Loopctl MCP Server

loopctl-mcp-server npm v2.89.0 Source verified

Published by mkreyman — publish provenance cryptographically ties this package to that repository. That is proof of origin, not an official vendor package.

MCP server for loopctl — structural trust for AI development loops

Trust grade
A
94/100
Last scanned get badge →
Trust
A · 94/100
Adoption risk for you: the threat score, then adjusted down for blast radius, publisher verification and how much the scan could see. Deterministic; every point is auditable.
Capability
High
Blast radius if it went rogue — what the server’s tools could reach. Independent of trust.
Coverage
Source
How much the scan could actually inspect. Shallow coverage is stated, never hidden.
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A Why this grade threat 100 − adoption risk = 94/100

The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.

1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:

The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.

2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 6 = 94. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:

PointsAdoption-risk factor
−6 capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated

Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored. Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.

Findings 2

high Shell/command execution in server code (lib/client-context.js)MTC-SRC-002

In the server's implementation (`lib/client-context.js:45`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.

Evidence: ecFileSync } from "node:child_process"; import os from "node:os"; function env(name) { const v = process.env[name];

Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.

Location: server lib/client-context.js

medium Unconstrained URL/host parameter "host" on "channel_handoffs"MTC-CAP-007

Tool "channel_handoffs" takes a URL/host parameter "host" with no allowlist/pattern. An outbound-request tool with an unbounded destination enables SSRF and cloud-metadata access (e.g. 169.254.169.254).

Fix: Allowlist destinations or constrain the parameter; block private/link-local addresses server-side.

Location: tool channel_handoffs · inputSchema.properties.host

Tools 137

Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.

  • channel_getingests untrusted input
  • channel_handoffsingests untrusted input
  • channel_recentingests untrusted input
  • get_story_token_usagereads sensitive data
  • knowledge_heat_indexingests untrusted input
  • knowledge_indexingests untrusted input
  • archive_kb_scopeno sensitive capability
  • backfill_storyno sensitive capability
  • bulk_mark_completeno sensitive capability
  • channel_claimno sensitive capability
Show 127 more tools ↓
  • channel_claimsno sensitive capability
  • channel_deleteno sensitive capability
  • channel_doneno sensitive capability
  • channel_graduateno sensitive capability
  • channel_lockno sensitive capability
  • channel_locksno sensitive capability
  • channel_postno sensitive capability
  • channel_releaseno sensitive capability
  • channel_unlockno sensitive capability
  • claim_storyno sensitive capability
  • clear_local_onlyno sensitive capability
  • contract_storyno sensitive capability
  • corpus_createno sensitive capability
  • corpus_deleteno sensitive capability
  • corpus_indexno sensitive capability
  • corpus_listno sensitive capability
  • corpus_searchno sensitive capability
  • corpus_statusno sensitive capability
  • create_kb_scopeno sensitive capability
  • create_projectno sensitive capability
  • create_storyno sensitive capability
  • custody_claimno sensitive capability
  • custody_failuresno sensitive capability
  • custody_generate_keypairno sensitive capability
  • custody_sign_attestationno sensitive capability
  • custody_sign_claimno sensitive capability
  • custody_sign_owner_rotationno sensitive capability
  • declare_trusted_endpointno sensitive capability
  • delete_projectno sensitive capability
  • dispatchno sensitive capability
  • egress_postureno sensitive capability
  • egress_repinno sensitive capability
  • embedding_materialize_system_corpusno sensitive capability
  • embedding_reembedno sensitive capability
  • embedding_statusno sensitive capability
  • enroll_authenticatorno sensitive capability
  • get_acceptance_criteriano sensitive capability
  • get_cost_anomaliesno sensitive capability
  • get_cost_summaryno sensitive capability
  • get_ingestion_anomaliesno sensitive capability
  • get_progressno sensitive capability
  • get_sthno sensitive capability
  • get_storyno sensitive capability
  • get_system_articlesno sensitive capability
  • get_tenantno sensitive capability
  • handoffno sensitive capability
  • import_storiesno sensitive capability
  • knowledge_agent_usageno sensitive capability
  • knowledge_analytics_topno sensitive capability
  • knowledge_archiveno sensitive capability
  • knowledge_article_statsno sensitive capability
  • knowledge_assert_conflictno sensitive capability
  • knowledge_bulk_deleteno sensitive capability
  • knowledge_bulk_publishno sensitive capability
  • knowledge_bulk_unpublishno sensitive capability
  • knowledge_conflictsno sensitive capability
  • knowledge_consolidationno sensitive capability
  • knowledge_contextno sensitive capability
  • knowledge_countno sensitive capability
  • knowledge_createno sensitive capability
  • knowledge_curation_logno sensitive capability
  • knowledge_deleteno sensitive capability
  • knowledge_distant_pairsno sensitive capability
  • knowledge_draftsno sensitive capability
  • knowledge_exportno sensitive capability
  • knowledge_facetsno sensitive capability
  • knowledge_getno sensitive capability
  • knowledge_graphno sensitive capability
  • knowledge_hybrid_searchno sensitive capability
  • knowledge_ingestno sensitive capability
  • knowledge_ingest_batchno sensitive capability
  • knowledge_ingestion_jobsno sensitive capability
  • knowledge_lintno sensitive capability
  • knowledge_listno sensitive capability
  • knowledge_llm_usageno sensitive capability
  • knowledge_noveltyno sensitive capability
  • knowledge_okf_exportno sensitive capability
  • knowledge_okf_importno sensitive capability
  • knowledge_progressive_drillno sensitive capability
  • knowledge_progressive_indexno sensitive capability
  • knowledge_publishno sensitive capability
  • knowledge_random_walkno sensitive capability
  • knowledge_resolve_conflictno sensitive capability
  • knowledge_retrieval_metricsno sensitive capability
  • knowledge_searchno sensitive capability
  • knowledge_search_coverageno sensitive capability
  • knowledge_statsno sensitive capability
  • knowledge_suggest_linksno sensitive capability
  • knowledge_suppressno sensitive capability
  • knowledge_unpublishno sensitive capability
  • knowledge_unsuppressno sensitive capability
  • knowledge_unused_articlesno sensitive capability
  • knowledge_updateno sensitive capability
  • list_enrolled_agent_keysno sensitive capability
  • list_projectsno sensitive capability
  • list_ready_storiesno sensitive capability
  • list_routesno sensitive capability
  • list_storiesno sensitive capability
  • llm_configno sensitive capability
  • memory_forgetno sensitive capability
  • memory_graduateno sensitive capability
  • memory_listno sensitive capability
  • memory_promoteno sensitive capability
  • memory_recallno sensitive capability
  • memory_rememberno sensitive capability
  • recall_contextno sensitive capability
  • recall_referencedno sensitive capability
  • recover_capno sensitive capability
  • register_custody_owner_keyno sensitive capability
  • reject_storyno sensitive capability
  • report_storyno sensitive capability
  • report_token_usageno sensitive capability
  • request_authenticator_challengeno sensitive capability
  • request_authenticator_revoke_challengeno sensitive capability
  • request_reviewno sensitive capability
  • resolve_projectno sensitive capability
  • restore_kb_scopeno sensitive capability
  • review_completeno sensitive capability
  • revoke_authenticatorno sensitive capability
  • revoke_trusted_endpointno sensitive capability
  • set_llm_configno sensitive capability
  • set_local_onlyno sensitive capability
  • set_token_budgetno sensitive capability
  • signupno sensitive capability
  • start_storyno sensitive capability
  • verify_all_in_epicno sensitive capability
  • verify_storyno sensitive capability

What this scan could not see

Versions 10

Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.

VersionScoreFindingsEngineScanned
v2.89.0 latest A 94/100 2 1.13.0 2026-09-07
v2.78.2 A 94/100 2 1.13.0 2026-09-06
v2.78.0 A 94/100 2 1.13.0 2026-08-31
v2.77.0 A 94/100 2 1.13.0 2026-08-28
v2.76.0 A 94/100 2 1.12.1 2026-08-22
Show 5 more versions ↓
v2.75.0 A 94/100 2 1.12.1 2026-08-21
v2.74.0 A 94/100 2 1.12.1 2026-08-20
v2.72.0 A 97/100 1 1.12.1 2026-08-12
v2.71.0 A 97/100 1 1.12.1 2026-08-07
v2.67.0 A 97/100 1 1.12.1 2026-08-05

Embed this score

Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.

MCP Trust Score: A · 94/100
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Verify this score yourself

The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.

npx mcptrustchecker scan loopctl-mcp-server --online

Use the free API → How scoring works

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