Coding (kieutrongthien) MCP Server

@kieutrongthien/coding-mcp npm v1.0.8

Published by @kieutrongthien — no publish provenance and no public repository, so the publisher could not be verified and the source cannot be independently located.

Production-ready multi-project MCP server for coding agents

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Trust grade

92/100

Last scanned 2026-09-08 get badge →

Trust

A · 92/100

Adoption risk for you: the threat score, then adjusted down for blast radius, publisher verification and how much the scan could see. Deterministic; every point is auditable.

Capability

High

Blast radius if it went rogue — what the server’s tools could reach. Independent of trust.

Coverage

Source

How much the scan could actually inspect. Shallow coverage is stated, never hidden.

A Why this grade threat 100 − adoption risk = 92/100

The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.

1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:

The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.

2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 8 = 92. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:

Points	Adoption-risk factor
−6	capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated
−2	publisher verification (unlinked) — no provenance/repo link, but the shipped source was fully read

Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored. Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.

Findings 13

high Sensitive-source and external-sink co-existMTC-FLOW-004

Tools that read sensitive data ([list_directory, read_file]) and tools that can send data out ([run_command_safe]) are exposed together. An agent can move private data to the sink.

Evidence: sources [list_directory, read_file] → sinks [run_command_safe]

Fix: Keep secret-reading and egress capabilities on separate, separately-approved servers.

Location: flow list_directory → run_command_safe

high Tool "run_command_safe" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001

Tool "run_command_safe" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "run_command" in tool name). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.

Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.

Location: tool run_command_safe

high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/src/services/commands/command-runner.service.js)MTC-SRC-002

In the server's implementation (`dist/src/services/commands/command-runner.service.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.

Evidence: rt { spawn } from "node:child_process"; import { truncateText } from "../../core/policies.js"; import { isTransientError

Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.

Location: server dist/src/services/commands/command-runner.service.js

high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/src/services/git/git-runner.js)MTC-SRC-002

In the server's implementation (`dist/src/services/git/git-runner.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.

Evidence: rt { spawn } from "node:child_process"; import path from "node:path"; import fs from "node:fs"; import { ValidationError

Location: server dist/src/services/git/git-runner.js

medium Tool "create_file" can modify the filesystemMTC-CAP-002

Tool "create_file" can write, overwrite or delete files (keyword "create_file" in tool name). Verify it is scoped to a safe directory.

Fix: Constrain file operations to an explicit, non-sensitive root; reject path traversal.

Location: tool create_file

medium Tool "write_file" can modify the filesystemMTC-CAP-002

Tool "write_file" can write, overwrite or delete files (keyword "write_file" in tool name). Verify it is scoped to a safe directory.

Fix: Constrain file operations to an explicit, non-sensitive root; reject path traversal.

Location: tool write_file

medium Tool "delete_file" can modify the filesystemMTC-CAP-002

Tool "delete_file" can write, overwrite or delete files (keyword "delete_file" in tool name). Verify it is scoped to a safe directory.

Fix: Constrain file operations to an explicit, non-sensitive root; reject path traversal.

Location: tool delete_file

medium Tool "move_file" can modify the filesystemMTC-CAP-002

Tool "move_file" can write, overwrite or delete files (keyword "move_file" in tool name). Verify it is scoped to a safe directory.

Fix: Constrain file operations to an explicit, non-sensitive root; reject path traversal.

Location: tool move_file

low Mutating tool "run_command_safe" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005

Tool "run_command_safe" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.