Kontexta — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.13.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.
{
"tool": {
"name": "mcptrustchecker",
"version": "1.13.0",
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"target": {
"id": "kontexta-mcp",
"source": {
"kind": "package",
"origin": "kontexta-mcp"
},
"server": {
"name": "kontexta-mcp"
}
},
"grade": "A",
"score": {
"score": 90,
"threatScore": 96,
"grade": "A",
"band": "A",
"categorySubtotals": {
"injection": 0,
"exfiltration": 0,
"permissions": 0,
"supply-chain": 3.6,
"network": 0,
"hygiene": 0
},
"vector": [
{
"kind": "threat",
"ruleId": "MTC-SUP-005",
"category": "supply-chain",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"rawWeight": 9,
"confidenceMult": 0.4,
"diminishingFactor": 1,
"appliedPenalty": 3.6
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "capability-exposure",
"level": "high",
"label": "capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated",
"appliedPenalty": 6
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "verification-discount",
"level": "source",
"label": "publisher verification (provenance) — cryptographic build provenance ties the artifact to its source",
"appliedPenalty": 0
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "coverage-honesty",
"level": "source",
"label": "inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see",
"appliedPenalty": 0
}
],
"gatesFired": [],
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"capability": {
"level": "high",
"reasons": [
"can create, modify or delete files",
"reads sensitive or local data",
"has a read → egress path (a data-exfiltration surface)",
"can execute shell commands or code"
],
"tags": [
"file-write",
"sensitive-source",
"code-exec"
]
},
"coverage": {
"level": "source",
"inputs": {
"toolSurface": true,
"implementationSource": true,
"packageMetadata": true,
"liveTransport": false
},
"caveats": [
"Tools were statically extracted from the published source (70 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
]
},
"findings": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-006",
"title": "Reads a sensitive credential path or dumps the environment (dist/index.js)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/index.js:95`): Reading private keys / cloud credentials, or serializing the whole environment, is a sensitive-data source that becomes exfiltration when combined with any egress. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/index.js"
},
"evidence": "ws\", \".gnupg\", \".kube\", \".config/gcloud\", \".docker\"].map((p) => `${home}/${p}`); } function safeMkdir(dir) { try {",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-006",
"file": "dist/index.js",
"line": 95,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/index.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/index.js:625`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/index.js"
},
"evidence": "ort { spawnSync } from \"child_process\"; function redactCredentials(s) { return s.replace(/([a-z][a-z0-9+.-]*:\\/\\/)([^:",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/index.js",
"line": 625,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-002",
"title": "Tool \"create_file\" can modify the filesystem",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "Tool \"create_file\" can write, overwrite or delete files (keyword \"create_file\" in tool name). Verify it is scoped to a safe directory.",
"remediation": "Constrain file operations to an explicit, non-sensitive root; reject path traversal.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "create_file"
},
"data": {
"tags": [
"file-write"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-002",
"title": "Tool \"delete_file\" can modify the filesystem",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "Tool \"delete_file\" can write, overwrite or delete files (keyword \"delete_file\" in tool name). Verify it is scoped to a safe directory.",
"remediation": "Constrain file operations to an explicit, non-sensitive root; reject path traversal.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "delete_file"
},
"data": {
"tags": [
"file-write"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-002",
"title": "Tool \"move_file\" can modify the filesystem",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "Tool \"move_file\" can write, overwrite or delete files (keyword \"move_file\" in tool name). Verify it is scoped to a safe directory.",
"remediation": "Constrain file operations to an explicit, non-sensitive root; reject path traversal.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "move_file"
},
"data": {
"tags": [
"file-write"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-002",
"title": "Tool \"create_files\" can modify the filesystem",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "Tool \"create_files\" can write, overwrite or delete files (keyword \"create_file\" in tool name). Verify it is scoped to a safe directory.",
"remediation": "Constrain file operations to an explicit, non-sensitive root; reject path traversal.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "create_files"
},
"data": {
"tags": [
"file-write"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-002",
"title": "Tool \"delete_files\" can modify the filesystem",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "Tool \"delete_files\" can write, overwrite or delete files (keyword \"delete_file\" in tool name). Verify it is scoped to a safe directory.",
"remediation": "Constrain file operations to an explicit, non-sensitive root; reject path traversal.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "delete_files"
},
"data": {
"tags": [
"file-write"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SUP-005",
"title": "Near-miss of @upstash/context7-mcp (edit distance 2)",
"category": "supply-chain",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "\"kontexta-mcp\" is edit-distance 2 from the high-traffic package \"@upstash/context7-mcp\". Its own download count is negligible, consistent with a squat.",
"remediation": "Confirm you meant \"@upstash/context7-mcp\". Install packages only from their documented, official name.",
"location": {
"kind": "package",
"name": "kontexta-mcp"
},
"owasp": "LLM03:2025 Supply Chain",
"references": [
"https://github.com/ossf/package-analysis",
"https://owasp.org/www-project-top-10-ci-cd-security-risks/"
],
"data": {
"candidate": "kontexta-mcp",
"target": "@upstash/context7-mcp"
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-005",
"title": "Mutating tool \"create_file\" declares no destructiveHint",
"category": "hygiene",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"create_file\" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.",
"remediation": "Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "create_file"
},
"data": {
"tags": [
"file-write"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-005",
"title": "Mutating tool \"delete_file\" declares no destructiveHint",
"category": "hygiene",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"delete_file\" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.",
"remediation": "Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "delete_file"
},
"data": {
"tags": [
"file-write"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-005",
"title": "Mutating tool \"move_file\" declares no destructiveHint",
"category": "hygiene",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"move_file\" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.",
"remediation": "Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "move_file"
},
"data": {
"tags": [
"file-write"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-005",
"title": "Mutating tool \"create_files\" declares no destructiveHint",
"category": "hygiene",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"create_files\" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.",
"remediation": "Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "create_files"
},
"data": {
"tags": [
"file-write"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-005",
"title": "Mutating tool \"delete_files\" declares no destructiveHint",
"category": "hygiene",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"delete_files\" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.",
"remediation": "Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "delete_files"
},
"data": {
"tags": [
"file-write"
]
}
}
],
"toxicFlows": [],
"capabilities": [
{
"tool": "journal_note",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "journal_intent",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "distill_journal",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "journal_status",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "distill_journal_commit_upgrades",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "housekeep_journal",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "calendar_add_entity",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "calendar_update_entity",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "calendar_delete_entity",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "calendar_list_entities",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "calendar_link_entities",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "calendar_add_event",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "calendar_update_event",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "calendar_delete_event",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "calendar_list_events",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "calendar_conflicts",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "calendar_export_ics",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "journal_append",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "create_file",
"tags": [
"file-write"
],
"reasons": {
"file-write": [
"keyword \"create_file\" in tool name"
]
}
},
{
"tool": "add_report_resource",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_report_resources",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "delete_report_resource",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "export_report",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "read_file",
"tags": [
"sensitive-source"
],
"reasons": {
"sensitive-source": [
"keyword \"read_file\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "read_files",
"tags": [
"sensitive-source"
],
"reasons": {
"sensitive-source": [
"keyword \"read_file\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "describe_file",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "read_file_lines",
"tags": [
"sensitive-source"
],
"reasons": {
"sensitive-source": [
"keyword \"read_file\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "grep_in_file",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "regex_search",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "update_file",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "delete_file",
"tags": [
"file-write"
],
"reasons": {
"file-write": [
"keyword \"delete_file\" in tool name"
]
}
},
{
"tool": "list_files",
"tags": [
"sensitive-source"
],
"reasons": {
"sensitive-source": [
"keyword \"list_files\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "search",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "bundle_search",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "add_tags",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "remove_tags",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "set_favorite",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_tags",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_projects",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "register_project",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "onboard_agent",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "transfer_agent_context",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "commit_backup",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "clip_url",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_history",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_diff",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "restore_file",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "read_file_outline",
"tags": [
"sensitive-source"
],
"reasons": {
"sensitive-source": [
"keyword \"read_file\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "read_section",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "update_file_section",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_folders",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "create_folder",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "delete_folder",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "move_file",
"tags": [
"file-write"
],
"reasons": {
"file-write": [
"keyword \"move_file\" in tool name"
]
}
},
{
"tool": "find_related",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "create_files",
"tags": [
"file-write"
],
"reasons": {
"file-write": [
"keyword \"create_file\" in tool name"
]
}
},
{
"tool": "delete_files",
"tags": [
"file-write"
],
"reasons": {
"file-write": [
"keyword \"delete_file\" in tool name"
]
}
},
{
"tool": "tag_search_results",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "read_file_by_path",
"tags": [
"sensitive-source"
],
"reasons": {
"sensitive-source": [
"keyword \"read_file\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "stats",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "suggest_tags",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "diff_against_disk",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "refresh_index",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "whats_new",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "project_map",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_hands",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "reload_hands",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "confirm_hand",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "describe_hands_schema",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_profile",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
}
],
"surfaceDigest": "b03f057d2ff610f06201337b7927bc2d6383486fc0382efaaa7df0f22e247d95",
"stats": {
"tools": 70,
"prompts": 0,
"resources": 0,
"findingsBySeverity": {
"critical": 0,
"high": 2,
"medium": 6,
"low": 5,
"info": 0
}
}
}