Kontexta MCP Server

kontexta-mcp npm v4.5.2 Source verified

Published by safiyu — publish provenance cryptographically ties this package to that repository. That is proof of origin, not an official vendor package.

The local Brain and Hands for AI coding agents (MCP Server)

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Trust grade

90/100

Last scanned 2026-09-07 get badge →

Trust

A · 90/100

Adoption risk for you: the threat score, then adjusted down for blast radius, publisher verification and how much the scan could see. Deterministic; every point is auditable.

Capability

High

Blast radius if it went rogue — what the server’s tools could reach. Independent of trust.

Coverage

Source

How much the scan could actually inspect. Shallow coverage is stated, never hidden.

A Why this grade threat 96 − adoption risk = 90/100

The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.

1. Threat score — 100 − 3.6 = 96. What the published surface and source actually contain:

Points	What was found	Category
−3.6	Near-miss of @upstash/context7-mcp MTC-SUP-005	supply-chain

2. Client adoption risk — 96 − 6 = 90. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:

Points	Adoption-risk factor
−6	capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated

Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored. Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.

Findings 13

high Reads a sensitive credential path or dumps the environment (dist/index.js)MTC-SRC-006

In the server's implementation (`dist/index.js:95`): Reading private keys / cloud credentials, or serializing the whole environment, is a sensitive-data source that becomes exfiltration when combined with any egress. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.

Evidence: ws", ".gnupg", ".kube", ".config/gcloud", ".docker"].map((p) => `${home}/${p}`); } function safeMkdir(dir) { try {

Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.

Location: server dist/index.js

high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/index.js)MTC-SRC-002

In the server's implementation (`dist/index.js:625`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.

Evidence: ort { spawnSync } from "child_process"; function redactCredentials(s) { return s.replace(/([a-z][a-z0-9+.-]*:\/\/)([^:

Location: server dist/index.js

medium Tool "create_file" can modify the filesystemMTC-CAP-002

Tool "create_file" can write, overwrite or delete files (keyword "create_file" in tool name). Verify it is scoped to a safe directory.

Fix: Constrain file operations to an explicit, non-sensitive root; reject path traversal.

Location: tool create_file

medium Tool "delete_file" can modify the filesystemMTC-CAP-002

Tool "delete_file" can write, overwrite or delete files (keyword "delete_file" in tool name). Verify it is scoped to a safe directory.

Fix: Constrain file operations to an explicit, non-sensitive root; reject path traversal.

Location: tool delete_file

medium Tool "move_file" can modify the filesystemMTC-CAP-002

Tool "move_file" can write, overwrite or delete files (keyword "move_file" in tool name). Verify it is scoped to a safe directory.

Fix: Constrain file operations to an explicit, non-sensitive root; reject path traversal.

Location: tool move_file

medium Tool "create_files" can modify the filesystemMTC-CAP-002

Tool "create_files" can write, overwrite or delete files (keyword "create_file" in tool name). Verify it is scoped to a safe directory.

Fix: Constrain file operations to an explicit, non-sensitive root; reject path traversal.

Location: tool create_files

medium Tool "delete_files" can modify the filesystemMTC-CAP-002

Tool "delete_files" can write, overwrite or delete files (keyword "delete_file" in tool name). Verify it is scoped to a safe directory.

Fix: Constrain file operations to an explicit, non-sensitive root; reject path traversal.

Location: tool delete_files

medium Near-miss of @upstash/context7-mcp (edit distance 2)MTC-SUP-005

"kontexta-mcp" is edit-distance 2 from the high-traffic package "@upstash/context7-mcp". Its own download count is negligible, consistent with a squat.

Fix: Confirm you meant "@upstash/context7-mcp". Install packages only from their documented, official name.

Location: package kontexta-mcp

low Mutating tool "create_file" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005

Tool "create_file" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.