Launchframe MCP Server
@launchframe/mcp
npm
v1.1.14
Published by @launchframe — no publish provenance and no public repository, so the publisher could not be verified and the source cannot be independently located.
LaunchFrame MCP Server — knowledge tools for AI agents building LaunchFrame projects
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 6.3 = 94. What the published surface and source actually contain:
| Points | What was found | Category |
|---|---|---|
| −6.3 | Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink MTC-SRC-009 | injection |
2. Client adoption risk — 94 − 12 = 82. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −10 | capability blast radius (critical) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −2 | publisher verification (unlinked) — no provenance/repo link, but the shipped source was fully read |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 3
critical Completed toxic-flow trifecta across toolsMTC-FLOW-002
This server (without client built-ins) exposes a complete data-exfiltration chain: cli_docker_logs → env_get_conventions → webhook_get_architecture. Untrusted input is ingested, private data is read, and it can be sent to an external sink via the agent composing the tools (→). Static analysis proves the primitive exists, not that a specific run will occur.
Fix: Remove one leg of the trifecta: isolate untrusted-input tools from secret-reading tools and from egress tools, or require human approval between them.
Location: flow cli_docker_logs → env_get_conventions → webhook_get_architecture
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/tools/cli.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/tools/cli.js:2`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: port { execSync } from 'child_process'; /** * Request human confirmation for a destructive action via MCP elicitation.
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/tools/cli.js
medium Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (dist/tools/cli.js)MTC-SRC-009
In the server's implementation (`dist/tools/cli.js:44`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: const output = execSync(`launchframe docker:up${svc} --detach`, { cwd: projectPath, encoding: 'utf8' });
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/tools/cli.js
Tools 56
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
cli_docker_logsingests untrusted inputcli_waitlist_logsingests untrusted inputenv_get_conventionsreads sensitive datawebhook_get_architecturenetwork egresswebhook_scaffold_handlernetwork egressarchitecture_get_overviewno sensitive capabilityauth_get_decorator_usageno sensitive capabilityauth_get_guard_usageno sensitive capabilityauth_get_overviewno sensitive capabilitycli_cache_clearno sensitive capability
Show 46 more tools ↓
cli_cache_infono sensitive capabilitycli_cache_updateno sensitive capabilitycli_database_queryno sensitive capabilitycli_deploy_buildno sensitive capabilitycli_deploy_sync_featuresno sensitive capabilitycli_deploy_upno sensitive capabilitycli_dev_add_userno sensitive capabilitycli_dev_logono sensitive capabilitycli_dev_npm_installno sensitive capabilitycli_docker_buildno sensitive capabilitycli_docker_destroyno sensitive capabilitycli_docker_downno sensitive capabilitycli_docker_upno sensitive capabilitycli_migration_createno sensitive capabilitycli_migration_revertno sensitive capabilitycli_migration_runno sensitive capabilitycli_module_addno sensitive capabilitycli_module_listno sensitive capabilitycli_service_addno sensitive capabilitycli_service_listno sensitive capabilitycli_waitlist_deployno sensitive capabilitycli_waitlist_downno sensitive capabilitycli_waitlist_upno sensitive capabilitycredits_get_add_patternno sensitive capabilitycredits_get_deduction_patternno sensitive capabilitycredits_get_monetization_strategiesno sensitive capabilitycron_get_patternno sensitive capabilitycron_scaffold_jobno sensitive capabilitydatabase_schemano sensitive capabilityemail_get_conventionsno sensitive capabilityemail_scaffold_sendno sensitive capabilityemail_scaffold_templateno sensitive capabilityentity_get_conventionsno sensitive capabilityentity_scaffold_typeormno sensitive capabilityfeature_gates_get_check_patternno sensitive capabilityfeature_gates_get_overviewno sensitive capabilitymodule_get_structureno sensitive capabilitymodule_scaffold_nestjsno sensitive capabilityqueue_get_namesno sensitive capabilityqueue_scaffold_processorno sensitive capabilityqueue_scaffold_producerno sensitive capabilityrbac_get_guard_usageno sensitive capabilityrbac_get_overviewno sensitive capabilityrbac_get_permission_patternno sensitive capabilitysubscriptions_get_plans_overviewno sensitive capabilityvariant_get_overviewno sensitive capability
Toxic flows 1
Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (56 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.1.14 latest |
B 82/100 | 3 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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