Lindoai — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.13.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.
{
"tool": {
"name": "mcptrustchecker",
"version": "1.13.0",
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"target": {
"id": "@lindoai/mcp-server",
"source": {
"kind": "package",
"origin": "@lindoai/mcp-server"
},
"server": {
"name": "@lindoai/mcp-server"
}
},
"grade": "B",
"score": {
"score": 84,
"threatScore": 94,
"grade": "B",
"band": "B",
"categorySubtotals": {
"injection": 6.3,
"exfiltration": 0,
"permissions": 0,
"supply-chain": 0,
"network": 0,
"hygiene": 0
},
"vector": [
{
"kind": "threat",
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-009",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"rawWeight": 9,
"confidenceMult": 0.7,
"diminishingFactor": 1,
"appliedPenalty": 6.3
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "capability-exposure",
"level": "critical",
"label": "capability blast radius (critical) — client exposure if the model is manipulated",
"appliedPenalty": 10
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "verification-discount",
"level": "source",
"label": "publisher verification (provenance) — cryptographic build provenance ties the artifact to its source",
"appliedPenalty": 0
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "coverage-honesty",
"level": "source",
"label": "inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see",
"appliedPenalty": 0
}
],
"gatesFired": [],
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"capability": {
"level": "critical",
"reasons": [
"ingests untrusted external content (a prompt-injection entry point)",
"can execute shell commands or code",
"untrusted input can reach code execution"
],
"tags": [
"untrusted-input",
"code-exec"
]
},
"coverage": {
"level": "source",
"inputs": {
"toolSurface": true,
"implementationSource": true,
"packageMetadata": true,
"liveTransport": false
},
"caveats": [
"Tools were statically extracted from the published source (50 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
]
},
"findings": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (server/index.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`server/index.js:10`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "server/index.js"
},
"evidence": "{ execSync } = require(\"child_process\"); const BASE_URL = \"https://api.lindo.ai\"; const WEBAPP_URL = \"https://app.lindo",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "server/index.js",
"line": 10,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-009",
"title": "Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (server/index.js)",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`server/index.js:93`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "server/index.js"
},
"evidence": "(platform === \"darwin\") execSync(`open \"${authUrl}\"`); else if (platform === \"win32\") execSync(`start \"\" \"${auth",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-009",
"file": "server/index.js",
"line": 93,
"nonRuntime": false
}
}
],
"toxicFlows": [],
"capabilities": [
{
"tool": "get_workspace",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "update_workspace",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_workspace_analytics",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_workspace_team",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "add_workspace_team_member",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "remove_workspace_team_member",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "create_client",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_clients",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "update_client",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "delete_client",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "assign_website",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "generate_magic_link",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "create_website",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_websites",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_website",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "update_website",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "delete_website",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "update_website_settings",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "add_custom_domain",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "remove_custom_domain",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_website_team",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_website_analytics",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "edit_website",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_pages",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_page",
"tags": [
"untrusted-input"
],
"reasons": {
"untrusted-input": [
"keyword \"get_page\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "update_page",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "delete_page",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "publish_page",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "update_page_content",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "unpublish_page",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_page_html",
"tags": [
"untrusted-input"
],
"reasons": {
"untrusted-input": [
"keyword \"get_page\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "create_blog",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "publish_blog",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_blogs",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_blog",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "update_blog",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "delete_blog",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "update_blog_content",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "unpublish_blog",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_blog_html",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "check_website_status",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "check_edit_status",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "check_blog_status",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "batch_create_websites",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "batch_create_blogs",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "batch_check_website_status",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "batch_check_blog_status",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_credits",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_client_credits",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "allocate_credits",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
}
],
"surfaceDigest": "723bcc34c3f07388b553652dbfb6b87a13c37e63ed043879b3207bd77586bac3",
"stats": {
"tools": 50,
"prompts": 0,
"resources": 0,
"findingsBySeverity": {
"critical": 0,
"high": 1,
"medium": 1,
"low": 0,
"info": 0
}
}
}