Libscope MCP Server
libscope
npm
v1.8.0
Source verified
Published by robertld — publish provenance cryptographically ties this package to that repository. That is proof of origin, not an official vendor package.
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The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 6 = 94. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 6
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/api/indexing/repoIndexer.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/api/indexing/repoIndexer.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ecFileSync } from "node:child_process"; import { readdirSync, readFileSync, rmSync, statSync, existsSync } from "node:fs
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/api/indexing/repoIndexer.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/cli/index.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/cli/index.js:31`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: spawnSync } from "node:child_process"; import { createRequire } from "node:module"; import { FileWatcher, DEFAULT_WATCH
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/cli/index.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/registry/git.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/registry/git.js:5`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: execFileCb } from "node:child_process"; import { promisify } from "node:util"; import { existsSync, readFileSync, writeF
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/registry/git.js
medium Untrusted input can drive an external actionMTC-FLOW-005
Untrusted-input tools ([submit-document]) co-exist with external-action tools ([create-webhook, delete-webhook]). A prompt injection could cause unwanted external actions, though no direct sensitive-data leak path was found.
Evidence: untrusted [submit-document] → sinks [create-webhook, delete-webhook]
Fix: Require confirmation for state-changing/egress actions triggered after processing untrusted content.
Location: flow submit-document → create-webhook
medium Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (dist/core/rag.js)MTC-SRC-003
In the server's implementation (`dist/core/rag.js:82`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: res = await fetch("https://api.openai.com/v1/chat/completions", { method: "POST",
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/core/rag.js
medium Dynamic module load from a non-literal (dist/lite/chunker-treesitter.js)MTC-SRC-005
In the server's implementation (`dist/lite/chunker-treesitter.js:262`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: const mod = (await import(packageName)); // Grammar packages typically export the language as the defau
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/lite/chunker-treesitter.js
Tools 31
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
create-webhooknetwork egressdelete-webhooknetwork egresssubmit-documentingests untrusted inputask-questionno sensitive capabilitydelete-documentno sensitive capabilitydelete-linkno sensitive capabilitydelete-saved-searchno sensitive capabilityget-documentno sensitive capabilityget-document-linksno sensitive capabilityget-relatedno sensitive capability
Show 21 more tools ↓
health-checkno sensitive capabilityinstall-packno sensitive capabilitylink-documentsno sensitive capabilitylist-documentsno sensitive capabilitylist-packsno sensitive capabilitylist-saved-searchesno sensitive capabilitylist-topicsno sensitive capabilitylist-webhooksno sensitive capabilityrate-documentno sensitive capabilityreindex-documentsno sensitive capabilityrun-saved-searchno sensitive capabilitysave-searchno sensitive capabilitysearch-analyticsno sensitive capabilitysearch-docsno sensitive capabilitysuggest-tagsno sensitive capabilitysync-confluenceno sensitive capabilitysync-notionno sensitive capabilitysync-obsidian-vaultno sensitive capabilitysync-onenoteno sensitive capabilitysync-slackno sensitive capabilityupdate-documentno sensitive capability
Toxic flows 1
Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (31 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.8.0 latest |
A 94/100 | 6 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-09 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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