Orchestro MCP Server
@khaoss85/orchestro
npm
v2.1.0
Published by @khaoss85 — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
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The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 6.3 = 94. What the published surface and source actually contain:
| Points | What was found | Category |
|---|---|---|
| −6.3 | Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink MTC-SRC-009 | injection |
2. Client adoption risk — 94 − 7 = 87. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 9
high Tool "add_mcp_tool" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "add_mcp_tool" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (parameter "command"). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool add_mcp_tool
high Tool "update_mcp_tool" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "update_mcp_tool" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (parameter "command"). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool update_mcp_tool
high Shell/command execution in server code (packages/init/index.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`packages/init/index.js:3`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ync, spawn } = require('child_process'); const fs = require('fs'); const path = require('path'); const os = require('os'
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server packages/init/index.js
medium Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (packages/init/index.js)MTC-SRC-009
In the server's implementation (`packages/init/index.js:121`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: .', 'dim'); try { execSync( `git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/yourusername/orchestro.git "${installDir
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server packages/init/index.js
medium Unconstrained command parameter "command" on "add_mcp_tool"MTC-CAP-006
Tool "add_mcp_tool" takes a command-shaped parameter "command" with no enum/pattern constraint. Free-form, model- or attacker-controlled arguments reaching a shell is the command-injection precondition.
Fix: Constrain the parameter (enum/pattern), or build the command from a fixed template with escaped args.
Location: tool add_mcp_tool · inputSchema.properties.command
medium Unconstrained command parameter "command" on "update_mcp_tool"MTC-CAP-006
Tool "update_mcp_tool" takes a command-shaped parameter "command" with no enum/pattern constraint. Free-form, model- or attacker-controlled arguments reaching a shell is the command-injection precondition.
Fix: Constrain the parameter (enum/pattern), or build the command from a fixed template with escaped args.
Location: tool update_mcp_tool · inputSchema.properties.command
low Mutating tool "add_mcp_tool" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "add_mcp_tool" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool add_mcp_tool
low Mutating tool "update_mcp_tool" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "update_mcp_tool" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool update_mcp_tool
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (scripts/setup.cjs)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`scripts/setup.cjs:13`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: nst { exec } = require('child_process'); const os = require('os'); // Colors for terminal output const colors = { res
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server scripts/setup.cjs
Tools 65
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
add_mcp_toolruns code / shellupdate_mcp_toolruns code / shelladd_code_patternno sensitive capabilityadd_feedbackno sensitive capabilityadd_guidelineno sensitive capabilityadd_sub_agentno sensitive capabilityadd_tech_stackno sensitive capabilitycheck_pattern_riskno sensitive capabilitycreate_taskno sensitive capabilitydelete_taskno sensitive capability
Show 55 more tools ↓
delete_user_storyno sensitive capabilitydetect_failure_patternsno sensitive capabilityError Handling Patternno sensitive capabilityget_code_changesno sensitive capabilityget_decisionsno sensitive capabilityget_execution_orderno sensitive capabilityget_execution_promptno sensitive capabilityget_guardian_interventionsno sensitive capabilityget_iteration_countno sensitive capabilityget_pattern_statsno sensitive capabilityget_project_configurationno sensitive capabilityget_project_infono sensitive capabilityget_relevant_knowledgeno sensitive capabilityget_resource_usageno sensitive capabilityget_similar_learningsno sensitive capabilityget_status_historyno sensitive capabilityget_task_conflictsno sensitive capabilityget_task_contextno sensitive capabilityget_task_dependency_graphno sensitive capabilityget_task_historyno sensitive capabilityget_task_snapshotno sensitive capabilityget_task_statsno sensitive capabilityget_tasks_by_user_storyno sensitive capabilityget_top_patternsno sensitive capabilityget_trending_patternsno sensitive capabilityget_user_storiesno sensitive capabilityget_user_story_healthno sensitive capabilityIn-Memory Storage Patternno sensitive capabilityinitialize_project_configurationno sensitive capabilityintelligent_decompose_storyno sensitive capabilitylist_learningsno sensitive capabilitylist_patternsno sensitive capabilitylist_tasksno sensitive capabilitylist_templatesno sensitive capabilityMCP Tool Registration Patternno sensitive capabilityprepare_task_for_executionno sensitive capabilityread_claude_code_agentsno sensitive capabilityrecord_code_changeno sensitive capabilityrecord_decisionno sensitive capabilityrecord_guardian_interventionno sensitive capabilityrecord_status_transitionno sensitive capabilityremove_tech_stackno sensitive capabilityrender_templateno sensitive capabilityrollback_taskno sensitive capabilitysafe_delete_tasks_by_statusno sensitive capabilitysave_dependenciesno sensitive capabilitysave_story_decompositionno sensitive capabilitysave_task_analysisno sensitive capabilitysuggest_agents_for_taskno sensitive capabilitysuggest_tools_for_taskno sensitive capabilitysync_claude_code_agentsno sensitive capabilityupdate_agent_prompt_templatesno sensitive capabilityupdate_sub_agentno sensitive capabilityupdate_taskno sensitive capabilityupdate_tech_stackno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (65 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v2.1.0 latest |
B 87/100 | 9 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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