Kubectl — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.13.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.
{
"tool": {
"name": "mcptrustchecker",
"version": "1.13.0",
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"target": {
"id": "kubectl-mcp-server",
"source": {
"kind": "package",
"origin": "kubectl-mcp-server"
},
"server": {
"name": "kubectl-mcp-server"
}
},
"grade": "A",
"score": {
"score": 93,
"threatScore": 100,
"grade": "A",
"band": "A",
"categorySubtotals": {
"injection": 0,
"exfiltration": 0,
"permissions": 0,
"supply-chain": 0,
"network": 0,
"hygiene": 0
},
"vector": [
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "capability-exposure",
"level": "high",
"label": "capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated",
"appliedPenalty": 6
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "verification-discount",
"level": "repo",
"label": "publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable",
"appliedPenalty": 1
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "coverage-honesty",
"level": "source",
"label": "inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see",
"appliedPenalty": 0
}
],
"gatesFired": [],
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"capability": {
"level": "high",
"reasons": [
"can execute shell commands or code"
],
"tags": [
"code-exec"
]
},
"coverage": {
"level": "source",
"inputs": {
"toolSurface": true,
"implementationSource": true,
"packageMetadata": true,
"liveTransport": false
},
"caveats": [
"Tools were statically extracted from the published source (37 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
]
},
"findings": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-001",
"title": "Tool \"kind_node_exec_tool\" exposes command/code execution",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "Tool \"kind_node_exec_tool\" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword \"exec\" in tool name). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.",
"remediation": "Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "kind_node_exec_tool"
},
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"tags": [
"code-exec"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (kubectl_mcp_tool/cli/cli.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`kubectl_mcp_tool/cli/cli.py:347`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "kubectl_mcp_tool/cli/cli.py"
},
"evidence": "R result = subprocess.run( [\"kubectl\", \"config\", \"use-context\", args.name],",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "kubectl_mcp_tool/cli/cli.py",
"line": 347,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (kubectl_mcp_tool/crd_detector.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`kubectl_mcp_tool/crd_detector.py:93`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "kubectl_mcp_tool/crd_detector.py"
},
"evidence": "] result = subprocess.run(cmd, capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=30) if result.returncode ==",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "kubectl_mcp_tool/crd_detector.py",
"line": 93,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (kubectl_mcp_tool/diagnostics.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`kubectl_mcp_tool/diagnostics.py:20`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "kubectl_mcp_tool/diagnostics.py"
},
"evidence": "y: result = subprocess.run(cmd, capture_output=True, text=True, check=True) return result.stdout",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "kubectl_mcp_tool/diagnostics.py",
"line": 20,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (kubectl_mcp_tool/mcp_server.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`kubectl_mcp_tool/mcp_server.py:373`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "kubectl_mcp_tool/mcp_server.py"
},
"evidence": "bectl\": subprocess.check_output( [tool, \"version\", \"--client\", \"--output=json\"],",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "kubectl_mcp_tool/mcp_server.py",
"line": 373,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (kubectl_mcp_tool/resources/resources.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`kubectl_mcp_tool/resources/resources.py:192`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "kubectl_mcp_tool/resources/resources.py"
},
"evidence": "y: result = subprocess.run( [\"kubectl\", \"api-resources\", \"--output=wide\"], c",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "kubectl_mcp_tool/resources/resources.py",
"line": 192,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (kubectl_mcp_tool/tools/_cli_utils.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`kubectl_mcp_tool/tools/_cli_utils.py:10`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "kubectl_mcp_tool/tools/_cli_utils.py"
},
"evidence": "try: result = subprocess.run( [binary, \"version\"], capture_output=True, ti",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "kubectl_mcp_tool/tools/_cli_utils.py",
"line": 10,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (kubectl_mcp_tool/tools/backup.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`kubectl_mcp_tool/tools/backup.py:29`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "kubectl_mcp_tool/tools/backup.py"
},
"evidence": "try: result = subprocess.run([\"velero\", \"version\", \"--client-only\"], capture_o",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "kubectl_mcp_tool/tools/backup.py",
"line": 29,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (kubectl_mcp_tool/tools/browser.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`kubectl_mcp_tool/tools/browser.py:102`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "kubectl_mcp_tool/tools/browser.py"
},
"evidence": "try: result = subprocess.run(cmd, capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=timeout) if result.returnco",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "kubectl_mcp_tool/tools/browser.py",
"line": 102,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (kubectl_mcp_tool/tools/capi.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`kubectl_mcp_tool/tools/capi.py:30`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "kubectl_mcp_tool/tools/capi.py"
},
"evidence": "try: result = subprocess.run([\"clusterctl\", \"version\"], capture_output=True, timeout=5) return result.",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "kubectl_mcp_tool/tools/capi.py",
"line": 30,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (kubectl_mcp_tool/tools/certs.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`kubectl_mcp_tool/tools/certs.py:338`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "kubectl_mcp_tool/tools/certs.py"
},
"evidence": "try: check = subprocess.run([\"cmctl\", \"version\"], capture_output=True, timeout=5) cmctl_available = c",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "kubectl_mcp_tool/tools/certs.py",
"line": 338,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-005",
"title": "Mutating tool \"kind_node_exec_tool\" declares no destructiveHint",
"category": "hygiene",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"kind_node_exec_tool\" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.",
"remediation": "Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "kind_node_exec_tool"
},
"data": {
"tags": [
"code-exec"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SUP-012",
"title": "Package has no license",
"category": "hygiene",
"severity": "info",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "\"kubectl-mcp-server\" has no declared license. This is a legal/reuse concern, not a security finding.",
"location": {
"kind": "package",
"name": "kubectl-mcp-server"
}
}
],
"toxicFlows": [],
"capabilities": [
{
"tool": "backup_create_tool",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "backup_delete_tool",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "restore_create_tool",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "backup_schedule_create_tool",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "capi_machinedeployment_scale_tool",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "certs_renew_tool",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "gitops_app_sync_tool",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "kind_create_cluster_tool",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "kind_delete_cluster_tool",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "kind_delete_all_clusters_tool",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "kind_load_image_tool",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "kind_load_image_archive_tool",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "kind_build_node_image_tool",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "kind_set_kubeconfig_tool",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "kind_registry_create_tool",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "kind_registry_connect_tool",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "kind_node_exec_tool",
"tags": [
"code-exec"
],
"reasons": {
"code-exec": [
"keyword \"exec\" in tool name"
]
}
},
{
"tool": "kind_node_restart_tool",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "kind_ingress_setup_tool",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "kubevirt_vm_start_tool",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "kubevirt_vm_stop_tool",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "kubevirt_vm_restart_tool",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "kubevirt_vm_pause_tool",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "kubevirt_vm_unpause_tool",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "kubevirt_vm_migrate_tool",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "rollout_promote_tool",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "rollout_abort_tool",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "rollout_retry_tool",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "rollout_restart_tool",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "vind_create_cluster_tool",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "vind_delete_cluster_tool",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "vind_pause_tool",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "vind_resume_tool",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "vind_connect_tool",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "vind_disconnect_tool",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "vind_upgrade_tool",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "vind_platform_start_tool",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
}
],
"surfaceDigest": "27d3c62207c5768393f8387727d7510e4be60c3fac9aca28031a967983e73d8f",
"stats": {
"tools": 37,
"prompts": 0,
"resources": 0,
"findingsBySeverity": {
"critical": 0,
"high": 11,
"medium": 0,
"low": 1,
"info": 1
}
}
}