Loopspec MCP Server
loopspec-mcp
npm
v2.4.1
Published by an unidentified publisher — no publish provenance and no public repository, so the publisher could not be verified and the source cannot be independently located.
The Compound Intelligence Engine for AI Development — MCP server + CLI with sessions, goals, real-time watcher, and smart guardrails
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 9.5 = 91. What the published surface and source actually contain:
| Points | What was found | Category |
|---|---|---|
| −9.5 | Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink ×2 MTC-SRC-009 | injection |
2. Client adoption risk — 91 − 8 = 83. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −2 | publisher verification (unlinked) — no provenance/repo link, but the shipped source was fully read |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 8
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/chunk-SEVTR4UW.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/chunk-SEVTR4UW.js:2`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: port { execSync } from "child_process"; import { existsSync, readFileSync } from "fs"; import { homedir } from "os"; imp
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/chunk-SEVTR4UW.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/review-K5X23WCS.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/review-K5X23WCS.js:21`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: port { execSync } from "child_process"; import path from "path"; import fs from "fs"; function isGitRepo(dir) { try {
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/review-K5X23WCS.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/server.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/server.js:2523`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ; import { exec } from "child_process"; import { promisify } from "util"; import fs from "fs"; import path7 from "path";
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/server.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/session-4QHX5AT2.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/session-4QHX5AT2.js:21`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: port { execSync } from "child_process"; import fs from "fs"; import path from "path"; function getGitChangedFiles(projec
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/session-4QHX5AT2.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/test-TNGMUUKV.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/test-TNGMUUKV.js:14`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: port { execSync } from "child_process"; import path from "path"; import fs from "fs"; function detectRunner(projectDir)
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/test-TNGMUUKV.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/worktree-AIILDH47.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/worktree-AIILDH47.js:7`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: port { execSync } from "child_process"; async function runWorktreeCommand(positional, _flags) { const action = positio
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/worktree-AIILDH47.js
medium Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (dist/review-K5X23WCS.js)MTC-SRC-009
In the server's implementation (`dist/review-K5X23WCS.js:58`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ry { const diff = execSync(`git diff --name-only ${base}`, { cwd: ctx.projectDir, encoding: "utf-8" }); chan
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/review-K5X23WCS.js
medium Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (dist/worktree-AIILDH47.js)MTC-SRC-009
In the server's implementation (`dist/worktree-AIILDH47.js:28`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: } try { execSync(`git worktree add ../${name} -b ${name}`, { encoding: "utf-8", stdio: "pipe" });
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/worktree-AIILDH47.js
Tools 49
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
loopspec_amplifyno sensitive capabilityloopspec_autocompleteno sensitive capabilityloopspec_checker_promptno sensitive capabilityloopspec_checkpointno sensitive capabilityloopspec_compoundno sensitive capabilityloopspec_contextno sensitive capabilityloopspec_contractsno sensitive capabilityloopspec_daemonno sensitive capabilityloopspec_decisionno sensitive capabilityloopspec_decomposeno sensitive capability
Show 39 more tools ↓
loopspec_deployno sensitive capabilityloopspec_designno sensitive capabilityloopspec_detectno sensitive capabilityloopspec_driftno sensitive capabilityloopspec_enforceno sensitive capabilityloopspec_escalateno sensitive capabilityloopspec_feedbackno sensitive capabilityloopspec_fixno sensitive capabilityloopspec_goalno sensitive capabilityloopspec_graphno sensitive capabilityloopspec_guardrails_addno sensitive capabilityloopspec_guidanceno sensitive capabilityloopspec_healno sensitive capabilityloopspec_inferno sensitive capabilityloopspec_initno sensitive capabilityloopspec_maker_promptno sensitive capabilityloopspec_memory_statsno sensitive capabilityloopspec_merge_reviewno sensitive capabilityloopspec_orchestrateno sensitive capabilityloopspec_planno sensitive capabilityloopspec_playbookno sensitive capabilityloopspec_pluginno sensitive capabilityloopspec_predictno sensitive capabilityloopspec_preflightno sensitive capabilityloopspec_profileno sensitive capabilityloopspec_retryno sensitive capabilityloopspec_sandboxno sensitive capabilityloopspec_scoreno sensitive capabilityloopspec_sessionno sensitive capabilityloopspec_statusno sensitive capabilityloopspec_suggestno sensitive capabilityloopspec_swarmno sensitive capabilityloopspec_templateno sensitive capabilityloopspec_typecheckno sensitive capabilityloopspec_updateno sensitive capabilityloopspec_verifyno sensitive capabilityloopspec_vibeno sensitive capabilityloopspec_watchno sensitive capabilityloopspec_worktreeno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (49 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v2.4.1 latest |
B 83/100 | 8 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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