Raw scan report

Libscope — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.13.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.

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{
  "tool": {
    "name": "mcptrustchecker",
    "version": "1.13.0",
    "methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
  },
  "target": {
    "id": "libscope",
    "source": {
      "kind": "package",
      "origin": "libscope"
    },
    "server": {
      "name": "libscope"
    }
  },
  "grade": "A",
  "score": {
    "score": 94,
    "threatScore": 100,
    "grade": "A",
    "band": "A",
    "categorySubtotals": {
      "injection": 0,
      "exfiltration": 0,
      "permissions": 0,
      "supply-chain": 0,
      "network": 0,
      "hygiene": 0
    },
    "vector": [
      {
        "kind": "client",
        "term": "capability-exposure",
        "level": "high",
        "label": "capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated",
        "appliedPenalty": 6
      },
      {
        "kind": "client",
        "term": "verification-discount",
        "level": "source",
        "label": "publisher verification (provenance) — cryptographic build provenance ties the artifact to its source",
        "appliedPenalty": 0
      },
      {
        "kind": "client",
        "term": "coverage-honesty",
        "level": "source",
        "label": "inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see",
        "appliedPenalty": 0
      }
    ],
    "gatesFired": [],
    "methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
  },
  "capability": {
    "level": "high",
    "reasons": [
      "ingests untrusted external content (a prompt-injection entry point)",
      "can send data / act on an external service",
      "can execute shell commands or code"
    ],
    "tags": [
      "untrusted-input",
      "external-sink",
      "code-exec"
    ]
  },
  "coverage": {
    "level": "source",
    "inputs": {
      "toolSurface": true,
      "implementationSource": true,
      "packageMetadata": true,
      "liveTransport": false
    },
    "caveats": [
      "Tools were statically extracted from the published source (31 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
    ]
  },
  "findings": [
    {
      "ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
      "title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/api/indexing/repoIndexer.js)",
      "category": "permissions",
      "severity": "high",
      "confidence": "strong",
      "description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/api/indexing/repoIndexer.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
      "remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
      "location": {
        "kind": "server",
        "name": "dist/api/indexing/repoIndexer.js"
      },
      "evidence": "ecFileSync } from \"node:child_process\"; import { readdirSync, readFileSync, rmSync, statSync, existsSync } from \"node:fs",
      "owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
      "data": {
        "rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
        "file": "dist/api/indexing/repoIndexer.js",
        "line": 1,
        "nonRuntime": false
      }
    },
    {
      "ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
      "title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/cli/index.js)",
      "category": "permissions",
      "severity": "high",
      "confidence": "strong",
      "description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/cli/index.js:31`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
      "remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
      "location": {
        "kind": "server",
        "name": "dist/cli/index.js"
      },
      "evidence": "spawnSync } from \"node:child_process\"; import { createRequire } from \"node:module\"; import { FileWatcher, DEFAULT_WATCH",
      "owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
      "data": {
        "rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
        "file": "dist/cli/index.js",
        "line": 31,
        "nonRuntime": false
      }
    },
    {
      "ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
      "title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/registry/git.js)",
      "category": "permissions",
      "severity": "high",
      "confidence": "strong",
      "description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/registry/git.js:5`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
      "remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
      "location": {
        "kind": "server",
        "name": "dist/registry/git.js"
      },
      "evidence": "execFileCb } from \"node:child_process\"; import { promisify } from \"node:util\"; import { existsSync, readFileSync, writeF",
      "owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
      "data": {
        "rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
        "file": "dist/registry/git.js",
        "line": 5,
        "nonRuntime": false
      }
    },
    {
      "ruleId": "MTC-FLOW-005",
      "title": "Untrusted input can drive an external action",
      "category": "exfiltration",
      "severity": "medium",
      "confidence": "strong",
      "description": "Untrusted-input tools ([submit-document]) co-exist with external-action tools ([create-webhook, delete-webhook]). A prompt injection could cause unwanted external actions, though no direct sensitive-data leak path was found.",
      "remediation": "Require confirmation for state-changing/egress actions triggered after processing untrusted content.",
      "location": {
        "kind": "flow",
        "name": "submit-document → create-webhook"
      },
      "evidence": "untrusted [submit-document] → sinks [create-webhook, delete-webhook]",
      "owasp": "LLM06:2025 Excessive Agency",
      "references": [],
      "data": {
        "untrusted": [
          "submit-document"
        ],
        "sinks": [
          "create-webhook",
          "delete-webhook"
        ]
      }
    },
    {
      "ruleId": "MTC-SRC-003",
      "title": "Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (dist/core/rag.js)",
      "category": "exfiltration",
      "severity": "medium",
      "confidence": "strong",
      "description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/core/rag.js:82`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
      "remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
      "location": {
        "kind": "server",
        "name": "dist/core/rag.js"
      },
      "evidence": "res = await fetch(\"https://api.openai.com/v1/chat/completions\", { method: \"POST\",",
      "owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
      "data": {
        "rule": "MTC-SRC-003",
        "file": "dist/core/rag.js",
        "line": 82,
        "nonRuntime": false
      }
    },
    {
      "ruleId": "MTC-SRC-005",
      "title": "Dynamic module load from a non-literal (dist/lite/chunker-treesitter.js)",
      "category": "permissions",
      "severity": "medium",
      "confidence": "heuristic",
      "description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/lite/chunker-treesitter.js:262`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
      "remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
      "location": {
        "kind": "server",
        "name": "dist/lite/chunker-treesitter.js"
      },
      "evidence": "const mod = (await import(packageName)); // Grammar packages typically export the language as the defau",
      "owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
      "data": {
        "rule": "MTC-SRC-005",
        "file": "dist/lite/chunker-treesitter.js",
        "line": 262,
        "nonRuntime": false
      }
    }
  ],
  "toxicFlows": [
    {
      "id": "flow-1",
      "severity": "medium",
      "confidence": "strong",
      "untrustedInput": [
        "submit-document"
      ],
      "sensitiveSource": [],
      "externalSink": [
        "create-webhook",
        "delete-webhook"
      ],
      "selfContained": false,
      "description": "Untrusted input can drive an external action even though no sensitive source is exposed."
    }
  ],
  "capabilities": [
    {
      "tool": "search-docs",
      "tags": [],
      "reasons": {}
    },
    {
      "tool": "get-related",
      "tags": [],
      "reasons": {}
    },
    {
      "tool": "get-document",
      "tags": [],
      "reasons": {}
    },
    {
      "tool": "delete-document",
      "tags": [],
      "reasons": {}
    },
    {
      "tool": "update-document",
      "tags": [],
      "reasons": {}
    },
    {
      "tool": "rate-document",
      "tags": [],
      "reasons": {}
    },
    {
      "tool": "submit-document",
      "tags": [
        "untrusted-input"
      ],
      "reasons": {
        "untrusted-input": [
          "keyword \"fetch\""
        ]
      }
    },
    {
      "tool": "list-topics",
      "tags": [],
      "reasons": {}
    },
    {
      "tool": "health-check",
      "tags": [],
      "reasons": {}
    },
    {
      "tool": "list-documents",
      "tags": [],
      "reasons": {}
    },
    {
      "tool": "ask-question",
      "tags": [],
      "reasons": {}
    },
    {
      "tool": "reindex-documents",
      "tags": [],
      "reasons": {}
    },
    {
      "tool": "sync-slack",
      "tags": [],
      "reasons": {}
    },
    {
      "tool": "install-pack",
      "tags": [],
      "reasons": {}
    },
    {
      "tool": "list-packs",
      "tags": [],
      "reasons": {}
    },
    {
      "tool": "sync-onenote",
      "tags": [],
      "reasons": {}
    },
    {
      "tool": "sync-notion",
      "tags": [],
      "reasons": {}
    },
    {
      "tool": "sync-obsidian-vault",
      "tags": [],
      "reasons": {}
    },
    {
      "tool": "sync-confluence",
      "tags": [],
      "reasons": {}
    },
    {
      "tool": "search-analytics",
      "tags": [],
      "reasons": {}
    },
    {
      "tool": "link-documents",
      "tags": [],
      "reasons": {}
    },
    {
      "tool": "get-document-links",
      "tags": [],
      "reasons": {}
    },
    {
      "tool": "delete-link",
      "tags": [],
      "reasons": {}
    },
    {
      "tool": "save-search",
      "tags": [],
      "reasons": {}
    },
    {
      "tool": "suggest-tags",
      "tags": [],
      "reasons": {}
    },
    {
      "tool": "list-saved-searches",
      "tags": [],
      "reasons": {}
    },
    {
      "tool": "run-saved-search",
      "tags": [],
      "reasons": {}
    },
    {
      "tool": "delete-saved-search",
      "tags": [],
      "reasons": {}
    },
    {
      "tool": "create-webhook",
      "tags": [
        "external-sink"
      ],
      "reasons": {
        "external-sink": [
          "keyword \"webhook\""
        ]
      }
    },
    {
      "tool": "list-webhooks",
      "tags": [],
      "reasons": {}
    },
    {
      "tool": "delete-webhook",
      "tags": [
        "external-sink"
      ],
      "reasons": {
        "external-sink": [
          "keyword \"webhook\""
        ]
      }
    }
  ],
  "surfaceDigest": "3d94e9406d11794936a96620e827591036f97443497643763ec0fe3d4b55fbec",
  "stats": {
    "tools": 31,
    "prompts": 0,
    "resources": 0,
    "findingsBySeverity": {
      "critical": 0,
      "high": 3,
      "medium": 3,
      "low": 0,
      "info": 0
    }
  }
}