Raw scan report

Coding — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.13.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.

← Back to the scan page
{
  "tool": {
    "name": "mcptrustchecker",
    "version": "1.13.0",
    "methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
  },
  "target": {
    "id": "@kieutrongthien/coding-mcp",
    "source": {
      "kind": "package",
      "origin": "@kieutrongthien/coding-mcp"
    },
    "server": {
      "name": "@kieutrongthien/coding-mcp"
    }
  },
  "grade": "A",
  "score": {
    "score": 92,
    "threatScore": 100,
    "grade": "A",
    "band": "A",
    "categorySubtotals": {
      "injection": 0,
      "exfiltration": 0,
      "permissions": 0,
      "supply-chain": 0,
      "network": 0,
      "hygiene": 0
    },
    "vector": [
      {
        "kind": "client",
        "term": "capability-exposure",
        "level": "high",
        "label": "capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated",
        "appliedPenalty": 6
      },
      {
        "kind": "client",
        "term": "verification-discount",
        "level": "none",
        "label": "publisher verification (unlinked) — no provenance/repo link, but the shipped source was fully read",
        "appliedPenalty": 2
      },
      {
        "kind": "client",
        "term": "coverage-honesty",
        "level": "source",
        "label": "inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see",
        "appliedPenalty": 0
      }
    ],
    "gatesFired": [],
    "methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
  },
  "capability": {
    "level": "high",
    "reasons": [
      "can create, modify or delete files",
      "reads sensitive or local data",
      "has a read → egress path (a data-exfiltration surface)",
      "can execute shell commands or code"
    ],
    "tags": [
      "code-exec",
      "sensitive-source",
      "file-write"
    ]
  },
  "coverage": {
    "level": "source",
    "inputs": {
      "toolSurface": true,
      "implementationSource": true,
      "packageMetadata": true,
      "liveTransport": false
    },
    "caveats": [
      "Tools were statically extracted from the published source (33 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
    ]
  },
  "findings": [
    {
      "ruleId": "MTC-FLOW-004",
      "title": "Sensitive-source and external-sink co-exist",
      "category": "exfiltration",
      "severity": "high",
      "confidence": "strong",
      "description": "Tools that read sensitive data ([list_directory, read_file]) and tools that can send data out ([run_command_safe]) are exposed together. An agent can move private data to the sink.",
      "remediation": "Keep secret-reading and egress capabilities on separate, separately-approved servers.",
      "location": {
        "kind": "flow",
        "name": "list_directory → run_command_safe"
      },
      "evidence": "sources [list_directory, read_file] → sinks [run_command_safe]",
      "owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
      "references": [],
      "data": {
        "sources": [
          "list_directory",
          "read_file"
        ],
        "sinks": [
          "run_command_safe"
        ]
      }
    },
    {
      "ruleId": "MTC-CAP-001",
      "title": "Tool \"run_command_safe\" exposes command/code execution",
      "category": "permissions",
      "severity": "high",
      "confidence": "strong",
      "description": "Tool \"run_command_safe\" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword \"run_command\" in tool name). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.",
      "remediation": "Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.",
      "location": {
        "kind": "tool",
        "name": "run_command_safe"
      },
      "owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
      "data": {
        "tags": [
          "code-exec"
        ]
      }
    },
    {
      "ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
      "title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/src/services/commands/command-runner.service.js)",
      "category": "permissions",
      "severity": "high",
      "confidence": "strong",
      "description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/src/services/commands/command-runner.service.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
      "remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
      "location": {
        "kind": "server",
        "name": "dist/src/services/commands/command-runner.service.js"
      },
      "evidence": "rt { spawn } from \"node:child_process\"; import { truncateText } from \"../../core/policies.js\"; import { isTransientError",
      "owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
      "data": {
        "rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
        "file": "dist/src/services/commands/command-runner.service.js",
        "line": 1,
        "nonRuntime": false
      }
    },
    {
      "ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
      "title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/src/services/git/git-runner.js)",
      "category": "permissions",
      "severity": "high",
      "confidence": "strong",
      "description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/src/services/git/git-runner.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
      "remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
      "location": {
        "kind": "server",
        "name": "dist/src/services/git/git-runner.js"
      },
      "evidence": "rt { spawn } from \"node:child_process\"; import path from \"node:path\"; import fs from \"node:fs\"; import { ValidationError",
      "owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
      "data": {
        "rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
        "file": "dist/src/services/git/git-runner.js",
        "line": 1,
        "nonRuntime": false
      }
    },
    {
      "ruleId": "MTC-CAP-002",
      "title": "Tool \"create_file\" can modify the filesystem",
      "category": "permissions",
      "severity": "medium",
      "confidence": "strong",
      "description": "Tool \"create_file\" can write, overwrite or delete files (keyword \"create_file\" in tool name). Verify it is scoped to a safe directory.",
      "remediation": "Constrain file operations to an explicit, non-sensitive root; reject path traversal.",
      "location": {
        "kind": "tool",
        "name": "create_file"
      },
      "data": {
        "tags": [
          "file-write"
        ]
      }
    },
    {
      "ruleId": "MTC-CAP-002",
      "title": "Tool \"write_file\" can modify the filesystem",
      "category": "permissions",
      "severity": "medium",
      "confidence": "strong",
      "description": "Tool \"write_file\" can write, overwrite or delete files (keyword \"write_file\" in tool name). Verify it is scoped to a safe directory.",
      "remediation": "Constrain file operations to an explicit, non-sensitive root; reject path traversal.",
      "location": {
        "kind": "tool",
        "name": "write_file"
      },
      "data": {
        "tags": [
          "file-write"
        ]
      }
    },
    {
      "ruleId": "MTC-CAP-002",
      "title": "Tool \"delete_file\" can modify the filesystem",
      "category": "permissions",
      "severity": "medium",
      "confidence": "strong",
      "description": "Tool \"delete_file\" can write, overwrite or delete files (keyword \"delete_file\" in tool name). Verify it is scoped to a safe directory.",
      "remediation": "Constrain file operations to an explicit, non-sensitive root; reject path traversal.",
      "location": {
        "kind": "tool",
        "name": "delete_file"
      },
      "data": {
        "tags": [
          "file-write"
        ]
      }
    },
    {
      "ruleId": "MTC-CAP-002",
      "title": "Tool \"move_file\" can modify the filesystem",
      "category": "permissions",
      "severity": "medium",
      "confidence": "strong",
      "description": "Tool \"move_file\" can write, overwrite or delete files (keyword \"move_file\" in tool name). Verify it is scoped to a safe directory.",
      "remediation": "Constrain file operations to an explicit, non-sensitive root; reject path traversal.",
      "location": {
        "kind": "tool",
        "name": "move_file"
      },
      "data": {
        "tags": [
          "file-write"
        ]
      }
    },
    {
      "ruleId": "MTC-CAP-005",
      "title": "Mutating tool \"run_command_safe\" declares no destructiveHint",
      "category": "hygiene",
      "severity": "low",
      "confidence": "heuristic",
      "description": "Tool \"run_command_safe\" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.",
      "remediation": "Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.",
      "location": {
        "kind": "tool",
        "name": "run_command_safe"
      },
      "data": {
        "tags": [
          "code-exec"
        ]
      }
    },
    {
      "ruleId": "MTC-CAP-005",
      "title": "Mutating tool \"create_file\" declares no destructiveHint",
      "category": "hygiene",
      "severity": "low",
      "confidence": "heuristic",
      "description": "Tool \"create_file\" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.",
      "remediation": "Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.",
      "location": {
        "kind": "tool",
        "name": "create_file"
      },
      "data": {
        "tags": [
          "file-write"
        ]
      }
    },
    {
      "ruleId": "MTC-CAP-005",
      "title": "Mutating tool \"write_file\" declares no destructiveHint",
      "category": "hygiene",
      "severity": "low",
      "confidence": "heuristic",
      "description": "Tool \"write_file\" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.",
      "remediation": "Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.",
      "location": {
        "kind": "tool",
        "name": "write_file"
      },
      "data": {
        "tags": [
          "file-write"
        ]
      }
    },
    {
      "ruleId": "MTC-CAP-005",
      "title": "Mutating tool \"delete_file\" declares no destructiveHint",
      "category": "hygiene",
      "severity": "low",
      "confidence": "heuristic",
      "description": "Tool \"delete_file\" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.",
      "remediation": "Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.",
      "location": {
        "kind": "tool",
        "name": "delete_file"
      },
      "data": {
        "tags": [
          "file-write"
        ]
      }
    },
    {
      "ruleId": "MTC-CAP-005",
      "title": "Mutating tool \"move_file\" declares no destructiveHint",
      "category": "hygiene",
      "severity": "low",
      "confidence": "heuristic",
      "description": "Tool \"move_file\" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.",
      "remediation": "Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.",
      "location": {
        "kind": "tool",
        "name": "move_file"
      },
      "data": {
        "tags": [
          "file-write"
        ]
      }
    },
    {
      "ruleId": "MTC-SUP-012",
      "title": "Package has no license",
      "category": "hygiene",
      "severity": "info",
      "confidence": "strong",
      "description": "\"@kieutrongthien/coding-mcp\" has no declared license. This is a legal/reuse concern, not a security finding.",
      "location": {
        "kind": "package",
        "name": "@kieutrongthien/coding-mcp"
      }
    },
    {
      "ruleId": "MTC-SUP-011",
      "title": "Package declares no source repository",
      "category": "supply-chain",
      "severity": "info",
      "confidence": "strong",
      "description": "\"@kieutrongthien/coding-mcp\" declares no repository URL, so its published artifact cannot be compared against reviewable source.",
      "remediation": "Prefer packages that link to public, reviewable source.",
      "location": {
        "kind": "package",
        "name": "@kieutrongthien/coding-mcp"
      }
    }
  ],
  "toxicFlows": [
    {
      "id": "flow-1",
      "severity": "high",
      "confidence": "strong",
      "untrustedInput": [],
      "sensitiveSource": [
        "list_directory",
        "read_file"
      ],
      "externalSink": [
        "run_command_safe"
      ],
      "selfContained": false,
      "path": [
        "list_directory",
        "run_command_safe"
      ],
      "pathWired": false,
      "description": "A sensitive-source → external-sink chain exists: list_directory → run_command_safe."
    }
  ],
  "capabilities": [
    {
      "tool": "run_build",
      "tags": [],
      "reasons": {}
    },
    {
      "tool": "run_test",
      "tags": [],
      "reasons": {}
    },
    {
      "tool": "run_lint",
      "tags": [],
      "reasons": {}
    },
    {
      "tool": "run_command_safe",
      "tags": [
        "code-exec"
      ],
      "reasons": {
        "code-exec": [
          "keyword \"run_command\" in tool name"
        ]
      }
    },
    {
      "tool": "list_directory",
      "tags": [
        "sensitive-source"
      ],
      "reasons": {
        "sensitive-source": [
          "keyword \"list_files\""
        ]
      }
    },
    {
      "tool": "read_file",
      "tags": [
        "sensitive-source"
      ],
      "reasons": {
        "sensitive-source": [
          "keyword \"read_file\""
        ]
      }
    },
    {
      "tool": "read_multiple_files",
      "tags": [],
      "reasons": {}
    },
    {
      "tool": "create_file",
      "tags": [
        "file-write"
      ],
      "reasons": {
        "file-write": [
          "keyword \"create_file\" in tool name"
        ]
      }
    },
    {
      "tool": "write_file",
      "tags": [
        "file-write"
      ],
      "reasons": {
        "file-write": [
          "keyword \"write_file\" in tool name"
        ]
      }
    },
    {
      "tool": "replace_in_file",
      "tags": [],
      "reasons": {}
    },
    {
      "tool": "apply_patch",
      "tags": [],
      "reasons": {}
    },
    {
      "tool": "delete_file",
      "tags": [
        "file-write"
      ],
      "reasons": {
        "file-write": [
          "keyword \"delete_file\" in tool name"
        ]
      }
    },
    {
      "tool": "move_file",
      "tags": [
        "file-write"
      ],
      "reasons": {
        "file-write": [
          "keyword \"move_file\" in tool name"
        ]
      }
    },
    {
      "tool": "git_status",
      "tags": [],
      "reasons": {}
    },
    {
      "tool": "git_diff",
      "tags": [],
      "reasons": {}
    },
    {
      "tool": "git_branch_list",
      "tags": [],
      "reasons": {}
    },
    {
      "tool": "git_checkout_new_branch",
      "tags": [],
      "reasons": {}
    },
    {
      "tool": "git_checkout_branch",
      "tags": [],
      "reasons": {}
    },
    {
      "tool": "git_pull",
      "tags": [],
      "reasons": {}
    },
    {
      "tool": "git_add",
      "tags": [],
      "reasons": {}
    },
    {
      "tool": "git_restore",
      "tags": [],
      "reasons": {}
    },
    {
      "tool": "git_commit",
      "tags": [],
      "reasons": {}
    },
    {
      "tool": "git_push",
      "tags": [],
      "reasons": {}
    },
    {
      "tool": "git_log",
      "tags": [],
      "reasons": {}
    },
    {
      "tool": "git_show",
      "tags": [],
      "reasons": {}
    },
    {
      "tool": "git_create_tag",
      "tags": [],
      "reasons": {}
    },
    {
      "tool": "list_projects",
      "tags": [],
      "reasons": {}
    },
    {
      "tool": "get_project",
      "tags": [],
      "reasons": {}
    },
    {
      "tool": "refresh_project_index",
      "tags": [],
      "reasons": {}
    },
    {
      "tool": "search_files",
      "tags": [],
      "reasons": {}
    },
    {
      "tool": "grep_content",
      "tags": [],
      "reasons": {}
    },
    {
      "tool": "get_project_tree",
      "tags": [],
      "reasons": {}
    },
    {
      "tool": "summarize_project",
      "tags": [],
      "reasons": {}
    }
  ],
  "surfaceDigest": "27f8ffc06d0d964797ff28e0abe2f8a90493dd390cfcef3667c4208d8200283c",
  "stats": {
    "tools": 33,
    "prompts": 0,
    "resources": 0,
    "findingsBySeverity": {
      "critical": 0,
      "high": 4,
      "medium": 4,
      "low": 5,
      "info": 2
    }
  }
}