Launchframe — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.13.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.
{
"tool": {
"name": "mcptrustchecker",
"version": "1.13.0",
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"target": {
"id": "@launchframe/mcp",
"source": {
"kind": "package",
"origin": "@launchframe/mcp"
},
"server": {
"name": "@launchframe/mcp"
}
},
"grade": "B",
"score": {
"score": 82,
"threatScore": 94,
"grade": "B",
"band": "B",
"categorySubtotals": {
"injection": 6.3,
"exfiltration": 0,
"permissions": 0,
"supply-chain": 0,
"network": 0,
"hygiene": 0
},
"vector": [
{
"kind": "threat",
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-009",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"rawWeight": 9,
"confidenceMult": 0.7,
"diminishingFactor": 1,
"appliedPenalty": 6.3
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "capability-exposure",
"level": "critical",
"label": "capability blast radius (critical) — client exposure if the model is manipulated",
"appliedPenalty": 10
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "verification-discount",
"level": "none",
"label": "publisher verification (unlinked) — no provenance/repo link, but the shipped source was fully read",
"appliedPenalty": 2
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "coverage-honesty",
"level": "source",
"label": "inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see",
"appliedPenalty": 0
}
],
"gatesFired": [],
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"capability": {
"level": "critical",
"reasons": [
"ingests untrusted external content (a prompt-injection entry point)",
"can send data / act on an external service",
"reads sensitive or local data",
"has a read → egress path (a data-exfiltration surface)",
"can execute shell commands or code",
"untrusted-input, sensitive-source and egress co-exist across tools (toxic-flow surface)",
"untrusted input can reach code execution"
],
"tags": [
"untrusted-input",
"sensitive-source",
"external-sink",
"code-exec"
]
},
"coverage": {
"level": "source",
"inputs": {
"toolSurface": true,
"implementationSource": true,
"packageMetadata": true,
"liveTransport": false
},
"caveats": [
"Tools were statically extracted from the published source (56 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
]
},
"findings": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-FLOW-002",
"title": "Completed toxic-flow trifecta across tools",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "critical",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "This server (without client built-ins) exposes a complete data-exfiltration chain: cli_docker_logs → env_get_conventions → webhook_get_architecture. Untrusted input is ingested, private data is read, and it can be sent to an external sink via the agent composing the tools (→). Static analysis proves the primitive exists, not that a specific run will occur.",
"remediation": "Remove one leg of the trifecta: isolate untrusted-input tools from secret-reading tools and from egress tools, or require human approval between them.",
"location": {
"kind": "flow",
"name": "cli_docker_logs → env_get_conventions → webhook_get_architecture"
},
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"references": [],
"data": {
"untrusted": [
"cli_docker_logs",
"cli_waitlist_logs"
],
"sources": [
"env_get_conventions"
],
"sinks": [
"webhook_get_architecture",
"webhook_scaffold_handler"
],
"path": [
"cli_docker_logs",
"env_get_conventions",
"webhook_get_architecture"
],
"edges": [
{
"from": "cli_docker_logs",
"to": "env_get_conventions",
"kind": "agent-mediated"
},
{
"from": "env_get_conventions",
"to": "webhook_get_architecture",
"kind": "agent-mediated"
}
],
"wired": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/tools/cli.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/tools/cli.js:2`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/tools/cli.js"
},
"evidence": "port { execSync } from 'child_process'; /** * Request human confirmation for a destructive action via MCP elicitation.",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/tools/cli.js",
"line": 2,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-009",
"title": "Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (dist/tools/cli.js)",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/tools/cli.js:44`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/tools/cli.js"
},
"evidence": "const output = execSync(`launchframe docker:up${svc} --detach`, { cwd: projectPath, encoding: 'utf8' });",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-009",
"file": "dist/tools/cli.js",
"line": 44,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SUP-011",
"title": "Package declares no source repository",
"category": "supply-chain",
"severity": "info",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "\"@launchframe/mcp\" declares no repository URL, so its published artifact cannot be compared against reviewable source.",
"remediation": "Prefer packages that link to public, reviewable source.",
"location": {
"kind": "package",
"name": "@launchframe/mcp"
}
}
],
"toxicFlows": [
{
"id": "flow-1",
"severity": "critical",
"confidence": "strong",
"untrustedInput": [
"cli_docker_logs",
"cli_waitlist_logs"
],
"sensitiveSource": [
"env_get_conventions"
],
"externalSink": [
"webhook_get_architecture",
"webhook_scaffold_handler"
],
"selfContained": false,
"path": [
"cli_docker_logs",
"env_get_conventions",
"webhook_get_architecture"
],
"pathWired": false,
"description": "A cross-tool exfiltration chain exists: cli_docker_logs → env_get_conventions → webhook_get_architecture."
}
],
"capabilities": [
{
"tool": "architecture_get_overview",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "auth_get_overview",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "auth_get_decorator_usage",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "auth_get_guard_usage",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "cli_docker_up",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "cli_docker_down",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "cli_docker_build",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "cli_docker_logs",
"tags": [
"untrusted-input"
],
"reasons": {
"untrusted-input": [
"keyword \"fetch\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "cli_docker_destroy",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "cli_migration_run",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "cli_migration_create",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "cli_migration_revert",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "cli_database_query",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "cli_service_list",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "cli_service_add",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "cli_module_list",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "cli_module_add",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "cli_deploy_build",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "cli_deploy_up",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "cli_deploy_sync_features",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "cli_waitlist_up",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "cli_waitlist_down",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "cli_waitlist_deploy",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "cli_waitlist_logs",
"tags": [
"untrusted-input"
],
"reasons": {
"untrusted-input": [
"keyword \"fetch\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "cli_dev_add_user",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "cli_dev_npm_install",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "cli_dev_logo",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "cli_cache_info",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "cli_cache_update",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "cli_cache_clear",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "credits_get_deduction_pattern",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "credits_get_add_pattern",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "credits_get_monetization_strategies",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "cron_get_pattern",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "cron_scaffold_job",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "database_schema",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "email_get_conventions",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "email_scaffold_template",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "email_scaffold_send",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "entity_get_conventions",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "entity_scaffold_typeorm",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "env_get_conventions",
"tags": [
"sensitive-source"
],
"reasons": {
"sensitive-source": [
"keyword \"get_env\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "feature_gates_get_overview",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "feature_gates_get_check_pattern",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "module_get_structure",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "module_scaffold_nestjs",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "queue_get_names",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "queue_scaffold_producer",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "queue_scaffold_processor",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "rbac_get_overview",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "rbac_get_permission_pattern",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "rbac_get_guard_usage",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "subscriptions_get_plans_overview",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "variant_get_overview",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "webhook_get_architecture",
"tags": [
"external-sink"
],
"reasons": {
"external-sink": [
"keyword \"webhook\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "webhook_scaffold_handler",
"tags": [
"external-sink"
],
"reasons": {
"external-sink": [
"keyword \"webhook\""
]
}
}
],
"surfaceDigest": "efdcaceda1e55307c7a0dbc262bb09cf2e8402b0658d6a3cfecc97c9ccb8e3f2",
"stats": {
"tools": 56,
"prompts": 0,
"resources": 0,
"findingsBySeverity": {
"critical": 1,
"high": 1,
"medium": 1,
"low": 0,
"info": 1
}
}
}