Lore (EliotShift) MCP Server
lore-mcp
npm
v0.1.6
Published by eliotshift — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
LORE v0.1.6 — Type-Aware Architectural Memory for AI Coding. Plugin-based code archaeology engine with 13 analyzers, MCP integration, dependency graph, circular dependency detection, type safety scoring, hotspot analysis, and AI recommendations.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 6.3 = 94. What the published surface and source actually contain:
| Points | What was found | Category |
|---|---|---|
| −6.3 | Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink MTC-SRC-009 | injection |
2. Client adoption risk — 94 − 7 = 87. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 5
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/algorithms/hotspot-analysis.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/algorithms/hotspot-analysis.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: port { execSync } from 'child_process'; import * as fs from 'fs'; import * as path from 'path'; import { getCachePath, r
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/algorithms/hotspot-analysis.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/algorithms/incremental-coupling.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/algorithms/incremental-coupling.js:14`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: port { execSync } from 'child_process'; import * as path from 'path'; import { couplingCache, contentHash } from '../sto
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/algorithms/incremental-coupling.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/commands/diff.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/commands/diff.js:9`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: port { execSync } from 'child_process'; import { getCachePath, readJson, writeJson } from '../storage/store.js'; functio
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/commands/diff.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/lib/environment-check.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/lib/environment-check.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: port { execSync } from 'child_process'; import * as fs from 'fs'; import * as path from 'path'; import * as os from 'os'
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/lib/environment-check.js
medium Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (dist/algorithms/incremental-coupling.js)MTC-SRC-009
In the server's implementation (`dist/algorithms/incremental-coupling.js:111`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: const output = execSync(`git log --format="%H" "${afterCommit}..HEAD"`, { cwd: this.projectRoot
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/algorithms/incremental-coupling.js
Tools 17
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
analyzeno sensitive capabilityanalyze_architectureno sensitive capabilityArchitecture Analysisno sensitive capabilityFull Architecture Graphno sensitive capabilityget_async_chainsno sensitive capabilityget_dependenciesno sensitive capabilityget_type_flowno sensitive capabilityget_violationsno sensitive capabilityget-entropyno sensitive capabilityget-hotspotsno sensitive capability
Show 7 more tools ↓
get-recommendationsno sensitive capabilityget-scoresno sensitive capabilityget-violationsno sensitive capabilityLatest Analysisno sensitive capabilityProject Configurationno sensitive capabilityquery-fileno sensitive capabilityrecord_decisionno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (17 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.1.6 latest |
B 87/100 | 5 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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