Loopspec — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.13.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.
{
"tool": {
"name": "mcptrustchecker",
"version": "1.13.0",
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"target": {
"id": "loopspec-mcp",
"source": {
"kind": "package",
"origin": "loopspec-mcp"
},
"server": {
"name": "loopspec-mcp"
}
},
"grade": "B",
"score": {
"score": 83,
"threatScore": 91,
"grade": "B",
"band": "B",
"categorySubtotals": {
"injection": 9.45,
"exfiltration": 0,
"permissions": 0,
"supply-chain": 0,
"network": 0,
"hygiene": 0
},
"vector": [
{
"kind": "threat",
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-009",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"rawWeight": 9,
"confidenceMult": 0.7,
"diminishingFactor": 1,
"appliedPenalty": 6.3
},
{
"kind": "threat",
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-009",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"rawWeight": 9,
"confidenceMult": 0.7,
"diminishingFactor": 0.5,
"appliedPenalty": 3.15
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "capability-exposure",
"level": "high",
"label": "capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated",
"appliedPenalty": 6
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "verification-discount",
"level": "none",
"label": "publisher verification (unlinked) — no provenance/repo link, but the shipped source was fully read",
"appliedPenalty": 2
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "coverage-honesty",
"level": "source",
"label": "inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see",
"appliedPenalty": 0
}
],
"gatesFired": [],
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"capability": {
"level": "high",
"reasons": [
"can execute shell commands or code"
],
"tags": [
"code-exec"
]
},
"coverage": {
"level": "source",
"inputs": {
"toolSurface": true,
"implementationSource": true,
"packageMetadata": true,
"liveTransport": false
},
"caveats": [
"Tools were statically extracted from the published source (49 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
]
},
"findings": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/chunk-SEVTR4UW.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/chunk-SEVTR4UW.js:2`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/chunk-SEVTR4UW.js"
},
"evidence": "port { execSync } from \"child_process\"; import { existsSync, readFileSync } from \"fs\"; import { homedir } from \"os\"; imp",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/chunk-SEVTR4UW.js",
"line": 2,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/review-K5X23WCS.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/review-K5X23WCS.js:21`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/review-K5X23WCS.js"
},
"evidence": "port { execSync } from \"child_process\"; import path from \"path\"; import fs from \"fs\"; function isGitRepo(dir) { try {",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/review-K5X23WCS.js",
"line": 21,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/server.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/server.js:2523`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/server.js"
},
"evidence": "; import { exec } from \"child_process\"; import { promisify } from \"util\"; import fs from \"fs\"; import path7 from \"path\";",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/server.js",
"line": 2523,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/session-4QHX5AT2.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/session-4QHX5AT2.js:21`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/session-4QHX5AT2.js"
},
"evidence": "port { execSync } from \"child_process\"; import fs from \"fs\"; import path from \"path\"; function getGitChangedFiles(projec",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/session-4QHX5AT2.js",
"line": 21,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/test-TNGMUUKV.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/test-TNGMUUKV.js:14`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/test-TNGMUUKV.js"
},
"evidence": "port { execSync } from \"child_process\"; import path from \"path\"; import fs from \"fs\"; function detectRunner(projectDir)",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/test-TNGMUUKV.js",
"line": 14,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/worktree-AIILDH47.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/worktree-AIILDH47.js:7`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/worktree-AIILDH47.js"
},
"evidence": "port { execSync } from \"child_process\"; async function runWorktreeCommand(positional, _flags) { const action = positio",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/worktree-AIILDH47.js",
"line": 7,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-009",
"title": "Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (dist/review-K5X23WCS.js)",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/review-K5X23WCS.js:58`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/review-K5X23WCS.js"
},
"evidence": "ry { const diff = execSync(`git diff --name-only ${base}`, { cwd: ctx.projectDir, encoding: \"utf-8\" }); chan",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-009",
"file": "dist/review-K5X23WCS.js",
"line": 58,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-009",
"title": "Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (dist/worktree-AIILDH47.js)",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/worktree-AIILDH47.js:28`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/worktree-AIILDH47.js"
},
"evidence": "} try { execSync(`git worktree add ../${name} -b ${name}`, { encoding: \"utf-8\", stdio: \"pipe\" });",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-009",
"file": "dist/worktree-AIILDH47.js",
"line": 28,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SUP-011",
"title": "Package declares no source repository",
"category": "supply-chain",
"severity": "info",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "\"loopspec-mcp\" declares no repository URL, so its published artifact cannot be compared against reviewable source.",
"remediation": "Prefer packages that link to public, reviewable source.",
"location": {
"kind": "package",
"name": "loopspec-mcp"
}
}
],
"toxicFlows": [],
"capabilities": [
{
"tool": "loopspec_init",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "loopspec_vibe",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "loopspec_context",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "loopspec_plan",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "loopspec_design",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "loopspec_preflight",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "loopspec_guardrails_add",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "loopspec_drift",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "loopspec_update",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "loopspec_score",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "loopspec_verify",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "loopspec_compound",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "loopspec_playbook",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "loopspec_suggest",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "loopspec_worktree",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "loopspec_detect",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "loopspec_enforce",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "loopspec_feedback",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "loopspec_memory_stats",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "loopspec_typecheck",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "loopspec_fix",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "loopspec_infer",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "loopspec_maker_prompt",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "loopspec_checker_prompt",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "loopspec_retry",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "loopspec_escalate",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "loopspec_decompose",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "loopspec_merge_review",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "loopspec_watch",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "loopspec_template",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "loopspec_session",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "loopspec_goal",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "loopspec_decision",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "loopspec_checkpoint",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "loopspec_guidance",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "loopspec_status",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "loopspec_graph",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "loopspec_profile",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "loopspec_autocomplete",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "loopspec_heal",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "loopspec_contracts",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "loopspec_plugin",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "loopspec_sandbox",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "loopspec_predict",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "loopspec_swarm",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "loopspec_daemon",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "loopspec_deploy",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "loopspec_orchestrate",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "loopspec_amplify",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
}
],
"surfaceDigest": "716e72235875587c1250a3818e1182179a48053869eab19085c6961895df55d2",
"stats": {
"tools": 49,
"prompts": 0,
"resources": 0,
"findingsBySeverity": {
"critical": 0,
"high": 6,
"medium": 2,
"low": 0,
"info": 1
}
}
}