentationno sensitive capabilityget_examplesno sensitive capabilityget_full_magic_script_syntaxno sensitive capabilityget_knowledge_overviewno sensitive capabilityget_latest_breakpoint_statusno sensitive capabilityget_magic_api_class_detailsno sensitive capabilityget_magic_api_docsno sensitive capabilityget_magic_script_examplesno sensitive capabilityget_magic_script_syntaxno sensitive capabilityget_practices_guideno sensitive capabilityget_resource_statisticsno sensitive capabilityget_resource_treeno sensitive capabilityget_websocket_statusno sensitive capabilityinspect_ws_environmentsno sensitive capabilitylist_backupsno sensitive capabilitylist_breakpointsno sensitive capabilitylist_magic_api_classesno sensitive capabilitylist_resource_groupsno sensitive capabilitymove_resourceno sensitive capabilityread_set_lock_statusno sensitive capabilityremove_breakpointno sensitive capabilityreplace_api_scriptno sensitive capabilityresume_from_breakpointno sensitive capabilityrollback_backupno sensitive capabilitysave_api_endpointno sensitive capabilitysave_groupno sensitive capabilitysearch_api_endpointsno sensitive capabilitysearch_api_scriptsno sensitive capabilitysearch_knowledgeno sensitive capabilitysearch_magic_api_classesno sensitive capabilitysearch_magic_api_classes_txtno sensitive capabilitysearch_todo_commentsno sensitive capabilityset_breakpointno sensitive capabilitystep_into_breakpointno sensitive capabilitystep_out_breakpointno sensitive capabilitystep_over_breakpointno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (57 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.1.7 latest |
A 93/100 | 2 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-25 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan magic-api-mcp-server --online --registry pypiMore in API Development
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