M3 Memory MCP Server
m3-memory
PyPI
v2026.7.23.0
Published by skynetcmd — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 11 = 89. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −10 | capability blast radius (critical) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
| ✓ | inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 16
high Reads a sensitive credential path or dumps the environment (bin/dashboard_server.py)MTC-SRC-006
In the server's implementation (`bin/dashboard_server.py:2692`): Reading private keys / cloud credentials, or serializing the whole environment, is a sensitive-data source that becomes exfiltration when combined with any egress. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: dict(os.environ)
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server bin/dashboard_server.py
high Reads a sensitive credential path or dumps the environment (m3_memory/installer.py)MTC-SRC-006
In the server's implementation (`m3_memory/installer.py:1078`): Reading private keys / cloud credentials, or serializing the whole environment, is a sensitive-data source that becomes exfiltration when combined with any egress. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: dict(os.environ)
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server m3_memory/installer.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (bin/_task_runtime.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`bin/_task_runtime.py:48`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: subprocess.run(
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server bin/_task_runtime.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (bin/aider_patch.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`bin/aider_patch.py:31`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: subprocess.check_output(
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server bin/aider_patch.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (bin/auth_utils.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`bin/auth_utils.py:118`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: subprocess.run(
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server bin/auth_utils.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (bin/chatlog_init.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`bin/chatlog_init.py:238`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: subprocess.run(
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server bin/chatlog_init.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (bin/chatlog_status.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`bin/chatlog_status.py:577`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: subprocess.run(
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server bin/chatlog_status.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (bin/check_control_chars.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`bin/check_control_chars.py:68`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: subprocess.run(
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server bin/check_control_chars.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (bin/check_tool_catalog_drift.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`bin/check_tool_catalog_drift.py:66`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: subprocess.run(
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server bin/check_tool_catalog_drift.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (bin/dashboard_server.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`bin/dashboard_server.py:2423`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: subprocess.Popen(
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server bin/dashboard_server.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (bin/deep_sync.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`bin/deep_sync.py:29`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: subprocess.run(
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server bin/deep_sync.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (bin/doctor/dashboard_probe.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`bin/doctor/dashboard_probe.py:82`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: subprocess.run(
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server bin/doctor/dashboard_probe.py
medium Dynamic module load from a non-literal (bin/mem0_scan.py)MTC-SRC-005
In the server's implementation (`bin/mem0_scan.py:270`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: import(s)
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server bin/mem0_scan.py
medium Dynamic module load from a non-literal (m3_memory/cli.py)MTC-SRC-005
In the server's implementation (`m3_memory/cli.py:389`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: __import__(
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server m3_memory/cli.py
medium Dynamic module load from a non-literal (m3_memory/installer.py)MTC-SRC-005
In the server's implementation (`m3_memory/installer.py:681`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: __import__(
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server m3_memory/installer.py
medium Dynamic module load from a non-literal (m3_memory/setup_wizard.py)MTC-SRC-005
In the server's implementation (`m3_memory/setup_wizard.py:1827`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: __import__(
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server m3_memory/setup_wizard.py
Tools 46
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
files_corpus_getingests untrusted inputfiles_getingests untrusted inputget_news_headlinesingests untrusted inputm3_web_searchingests untrusted inputweb_searchingests untrusted inputcheck_thermal_loadno sensitive capabilitydebug_analyzeno sensitive capabilitydebug_bisectno sensitive capabilitydebug_correlateno sensitive capabilitydebug_historyno sensitive capabilitydebug_reportno sensitive capabilitydebug_traceno sensitive capabilityfiles_corpus_createno sensitive capabilityfiles_corpus_deleteno sensitive capabilityfiles_corpus_listno sensitive capabilityfiles_corpus_setno sensitive capabilityfiles_dedupno sensitive capabilityfiles_dedup_listno sensitive capabilityfiles_dedup_reviewno sensitive capabilityfiles_entity_coalesceno sensitive capabilityfiles_entity_coalesce_applyno sensitive capabilityfiles_entity_coalesce_listno sensitive capabilityfiles_entity_coalesce_reviewno sensitive capabilityfiles_entity_coalesce_unapplyno sensitive capabilityfiles_extract_pendingno sensitive capabilityfiles_healthno sensitive capabilityfiles_indexno sensitive capabilityfiles_ingestno sensitive capabilityfiles_link_renameno sensitive capabilityfiles_promotableno sensitive capabilityfiles_promoteno sensitive capabilityfiles_promotion_listno sensitive capabilityfiles_searchno sensitive capabilityfiles_staleness_reviewno sensitive capabilityfiles_statsno sensitive capabilityfiles_watch_onceno sensitive capabilityforgetno sensitive capabilitygrok_askno sensitive capabilitylog_activityno sensitive capabilityquery_decisionsno sensitive capabilityquery_local_modelno sensitive capabilityrecallno sensitive capabilityrememberno sensitive capabilityretire_focusno sensitive capabilitysave_handoffno sensitive capabilityupdate_focusno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (46 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v2026.7.23.0 latest |
B 89/100 | 16 | 1.8.0 | 2026-07-23 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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