Orchestro — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.13.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.
{
"tool": {
"name": "mcptrustchecker",
"version": "1.13.0",
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"target": {
"id": "@khaoss85/orchestro",
"source": {
"kind": "package",
"origin": "@khaoss85/orchestro"
},
"server": {
"name": "@khaoss85/orchestro"
}
},
"grade": "B",
"score": {
"score": 87,
"threatScore": 94,
"grade": "B",
"band": "B",
"categorySubtotals": {
"injection": 6.3,
"exfiltration": 0,
"permissions": 0,
"supply-chain": 0,
"network": 0,
"hygiene": 0
},
"vector": [
{
"kind": "threat",
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-009",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"rawWeight": 9,
"confidenceMult": 0.7,
"diminishingFactor": 1,
"appliedPenalty": 6.3
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "capability-exposure",
"level": "high",
"label": "capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated",
"appliedPenalty": 6
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "verification-discount",
"level": "repo",
"label": "publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable",
"appliedPenalty": 1
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "coverage-honesty",
"level": "source",
"label": "inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see",
"appliedPenalty": 0
}
],
"gatesFired": [],
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"capability": {
"level": "high",
"reasons": [
"can execute shell commands or code"
],
"tags": [
"code-exec"
]
},
"coverage": {
"level": "source",
"inputs": {
"toolSurface": true,
"implementationSource": true,
"packageMetadata": true,
"liveTransport": false
},
"caveats": [
"Tools were statically extracted from the published source (65 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
]
},
"findings": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-001",
"title": "Tool \"add_mcp_tool\" exposes command/code execution",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "Tool \"add_mcp_tool\" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (parameter \"command\"). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.",
"remediation": "Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "add_mcp_tool"
},
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"tags": [
"code-exec"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-001",
"title": "Tool \"update_mcp_tool\" exposes command/code execution",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "Tool \"update_mcp_tool\" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (parameter \"command\"). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.",
"remediation": "Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "update_mcp_tool"
},
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"tags": [
"code-exec"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (packages/init/index.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`packages/init/index.js:3`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "packages/init/index.js"
},
"evidence": "ync, spawn } = require('child_process'); const fs = require('fs'); const path = require('path'); const os = require('os'",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "packages/init/index.js",
"line": 3,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-009",
"title": "Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (packages/init/index.js)",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`packages/init/index.js:121`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "packages/init/index.js"
},
"evidence": ".', 'dim'); try { execSync( `git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/yourusername/orchestro.git \"${installDir",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-009",
"file": "packages/init/index.js",
"line": 121,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-006",
"title": "Unconstrained command parameter \"command\" on \"add_mcp_tool\"",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"add_mcp_tool\" takes a command-shaped parameter \"command\" with no enum/pattern constraint. Free-form, model- or attacker-controlled arguments reaching a shell is the command-injection precondition.",
"remediation": "Constrain the parameter (enum/pattern), or build the command from a fixed template with escaped args.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "add_mcp_tool",
"field": "inputSchema.properties.command"
},
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"param": "command"
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-006",
"title": "Unconstrained command parameter \"command\" on \"update_mcp_tool\"",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"update_mcp_tool\" takes a command-shaped parameter \"command\" with no enum/pattern constraint. Free-form, model- or attacker-controlled arguments reaching a shell is the command-injection precondition.",
"remediation": "Constrain the parameter (enum/pattern), or build the command from a fixed template with escaped args.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "update_mcp_tool",
"field": "inputSchema.properties.command"
},
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"param": "command"
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-005",
"title": "Mutating tool \"add_mcp_tool\" declares no destructiveHint",
"category": "hygiene",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"add_mcp_tool\" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.",
"remediation": "Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "add_mcp_tool"
},
"data": {
"tags": [
"code-exec"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-005",
"title": "Mutating tool \"update_mcp_tool\" declares no destructiveHint",
"category": "hygiene",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"update_mcp_tool\" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.",
"remediation": "Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "update_mcp_tool"
},
"data": {
"tags": [
"code-exec"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (scripts/setup.cjs)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`scripts/setup.cjs:13`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "scripts/setup.cjs"
},
"evidence": "nst { exec } = require('child_process'); const os = require('os'); // Colors for terminal output const colors = { res",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "scripts/setup.cjs",
"line": 13,
"nonRuntime": true
}
}
],
"toxicFlows": [],
"capabilities": [
{
"tool": "get_project_info",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "create_task",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_tasks",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "update_task",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "delete_task",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_task_context",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_execution_order",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_templates",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_patterns",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_learnings",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "render_template",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_relevant_knowledge",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "intelligent_decompose_story",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "save_story_decomposition",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "add_feedback",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_similar_learnings",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_top_patterns",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_trending_patterns",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_pattern_stats",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "detect_failure_patterns",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "check_pattern_risk",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "prepare_task_for_execution",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "save_task_analysis",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_execution_prompt",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "save_dependencies",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_task_dependency_graph",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_resource_usage",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_task_conflicts",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_user_stories",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_tasks_by_user_story",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "safe_delete_tasks_by_status",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_user_story_health",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "delete_user_story",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_project_configuration",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "initialize_project_configuration",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "add_tech_stack",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "update_tech_stack",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "remove_tech_stack",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "add_sub_agent",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "update_sub_agent",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "add_mcp_tool",
"tags": [
"code-exec"
],
"reasons": {
"code-exec": [
"parameter \"command\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "update_mcp_tool",
"tags": [
"code-exec"
],
"reasons": {
"code-exec": [
"parameter \"command\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "add_guideline",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "add_code_pattern",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "read_claude_code_agents",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "sync_claude_code_agents",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "suggest_agents_for_task",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "suggest_tools_for_task",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "update_agent_prompt_templates",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_task_history",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_status_history",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_decisions",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_guardian_interventions",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_code_changes",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "record_decision",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "record_code_change",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "record_guardian_intervention",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "record_status_transition",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_iteration_count",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_task_snapshot",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "rollback_task",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_task_stats",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "Error Handling Pattern",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "In-Memory Storage Pattern",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "MCP Tool Registration Pattern",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
}
],
"surfaceDigest": "066fc5f2a296d962f4f05fcaec7d31274fd0ab9b4966859ac6605ea571a1baf4",
"stats": {
"tools": 65,
"prompts": 0,
"resources": 0,
"findingsBySeverity": {
"critical": 0,
"high": 3,
"medium": 3,
"low": 3,
"info": 0
}
}
}