Lindoai MCP Server
@lindoai/mcp-server
npm
v1.1.1
Source verified
Published by lindoai — publish provenance cryptographically ties this package to that repository. That is proof of origin, not an official vendor package.
Lindo AI MCP server for Claude Desktop — create websites, pages, and blogs with AI
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 6.3 = 94. What the published surface and source actually contain:
| Points | What was found | Category |
|---|---|---|
| −6.3 | Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink MTC-SRC-009 | injection |
2. Client adoption risk — 94 − 10 = 84. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −10 | capability blast radius (critical) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 2
high Shell/command execution in server code (server/index.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`server/index.js:10`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { execSync } = require("child_process"); const BASE_URL = "https://api.lindo.ai"; const WEBAPP_URL = "https://app.lindo
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server server/index.js
medium Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (server/index.js)MTC-SRC-009
In the server's implementation (`server/index.js:93`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: (platform === "darwin") execSync(`open "${authUrl}"`); else if (platform === "win32") execSync(`start "" "${auth
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server server/index.js
Tools 50
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
get_pageingests untrusted inputget_page_htmlingests untrusted inputadd_custom_domainno sensitive capabilityadd_workspace_team_memberno sensitive capabilityallocate_creditsno sensitive capabilityassign_websiteno sensitive capabilitybatch_check_blog_statusno sensitive capabilitybatch_check_website_statusno sensitive capabilitybatch_create_blogsno sensitive capabilitybatch_create_websitesno sensitive capability
Show 40 more tools ↓
check_blog_statusno sensitive capabilitycheck_edit_statusno sensitive capabilitycheck_website_statusno sensitive capabilitycreate_blogno sensitive capabilitycreate_clientno sensitive capabilitycreate_websiteno sensitive capabilitydelete_blogno sensitive capabilitydelete_clientno sensitive capabilitydelete_pageno sensitive capabilitydelete_websiteno sensitive capabilityedit_websiteno sensitive capabilitygenerate_magic_linkno sensitive capabilityget_blogno sensitive capabilityget_blog_htmlno sensitive capabilityget_client_creditsno sensitive capabilityget_creditsno sensitive capabilityget_websiteno sensitive capabilityget_website_analyticsno sensitive capabilityget_website_teamno sensitive capabilityget_workspaceno sensitive capabilityget_workspace_analyticsno sensitive capabilityget_workspace_teamno sensitive capabilitylist_blogsno sensitive capabilitylist_clientsno sensitive capabilitylist_pagesno sensitive capabilitylist_websitesno sensitive capabilitypublish_blogno sensitive capabilitypublish_pageno sensitive capabilityremove_custom_domainno sensitive capabilityremove_workspace_team_memberno sensitive capabilityunpublish_blogno sensitive capabilityunpublish_pageno sensitive capabilityupdate_blogno sensitive capabilityupdate_blog_contentno sensitive capabilityupdate_clientno sensitive capabilityupdate_pageno sensitive capabilityupdate_page_contentno sensitive capabilityupdate_websiteno sensitive capabilityupdate_website_settingsno sensitive capabilityupdate_workspaceno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (50 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.1.1 latest |
B 84/100 | 2 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan @lindoai/mcp-server --onlineMore in Marketing & Social
Official Abyssfall game info, newsletter double opt-in, and merch reservation tools.
AdCritter ads platform: docs, API reference, app scaffolding, and white-label integration.
Google AdSense MCP Server - Monitor earnings, reports, and account health via Claude/AI
Operational empathy for technical founders + PE/VC operators navigating high-stakes B2B interactions. 28 MCP tools + CLI: ICP scoring, persona simulation, battlecards, deal classification, prospect discovery, investor matching, founder wellness, plus mark
MCP server for Bing Webmaster Tools — SEO site management, URL submission, sitemaps, stats, keywords
MCP (Model Context Protocol) server that helps AI agents use Primer Brand (@primer/react-brand) correctly when building GitHub marketing and landing pages.