Kubectl (rohitg00) MCP Server
kubectl-mcp-server
PyPI
v1.24.0
Published by rohitg00 — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
A Model Context Protocol (MCP) server for Kubernetes with 270+ tools, 8 resources, and 8 prompts
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 12
high Tool "kind_node_exec_tool" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "kind_node_exec_tool" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "exec" in tool name). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool kind_node_exec_tool
high Shell/command execution in server code (kubectl_mcp_tool/cli/cli.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`kubectl_mcp_tool/cli/cli.py:347`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: R result = subprocess.run( ["kubectl", "config", "use-context", args.name],
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server kubectl_mcp_tool/cli/cli.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (kubectl_mcp_tool/crd_detector.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`kubectl_mcp_tool/crd_detector.py:93`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ] result = subprocess.run(cmd, capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=30) if result.returncode ==
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server kubectl_mcp_tool/crd_detector.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (kubectl_mcp_tool/diagnostics.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`kubectl_mcp_tool/diagnostics.py:20`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: y: result = subprocess.run(cmd, capture_output=True, text=True, check=True) return result.stdout
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server kubectl_mcp_tool/diagnostics.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (kubectl_mcp_tool/mcp_server.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`kubectl_mcp_tool/mcp_server.py:373`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: bectl": subprocess.check_output( [tool, "version", "--client", "--output=json"],
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server kubectl_mcp_tool/mcp_server.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (kubectl_mcp_tool/resources/resources.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`kubectl_mcp_tool/resources/resources.py:192`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: y: result = subprocess.run( ["kubectl", "api-resources", "--output=wide"], c
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server kubectl_mcp_tool/resources/resources.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (kubectl_mcp_tool/tools/_cli_utils.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`kubectl_mcp_tool/tools/_cli_utils.py:10`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: try: result = subprocess.run( [binary, "version"], capture_output=True, ti
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server kubectl_mcp_tool/tools/_cli_utils.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (kubectl_mcp_tool/tools/backup.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`kubectl_mcp_tool/tools/backup.py:29`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: try: result = subprocess.run(["velero", "version", "--client-only"], capture_o
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server kubectl_mcp_tool/tools/backup.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (kubectl_mcp_tool/tools/browser.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`kubectl_mcp_tool/tools/browser.py:102`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: try: result = subprocess.run(cmd, capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=timeout) if result.returnco
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server kubectl_mcp_tool/tools/browser.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (kubectl_mcp_tool/tools/capi.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`kubectl_mcp_tool/tools/capi.py:30`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: try: result = subprocess.run(["clusterctl", "version"], capture_output=True, timeout=5) return result.
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server kubectl_mcp_tool/tools/capi.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (kubectl_mcp_tool/tools/certs.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`kubectl_mcp_tool/tools/certs.py:338`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: try: check = subprocess.run(["cmctl", "version"], capture_output=True, timeout=5) cmctl_available = c
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server kubectl_mcp_tool/tools/certs.py
low Mutating tool "kind_node_exec_tool" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "kind_node_exec_tool" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool kind_node_exec_tool
Tools 37
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
kind_node_exec_toolruns code / shellbackup_create_toolno sensitive capabilitybackup_delete_toolno sensitive capabilitybackup_schedule_create_toolno sensitive capabilitycapi_machinedeployment_scale_toolno sensitive capabilitycerts_renew_toolno sensitive capabilitygitops_app_sync_toolno sensitive capabilitykind_build_node_image_toolno sensitive capabilitykind_create_cluster_toolno sensitive capabilitykind_delete_all_clusters_toolno sensitive capability
Show 27 more tools ↓
kind_delete_cluster_toolno sensitive capabilitykind_ingress_setup_toolno sensitive capabilitykind_load_image_archive_toolno sensitive capabilitykind_load_image_toolno sensitive capabilitykind_node_restart_toolno sensitive capabilitykind_registry_connect_toolno sensitive capabilitykind_registry_create_toolno sensitive capabilitykind_set_kubeconfig_toolno sensitive capabilitykubevirt_vm_migrate_toolno sensitive capabilitykubevirt_vm_pause_toolno sensitive capabilitykubevirt_vm_restart_toolno sensitive capabilitykubevirt_vm_start_toolno sensitive capabilitykubevirt_vm_stop_toolno sensitive capabilitykubevirt_vm_unpause_toolno sensitive capabilityrestore_create_toolno sensitive capabilityrollout_abort_toolno sensitive capabilityrollout_promote_toolno sensitive capabilityrollout_restart_toolno sensitive capabilityrollout_retry_toolno sensitive capabilityvind_connect_toolno sensitive capabilityvind_create_cluster_toolno sensitive capabilityvind_delete_cluster_toolno sensitive capabilityvind_disconnect_toolno sensitive capabilityvind_pause_toolno sensitive capabilityvind_platform_start_toolno sensitive capabilityvind_resume_toolno sensitive capabilityvind_upgrade_toolno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (37 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.24.0 latest |
A 93/100 | 12 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-25 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan kubectl-mcp-server --online --registry pypiOther implementations of Kubectl 1
Independent packages implementing the same tool, scanned with the same engine. Compare all 2 side by side →
More in Security & Testing
The Stripe Agent Toolkit enables popular agent frameworks including LangChain and Vercel's AI SDK to integrate with Stripe APIs through function calling.
MCP (Model Context Protocol) server for AgentGate. Enables Claude and other MCP-compatible AI assistants to request approvals.
Scan any website for AI agent readiness, payment protocols, and discovery endpoints
MCP server for aigently security guardrails — reads static catalog-data JSON, zero API dependency
Governed threat modeling, code threat verification, traceability & compliance, as MCP tools.
Governed threat modeling, code threat verification, traceability & compliance, as MCP tools.