Lacrm — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.13.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.
{
"tool": {
"name": "mcptrustchecker",
"version": "1.13.0",
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"target": {
"id": "lacrm-mcp",
"source": {
"kind": "package",
"origin": "lacrm-mcp"
},
"server": {
"name": "lacrm-mcp"
}
},
"grade": "A",
"score": {
"score": 93,
"threatScore": 100,
"grade": "A",
"band": "A",
"categorySubtotals": {
"injection": 0,
"exfiltration": 0,
"permissions": 0,
"supply-chain": 0,
"network": 0,
"hygiene": 0
},
"vector": [
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "capability-exposure",
"level": "high",
"label": "capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated",
"appliedPenalty": 6
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "verification-discount",
"level": "repo",
"label": "publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable",
"appliedPenalty": 1
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "coverage-honesty",
"level": "source",
"label": "inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see",
"appliedPenalty": 0
}
],
"gatesFired": [],
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"capability": {
"level": "high",
"reasons": [
"ingests untrusted external content (a prompt-injection entry point)",
"can send data / act on an external service",
"can create, modify or delete files",
"reads sensitive or local data",
"has a read → egress path (a data-exfiltration surface)",
"can execute shell commands or code"
],
"tags": [
"file-write",
"untrusted-input",
"external-sink",
"sensitive-source",
"code-exec"
]
},
"coverage": {
"level": "source",
"inputs": {
"toolSurface": true,
"implementationSource": true,
"packageMetadata": true,
"liveTransport": false
},
"caveats": [
"Tools were statically extracted from the published source (88 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
]
},
"findings": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-006",
"title": "Reads a sensitive credential path or dumps the environment (build/tools/files/index.js)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`build/tools/files/index.js:38`): Reading private keys / cloud credentials, or serializing the whole environment, is a sensitive-data source that becomes exfiltration when combined with any egress. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "build/tools/files/index.js"
},
"evidence": "redentials', 'secrets', '.npmrc', '.pypirc' ]); for (const segment of segments) { if (forbiddenExact.has",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-006",
"file": "build/tools/files/index.js",
"line": 38,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (build/tools/bulk/async-delivery.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`build/tools/bulk/async-delivery.js:35`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "build/tools/bulk/async-delivery.js"
},
"evidence": "{ execFile } from 'node:child_process'; import { logger } from '../../utils/logger.js'; /** Ledger skill name reported w",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "build/tools/bulk/async-delivery.js",
"line": 35,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (build/tools/bulk/index.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`build/tools/bulk/index.js:21`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "build/tools/bulk/index.js"
},
"evidence": "rt { spawn } from 'node:child_process'; import { readFileSync } from 'node:fs'; import { randomUUID } from 'node:crypto'",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "build/tools/bulk/index.js",
"line": 21,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-FLOW-005",
"title": "Untrusted input can drive an external action",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "Untrusted-input tools ([get_file]) co-exist with external-action tools ([create_pipeline_item, create_webhook, delete_webhook]). A prompt injection could cause unwanted external actions, though no direct sensitive-data leak path was found.",
"remediation": "Require confirmation for state-changing/egress actions triggered after processing untrusted content.",
"location": {
"kind": "flow",
"name": "get_file → create_pipeline_item"
},
"evidence": "untrusted [get_file] → sinks [create_pipeline_item, create_webhook, delete_webhook]",
"owasp": "LLM06:2025 Excessive Agency",
"references": [],
"data": {
"untrusted": [
"get_file"
],
"sinks": [
"create_pipeline_item",
"create_webhook",
"delete_webhook"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-007",
"title": "Unconstrained URL/host parameter \"endpoint_url\" on \"create_webhook\"",
"category": "network",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"create_webhook\" takes a URL/host parameter \"endpoint_url\" with no allowlist/pattern. An outbound-request tool with an unbounded destination enables SSRF and cloud-metadata access (e.g. 169.254.169.254).",
"remediation": "Allowlist destinations or constrain the parameter; block private/link-local addresses server-side.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "create_webhook",
"field": "inputSchema.properties.endpoint_url"
},
"owasp": "LLM06:2025 Excessive Agency",
"data": {
"param": "endpoint_url"
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-002",
"title": "Tool \"create_file\" can modify the filesystem",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "Tool \"create_file\" can write, overwrite or delete files (keyword \"create_file\" in tool name). Verify it is scoped to a safe directory.",
"remediation": "Constrain file operations to an explicit, non-sensitive root; reject path traversal.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "create_file"
},
"data": {
"tags": [
"file-write"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-005",
"title": "Mutating tool \"create_file\" declares no destructiveHint",
"category": "hygiene",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"create_file\" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.",
"remediation": "Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "create_file"
},
"data": {
"tags": [
"file-write"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-008",
"title": "Unconstrained path parameter \"file_base64\" on \"create_file\"",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"create_file\" takes a path parameter \"file_base64\" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.",
"remediation": "Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "create_file",
"field": "inputSchema.properties.file_base64"
},
"data": {
"param": "file_base64"
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-008",
"title": "Unconstrained path parameter \"file_path\" on \"create_file\"",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"create_file\" takes a path parameter \"file_path\" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.",
"remediation": "Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "create_file",
"field": "inputSchema.properties.file_path"
},
"data": {
"param": "file_path"
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-008",
"title": "Unconstrained path parameter \"file_name\" on \"create_file\"",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"create_file\" takes a path parameter \"file_name\" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.",
"remediation": "Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "create_file",
"field": "inputSchema.properties.file_name"
},
"data": {
"param": "file_name"
}
}
],
"toxicFlows": [
{
"id": "flow-1",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"untrustedInput": [
"get_file"
],
"sensitiveSource": [],
"externalSink": [
"create_pipeline_item",
"create_webhook",
"delete_webhook"
],
"selfContained": false,
"description": "Untrusted input can drive an external action even though no sensitive source is exposed."
}
],
"capabilities": [
{
"tool": "bulk_generate_template",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "bulk_validate_csv",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "bulk_execute",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "bulk_run_status",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "bulk_run_resume",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "create_contact",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "edit_contact",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "delete_contact",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_contact",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_contacts_by_ids",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "search_contacts",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_workflow_guide",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_custom_fields",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_pipeline_custom_fields",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_pipelines",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_groups",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_users",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_calendars",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_contact_schema",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_company_schema",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_pipeline_item_schema",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "create_email",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_email",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "search_emails",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_emails_attached_to_contact",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "delete_email",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "create_event",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "edit_event",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "delete_event",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_event",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "search_events",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_events_attached_to_contact",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "create_file",
"tags": [
"file-write"
],
"reasons": {
"file-write": [
"keyword \"create_file\" in tool name"
]
}
},
{
"tool": "get_file",
"tags": [
"untrusted-input"
],
"reasons": {
"untrusted-input": [
"keyword \"download\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "get_files_attached_to_contact",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "add_contact_to_group",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "remove_contact_from_group",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_groups_for_contact",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_contacts_in_group",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "create_note",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "edit_note",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "delete_note",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_note",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "search_notes",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_notes_attached_to_contact",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "create_pipeline_item",
"tags": [
"external-sink"
],
"reasons": {
"external-sink": [
"keyword \"send_email\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "edit_pipeline_item",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "delete_pipeline_item",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "delete_pipeline_items_bulk",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_pipeline_item",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "search_pipeline_items",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_pipeline_items_attached_to_contact",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "create_relationship",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "edit_relationship",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "delete_relationship",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_relationship",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_relationships_attached_to_contact",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "create_custom_field",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "edit_custom_field",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "delete_custom_field",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_custom_field",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "create_group",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "edit_group",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "delete_group",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_group",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "create_pipeline_status",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "edit_pipeline_status",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "delete_pipeline_status",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_pipeline_statuses",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "create_pipeline",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "edit_pipeline",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "delete_pipeline",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_pipeline",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "create_team",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "edit_team",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "delete_team",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_team",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_teams",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "create_webhook",
"tags": [
"external-sink"
],
"reasons": {
"external-sink": [
"keyword \"webhook\"",
"parameter \"webhook\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "get_webhook",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_webhooks",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "delete_webhook",
"tags": [
"external-sink"
],
"reasons": {
"external-sink": [
"keyword \"webhook\"",
"parameter \"webhook\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "create_task",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "edit_task",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "delete_task",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_task",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "search_tasks",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_tasks_attached_to_contact",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
}
],
"surfaceDigest": "c343679b89b4f8c54f1ca919fb88bdc9025573f89930703f180a1d0e51dac59d",
"stats": {
"tools": 88,
"prompts": 0,
"resources": 0,
"findingsBySeverity": {
"critical": 0,
"high": 3,
"medium": 3,
"low": 4,
"info": 0
}
}
}