Lens Studio — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.13.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.
{
"tool": {
"name": "mcptrustchecker",
"version": "1.13.0",
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"target": {
"id": "lens-studio-mcp",
"source": {
"kind": "package",
"origin": "lens-studio-mcp"
},
"server": {
"name": "lens-studio-mcp"
}
},
"grade": "A",
"score": {
"score": 93,
"threatScore": 100,
"grade": "A",
"band": "A",
"categorySubtotals": {
"injection": 0,
"exfiltration": 0,
"permissions": 0,
"supply-chain": 0,
"network": 0,
"hygiene": 0
},
"vector": [
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "capability-exposure",
"level": "high",
"label": "capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated",
"appliedPenalty": 6
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "verification-discount",
"level": "repo",
"label": "publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable",
"appliedPenalty": 1
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "coverage-honesty",
"level": "source",
"label": "inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see",
"appliedPenalty": 0
}
],
"gatesFired": [],
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"capability": {
"level": "high",
"reasons": [
"can send data / act on an external service",
"reads sensitive or local data",
"has a read → egress path (a data-exfiltration surface)",
"can execute shell commands or code"
],
"tags": [
"external-sink",
"sensitive-source",
"code-exec"
]
},
"coverage": {
"level": "source",
"inputs": {
"toolSurface": true,
"implementationSource": true,
"packageMetadata": true,
"liveTransport": false
},
"caveats": [
"Tools were statically extracted from the published source (32 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
]
},
"findings": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-FLOW-004",
"title": "Sensitive-source and external-sink co-exist",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "Tools that read sensitive data ([ui_dump_menus]) and tools that can send data out ([ui_open_project]) are exposed together. An agent can move private data to the sink.",
"remediation": "Keep secret-reading and egress capabilities on separate, separately-approved servers.",
"location": {
"kind": "flow",
"name": "ui_dump_menus → ui_open_project"
},
"evidence": "sources [ui_dump_menus] → sinks [ui_open_project]",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"references": [],
"data": {
"sources": [
"ui_dump_menus"
],
"sinks": [
"ui_open_project"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (server.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`server.py:985`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "server.py"
},
"evidence": "Dict[str, Any]: p = subprocess.run(cmd, capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=15) return { \"returncode",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "server.py",
"line": 985,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (src/lens_studio_mcp/server.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/lens_studio_mcp/server.py:985`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/lens_studio_mcp/server.py"
},
"evidence": "Dict[str, Any]: p = subprocess.run(cmd, capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=15) return { \"returncode",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "src/lens_studio_mcp/server.py",
"line": 985,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SUP-012",
"title": "Package has no license",
"category": "hygiene",
"severity": "info",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "\"lens-studio-mcp\" has no declared license. This is a legal/reuse concern, not a security finding.",
"location": {
"kind": "package",
"name": "lens-studio-mcp"
}
}
],
"toxicFlows": [
{
"id": "flow-1",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"untrustedInput": [],
"sensitiveSource": [
"ui_dump_menus"
],
"externalSink": [
"ui_open_project"
],
"selfContained": false,
"path": [
"ui_dump_menus",
"ui_open_project"
],
"pathWired": false,
"description": "A sensitive-source → external-sink chain exists: ui_dump_menus → ui_open_project."
}
],
"capabilities": [
{
"tool": "connect",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "status",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_tools",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "lens_tool",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_scene",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "create_object",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "add_primitive",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "delete_object",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "create_asset",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "set_property",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "query_knowledge_base",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "create_material",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "set_color",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "assign_material",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_face_landmarks",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "create_face_anchor",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "add_face_element",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ui_activate",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ui_menu_click",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ui_new_project",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ui_save_project",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ui_open_project",
"tags": [
"external-sink"
],
"reasons": {
"external-sink": [
"keyword \"open_pr\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "ui_preview",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ui_keystroke",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ui_type_text",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ui_import_asset",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ui_export_lens",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ui_add_object",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ui_request_permissions",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ui_dump_menus",
"tags": [
"sensitive-source"
],
"reasons": {
"sensitive-source": [
"keyword \"dump\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "ui_list_buttons",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ui_click_button",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
}
],
"surfaceDigest": "13a6c9dac976b834cf16f5def4df7596d406512b2806426ebcc9ceff659bdf42",
"stats": {
"tools": 32,
"prompts": 0,
"resources": 0,
"findingsBySeverity": {
"critical": 0,
"high": 3,
"medium": 0,
"low": 0,
"info": 1
}
}
}