Memento Memory (luispmonteiro) MCP Server
@luispmonteiro/memento-memory-mcp
npm
v2.3.0
Published by @luispmonteiro — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
Persistent memory MCP server with typed memories, decay scoring, and token-aware context injection
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 1.2 = 99. What the published surface and source actually contain:
| Points | What was found | Category |
|---|---|---|
| −1.2 | Package runs install-time scripts MTC-SUP-010 | supply-chain |
2. Client adoption risk — 99 − 7 = 92. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 9
high Dynamic code execution in server code (dist/transformers-P4CWLDTE.js)MTC-SRC-001
In the server's implementation (`dist/transformers-P4CWLDTE.js:3236`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { var mod = eval("quire".replace(/^/, "re"))(moduleName); if (mod && (mod.length || Object.keys(
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/transformers-P4CWLDTE.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/chunk-3C6AM6LZ.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/chunk-3C6AM6LZ.js:58`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { execFileSync } from "child_process"; var logger = createLogger(logLevelFromEnv()); function git(cwd, args, opts = {})
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/chunk-3C6AM6LZ.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/cli/main.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/cli/main.js:294`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: spawn } = await import("child_process"); const opener = process.platform === "darwin" ? "open" : process.platform ==
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/cli/main.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/install-UQWPVGGR.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/install-UQWPVGGR.js:13`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: port { execSync } from "child_process"; import { createInterface } from "readline"; function detectClient() { if (exis
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/install-UQWPVGGR.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/transformers-P4CWLDTE.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/transformers-P4CWLDTE.js:14654`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ildProcess = __require("child_process"); var { isLinux, getReport } = require_process(); var { LDD_PATH, SELF_PA
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/transformers-P4CWLDTE.js
medium Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (dist/chunk-WH4TLQ5O.js)MTC-SRC-003
In the server's implementation (`dist/chunk-WH4TLQ5O.js:23`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: const response = await fetch("https://api.openai.com/v1/embeddings", { method: "POST", signal: controll
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/chunk-WH4TLQ5O.js
medium Tool "memory_unlink" can modify the filesystemMTC-CAP-002
Tool "memory_unlink" can write, overwrite or delete files (keyword "unlink" in tool name). Verify it is scoped to a safe directory.
Fix: Constrain file operations to an explicit, non-sensitive root; reject path traversal.
Location: tool memory_unlink
low Mutating tool "memory_unlink" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "memory_unlink" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool memory_unlink
low Package runs install-time scripts (postinstall)MTC-SUP-010
"@luispmonteiro/memento-memory-mcp" executes postinstall script(s) at install time. An install hook runs at install time; most are routine build/setup, but review what it does before trusting it.
Evidence: node -e "if(process.env.npm_config_global==='true'){require('child_process').execFileSync(process.execPath,['dist/cli/main.js','install'],{stdio:'inherit'})}"
Fix: Review the scripts; install with --ignore-scripts where possible and vet what they do.
Location: package @luispmonteiro/memento-memory-mcp
Tools 19
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
memory_unlinkwrites filesdecisions_logno sensitive capabilitymemory_analyticsno sensitive capabilitymemory_compressno sensitive capabilitymemory_dedup_checkno sensitive capabilitymemory_deleteno sensitive capabilitymemory_exportno sensitive capabilitymemory_getno sensitive capabilitymemory_graphno sensitive capabilitymemory_importno sensitive capability
Show 9 more tools ↓
memory_linkno sensitive capabilitymemory_listno sensitive capabilitymemory_pathno sensitive capabilitymemory_pinno sensitive capabilitymemory_searchno sensitive capabilitymemory_storeno sensitive capabilitymemory_timelineno sensitive capabilitymemory_updateno sensitive capabilitypitfalls_logno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (19 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v2.3.0 latest |
A 92/100 | 9 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan @luispmonteiro/memento-memory-mcp --onlineOther implementations of Memento Memory 1
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