M3 Memory — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.13.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.
{
"tool": {
"name": "mcptrustchecker",
"version": "1.13.0",
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"target": {
"id": "m3-memory",
"source": {
"kind": "package",
"origin": "m3-memory"
},
"server": {
"name": "m3-memory"
}
},
"grade": "A",
"score": {
"score": 93,
"threatScore": 100,
"grade": "A",
"band": "A",
"categorySubtotals": {
"injection": 0,
"exfiltration": 0,
"permissions": 0,
"supply-chain": 0,
"network": 0,
"hygiene": 0
},
"vector": [
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "capability-exposure",
"level": "high",
"label": "capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated",
"appliedPenalty": 6
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "verification-discount",
"level": "repo",
"label": "publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable",
"appliedPenalty": 1
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "coverage-honesty",
"level": "source",
"label": "inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see",
"appliedPenalty": 0
}
],
"gatesFired": [],
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"capability": {
"level": "high",
"reasons": [
"ingests untrusted external content (a prompt-injection entry point)",
"can execute shell commands or code"
],
"tags": [
"untrusted-input",
"code-exec"
]
},
"coverage": {
"level": "source",
"inputs": {
"toolSurface": true,
"implementationSource": true,
"packageMetadata": true,
"liveTransport": false
},
"caveats": [
"Tools were statically extracted from the published source (46 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
]
},
"findings": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (bin/_task_runtime.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`bin/_task_runtime.py:48`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "bin/_task_runtime.py"
},
"evidence": "rypoint makes: subprocess.run([...], **no_window_kwargs()) On POSIX this is an empty dict (CREATE_NO_WINDO",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "bin/_task_runtime.py",
"line": 48,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (bin/aider_patch.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`bin/aider_patch.py:31`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "bin/aider_patch.py"
},
"evidence": "try: branch = subprocess.check_output( ['git', 'branch', '--show-current'], stderr=sub",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "bin/aider_patch.py",
"line": 31,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (bin/auth_utils.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`bin/auth_utils.py:118`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "bin/auth_utils.py"
},
"evidence": "y: result = subprocess.run( [\"security\", \"find-generic-password\", \"-s\", \"AGENT_OS_MASTER_KEY",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "bin/auth_utils.py",
"line": 118,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (bin/chatlog_init.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`bin/chatlog_init.py:238`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "bin/chatlog_init.py"
},
"evidence": "try: result = subprocess.run( [sys.executable, migrate_script, \"up\", \"--target\", \"chatlog\", \"-y\"],",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "bin/chatlog_init.py",
"line": 238,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (bin/chatlog_status.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`bin/chatlog_status.py:769`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "bin/chatlog_status.py"
},
"evidence": "try: result = subprocess.run(cmd, env=env, shell=False) print(\"=\" * 80) print(f\"Command finish",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "bin/chatlog_status.py",
"line": 769,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (bin/check_control_chars.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`bin/check_control_chars.py:68`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "bin/check_control_chars.py"
},
"evidence": "try: out = subprocess.run( [\"git\", \"diff\", \"--cached\", \"--name-only\", \"--diff-filter=ACMR\"],",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "bin/check_control_chars.py",
"line": 68,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (bin/check_tool_catalog_drift.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`bin/check_tool_catalog_drift.py:66`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "bin/check_tool_catalog_drift.py"
},
"evidence": "tr]) -> int: return subprocess.run(cmd, cwd=_ROOT).returncode def _regenerate() -> bool: \"\"\"Run all generators",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "bin/check_tool_catalog_drift.py",
"line": 66,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (bin/dashboard_server.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`bin/dashboard_server.py:2591`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "bin/dashboard_server.py"
},
"evidence": "w_kwargs proc = subprocess.Popen( cmd, env=env, stdout=log_file_handle,",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "bin/dashboard_server.py",
"line": 2591,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (bin/deep_sync.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`bin/deep_sync.py:29`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "bin/deep_sync.py"
},
"evidence": "up_script): subprocess.run([cleanup_script], check=True, stdout=subprocess.DEVNULL) logger.info(",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "bin/deep_sync.py",
"line": 29,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (bin/doctor/claude_mcp_probe.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`bin/doctor/claude_mcp_probe.py:168`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "bin/doctor/claude_mcp_probe.py"
},
"evidence": "try: proc = subprocess.run( [\"claude\", \"mcp\", \"remove\", \"--scope\", \"user\", name], ch",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "bin/doctor/claude_mcp_probe.py",
"line": 168,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-005",
"title": "Dynamic module load from a non-literal (bin/mem0_scan.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`bin/mem0_scan.py:270`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "bin/mem0_scan.py"
},
"evidence": "f\"{totals['import']} import(s) · {totals['drop-in']} drop-in call(s) · \" f\"{totals['mapped']} mapped · {total",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-005",
"file": "bin/mem0_scan.py",
"line": 270,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-005",
"title": "Dynamic module load from a non-literal (m3_memory/cli.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`m3_memory/cli.py:601`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "m3_memory/cli.py"
},
"evidence": "try: __import__(mod) except ModuleNotFoundError: missing.append(mod)",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-005",
"file": "m3_memory/cli.py",
"line": 601,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-005",
"title": "Dynamic module load from a non-literal (m3_memory/installer.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`m3_memory/installer.py:754`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "m3_memory/installer.py"
},
"evidence": "try: __import__(mod) except ModuleNotFoundError: return False return True d",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-005",
"file": "m3_memory/installer.py",
"line": 754,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-005",
"title": "Dynamic module load from a non-literal (m3_memory/setup_wizard.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`m3_memory/setup_wizard.py:2488`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "m3_memory/setup_wizard.py"
},
"evidence": "try: __import__(mod) except ModuleNotFoundError: have = False break",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-005",
"file": "m3_memory/setup_wizard.py",
"line": 2488,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SUP-012",
"title": "Package has no license",
"category": "hygiene",
"severity": "info",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "\"m3-memory\" has no declared license. This is a legal/reuse concern, not a security finding.",
"location": {
"kind": "package",
"name": "m3-memory"
}
}
],
"toxicFlows": [],
"capabilities": [
{
"tool": "log_activity",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "update_focus",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "retire_focus",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "check_thermal_load",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "query_decisions",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "web_search",
"tags": [
"untrusted-input"
],
"reasons": {
"untrusted-input": [
"keyword \"web_search\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "m3_web_search",
"tags": [
"untrusted-input"
],
"reasons": {
"untrusted-input": [
"keyword \"web_search\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "grok_ask",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "query_local_model",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "debug_analyze",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "debug_trace",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "debug_bisect",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "debug_correlate",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "debug_history",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "debug_report",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "files_ingest",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "files_index",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "files_search",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "files_get",
"tags": [
"untrusted-input"
],
"reasons": {
"untrusted-input": [
"keyword \"fetch\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "files_stats",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "files_health",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "files_extract_pending",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "files_promote",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "files_promotion_list",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "files_promotable",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "files_dedup",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "files_dedup_list",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "files_dedup_review",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "files_entity_coalesce",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "files_entity_coalesce_list",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "files_entity_coalesce_review",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "files_entity_coalesce_apply",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "files_entity_coalesce_unapply",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "files_staleness_review",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "files_link_rename",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "files_corpus_create",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "files_corpus_list",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "files_corpus_get",
"tags": [
"untrusted-input"
],
"reasons": {
"untrusted-input": [
"keyword \"fetch\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "files_corpus_set",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "files_corpus_delete",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "files_watch_once",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_news_headlines",
"tags": [
"untrusted-input"
],
"reasons": {
"untrusted-input": [
"keyword \"fetch\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "save_handoff",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "remember",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "recall",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "forget",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
}
],
"surfaceDigest": "7d2b73a7b9e2aa63c552dc9e493db56f2cabbe4c70d85877522edd5b65b7ab0c",
"stats": {
"tools": 46,
"prompts": 0,
"resources": 0,
"findingsBySeverity": {
"critical": 0,
"high": 10,
"medium": 4,
"low": 0,
"info": 1
}
}
}