Lacrm MCP Server
lacrm-mcp
npm
v1.9.3
Published by optimize-overseas — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
MCP server for Less Annoying CRM - 87 tools for contacts, pipelines, tasks, events, bulk CSV, and more
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 10
high Reads a sensitive credential path or dumps the environment (build/tools/files/index.js)MTC-SRC-006
In the server's implementation (`build/tools/files/index.js:38`): Reading private keys / cloud credentials, or serializing the whole environment, is a sensitive-data source that becomes exfiltration when combined with any egress. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: redentials', 'secrets', '.npmrc', '.pypirc' ]); for (const segment of segments) { if (forbiddenExact.has
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server build/tools/files/index.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (build/tools/bulk/async-delivery.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`build/tools/bulk/async-delivery.js:35`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { execFile } from 'node:child_process'; import { logger } from '../../utils/logger.js'; /** Ledger skill name reported w
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server build/tools/bulk/async-delivery.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (build/tools/bulk/index.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`build/tools/bulk/index.js:21`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: rt { spawn } from 'node:child_process'; import { readFileSync } from 'node:fs'; import { randomUUID } from 'node:crypto'
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server build/tools/bulk/index.js
medium Untrusted input can drive an external actionMTC-FLOW-005
Untrusted-input tools ([get_file]) co-exist with external-action tools ([create_pipeline_item, create_webhook, delete_webhook]). A prompt injection could cause unwanted external actions, though no direct sensitive-data leak path was found.
Evidence: untrusted [get_file] → sinks [create_pipeline_item, create_webhook, delete_webhook]
Fix: Require confirmation for state-changing/egress actions triggered after processing untrusted content.
Location: flow get_file → create_pipeline_item
medium Unconstrained URL/host parameter "endpoint_url" on "create_webhook"MTC-CAP-007
Tool "create_webhook" takes a URL/host parameter "endpoint_url" with no allowlist/pattern. An outbound-request tool with an unbounded destination enables SSRF and cloud-metadata access (e.g. 169.254.169.254).
Fix: Allowlist destinations or constrain the parameter; block private/link-local addresses server-side.
Location: tool create_webhook · inputSchema.properties.endpoint_url
medium Tool "create_file" can modify the filesystemMTC-CAP-002
Tool "create_file" can write, overwrite or delete files (keyword "create_file" in tool name). Verify it is scoped to a safe directory.
Fix: Constrain file operations to an explicit, non-sensitive root; reject path traversal.
Location: tool create_file
low Mutating tool "create_file" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "create_file" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool create_file
low Unconstrained path parameter "file_base64" on "create_file"MTC-CAP-008
Tool "create_file" takes a path parameter "file_base64" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.
Fix: Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.
Location: tool create_file · inputSchema.properties.file_base64
low Unconstrained path parameter "file_path" on "create_file"MTC-CAP-008
Tool "create_file" takes a path parameter "file_path" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.
Fix: Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.
Location: tool create_file · inputSchema.properties.file_path
low Unconstrained path parameter "file_name" on "create_file"MTC-CAP-008
Tool "create_file" takes a path parameter "file_name" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.
Fix: Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.
Location: tool create_file · inputSchema.properties.file_name
Tools 88
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
create_filewrites filescreate_pipeline_itemnetwork egresscreate_webhooknetwork egressdelete_webhooknetwork egressget_fileingests untrusted inputadd_contact_to_groupno sensitive capabilitybulk_executeno sensitive capabilitybulk_generate_templateno sensitive capabilitybulk_run_resumeno sensitive capabilitybulk_run_statusno sensitive capability
Show 78 more tools ↓
bulk_validate_csvno sensitive capabilitycreate_contactno sensitive capabilitycreate_custom_fieldno sensitive capabilitycreate_emailno sensitive capabilitycreate_eventno sensitive capabilitycreate_groupno sensitive capabilitycreate_noteno sensitive capabilitycreate_pipelineno sensitive capabilitycreate_pipeline_statusno sensitive capabilitycreate_relationshipno sensitive capabilitycreate_taskno sensitive capabilitycreate_teamno sensitive capabilitydelete_contactno sensitive capabilitydelete_custom_fieldno sensitive capabilitydelete_emailno sensitive capabilitydelete_eventno sensitive capabilitydelete_groupno sensitive capabilitydelete_noteno sensitive capabilitydelete_pipelineno sensitive capabilitydelete_pipeline_itemno sensitive capabilitydelete_pipeline_items_bulkno sensitive capabilitydelete_pipeline_statusno sensitive capabilitydelete_relationshipno sensitive capabilitydelete_taskno sensitive capabilitydelete_teamno sensitive capabilityedit_contactno sensitive capabilityedit_custom_fieldno sensitive capabilityedit_eventno sensitive capabilityedit_groupno sensitive capabilityedit_noteno sensitive capabilityedit_pipelineno sensitive capabilityedit_pipeline_itemno sensitive capabilityedit_pipeline_statusno sensitive capabilityedit_relationshipno sensitive capabilityedit_taskno sensitive capabilityedit_teamno sensitive capabilityget_calendarsno sensitive capabilityget_company_schemano sensitive capabilityget_contactno sensitive capabilityget_contact_schemano sensitive capabilityget_contacts_by_idsno sensitive capabilityget_contacts_in_groupno sensitive capabilityget_custom_fieldno sensitive capabilityget_custom_fieldsno sensitive capabilityget_emailno sensitive capabilityget_emails_attached_to_contactno sensitive capabilityget_eventno sensitive capabilityget_events_attached_to_contactno sensitive capabilityget_files_attached_to_contactno sensitive capabilityget_groupno sensitive capabilityget_groupsno sensitive capabilityget_groups_for_contactno sensitive capabilityget_noteno sensitive capabilityget_notes_attached_to_contactno sensitive capabilityget_pipelineno sensitive capabilityget_pipeline_custom_fieldsno sensitive capabilityget_pipeline_itemno sensitive capabilityget_pipeline_item_schemano sensitive capabilityget_pipeline_items_attached_to_contactno sensitive capabilityget_pipeline_statusesno sensitive capabilityget_pipelinesno sensitive capabilityget_relationshipno sensitive capabilityget_relationships_attached_to_contactno sensitive capabilityget_taskno sensitive capabilityget_tasks_attached_to_contactno sensitive capabilityget_teamno sensitive capabilityget_teamsno sensitive capabilityget_usersno sensitive capabilityget_webhookno sensitive capabilityget_webhooksno sensitive capabilityget_workflow_guideno sensitive capabilityremove_contact_from_groupno sensitive capabilitysearch_contactsno sensitive capabilitysearch_emailsno sensitive capabilitysearch_eventsno sensitive capabilitysearch_notesno sensitive capabilitysearch_pipeline_itemsno sensitive capabilitysearch_tasksno sensitive capability
Toxic flows 1
Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (88 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 3
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.9.3 latest |
A 93/100 | 10 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
v1.9.2 |
A 93/100 | 10 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-25 |
v1.9.1 |
A 93/100 | 10 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-20 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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