Lens Studio MCP Server
lens-studio-mcp
PyPI
v0.1.0
Published by superdwayne — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
MCP server that proxies AI agent requests to Lens Studio's built-in MCP server
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 3
high Sensitive-source and external-sink co-existMTC-FLOW-004
Tools that read sensitive data ([ui_dump_menus]) and tools that can send data out ([ui_open_project]) are exposed together. An agent can move private data to the sink.
Evidence: sources [ui_dump_menus] → sinks [ui_open_project]
Fix: Keep secret-reading and egress capabilities on separate, separately-approved servers.
Location: flow ui_dump_menus → ui_open_project
high Shell/command execution in server code (server.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`server.py:985`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: Dict[str, Any]: p = subprocess.run(cmd, capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=15) return { "returncode
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server server.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/lens_studio_mcp/server.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/lens_studio_mcp/server.py:985`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: Dict[str, Any]: p = subprocess.run(cmd, capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=15) return { "returncode
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/lens_studio_mcp/server.py
Tools 32
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
ui_dump_menusreads sensitive dataui_open_projectnetwork egressadd_face_elementno sensitive capabilityadd_primitiveno sensitive capabilityassign_materialno sensitive capabilityconnectno sensitive capabilitycreate_assetno sensitive capabilitycreate_face_anchorno sensitive capabilitycreate_materialno sensitive capabilitycreate_objectno sensitive capability
Show 22 more tools ↓
delete_objectno sensitive capabilityget_face_landmarksno sensitive capabilityget_sceneno sensitive capabilitylens_toolno sensitive capabilitylist_toolsno sensitive capabilityquery_knowledge_baseno sensitive capabilityset_colorno sensitive capabilityset_propertyno sensitive capabilitystatusno sensitive capabilityui_activateno sensitive capabilityui_add_objectno sensitive capabilityui_click_buttonno sensitive capabilityui_export_lensno sensitive capabilityui_import_assetno sensitive capabilityui_keystrokeno sensitive capabilityui_list_buttonsno sensitive capabilityui_menu_clickno sensitive capabilityui_new_projectno sensitive capabilityui_previewno sensitive capabilityui_request_permissionsno sensitive capabilityui_save_projectno sensitive capabilityui_type_textno sensitive capability
Toxic flows 1
Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (32 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.1.0 latest |
A 93/100 | 3 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-25 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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