Kage Graph — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.13.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.
{
"tool": {
"name": "mcptrustchecker",
"version": "1.13.0",
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"target": {
"id": "@kage-core/kage-graph-mcp",
"source": {
"kind": "package",
"origin": "@kage-core/kage-graph-mcp"
},
"server": {
"name": "@kage-core/kage-graph-mcp"
}
},
"grade": "A",
"score": {
"score": 92,
"threatScore": 100,
"grade": "A",
"band": "A",
"categorySubtotals": {
"injection": 0,
"exfiltration": 0,
"permissions": 0,
"supply-chain": 0,
"network": 0,
"hygiene": 0
},
"vector": [
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "capability-exposure",
"level": "high",
"label": "capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated",
"appliedPenalty": 6
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "verification-discount",
"level": "none",
"label": "publisher verification (unlinked) — no provenance/repo link, but the shipped source was fully read",
"appliedPenalty": 2
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "coverage-honesty",
"level": "source",
"label": "inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see",
"appliedPenalty": 0
}
],
"gatesFired": [],
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"capability": {
"level": "high",
"reasons": [
"ingests untrusted external content (a prompt-injection entry point)",
"can send data / act on an external service",
"can execute shell commands or code"
],
"tags": [
"untrusted-input",
"code-exec",
"external-sink"
]
},
"coverage": {
"level": "source",
"inputs": {
"toolSurface": true,
"implementationSource": true,
"packageMetadata": true,
"liveTransport": false
},
"caveats": [
"Tools were statically extracted from the published source (81 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
]
},
"findings": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-001",
"title": "Tool \"kage_observe\" exposes command/code execution",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "Tool \"kage_observe\" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (parameter \"command\"). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.",
"remediation": "Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "kage_observe"
},
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"tags": [
"code-exec"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/cli.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/cli.js:4`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/cli.js"
},
"evidence": "ue: true }); const node_child_process_1 = require(\"node:child_process\"); const node_fs_1 = require(\"node:fs\"); const nod",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/cli.js",
"line": 4,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/daemon.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/daemon.js:23`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/daemon.js"
},
"evidence": "(\"node:fs\"); const node_child_process_1 = require(\"node:child_process\"); const node_os_1 = require(\"node:os\"); const nod",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/daemon.js",
"line": 23,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/delegation/adapters/cli-agent.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/delegation/adapters/cli-agent.js:13`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/delegation/adapters/cli-agent.js"
},
"evidence": "cooperation. const node_child_process_1 = require(\"node:child_process\"); const node_fs_1 = require(\"node:fs\"); const nod",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/delegation/adapters/cli-agent.js",
"line": 13,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/delegation/adapters/index.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/delegation/adapters/index.js:14`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/delegation/adapters/index.js"
},
"evidence": "he contract. const node_child_process_1 = require(\"node:child_process\"); const cli_agent_js_1 = require(\"./cli-agent.js\"",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/delegation/adapters/index.js",
"line": 14,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/delegation/adapters/stub.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/delegation/adapters/stub.js:7`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/delegation/adapters/stub.js"
},
"evidence": "egradation). const node_child_process_1 = require(\"node:child_process\"); const node_fs_1 = require(\"node:fs\"); const nod",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/delegation/adapters/stub.js",
"line": 7,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/delegation/app-daemon.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/delegation/app-daemon.js:12`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/delegation/app-daemon.js"
},
"evidence": "face's code. const node_child_process_1 = require(\"node:child_process\"); const node_path_1 = require(\"node:path\"); const",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/delegation/app-daemon.js",
"line": 12,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/delegation/dispatch.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/delegation/dispatch.js:23`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/delegation/dispatch.js"
},
"evidence": "two minutes. const node_child_process_1 = require(\"node:child_process\"); const node_crypto_1 = require(\"node:crypto\"); c",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/delegation/dispatch.js",
"line": 23,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/delegation/git.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/delegation/git.js:16`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/delegation/git.js"
},
"evidence": "han a crash. const node_child_process_1 = require(\"node:child_process\"); const node_fs_1 = require(\"node:fs\"); const nod",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/delegation/git.js",
"line": 16,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/delegation/manager-client.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/delegation/manager-client.js:15`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/delegation/manager-client.js"
},
"evidence": "could touch. const node_child_process_1 = require(\"node:child_process\"); const index_js_1 = require(\"./adapters/index.js",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/delegation/manager-client.js",
"line": 15,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-FLOW-005",
"title": "Untrusted input can drive an external action",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "Untrusted-input tools ([kage_fetch]) co-exist with external-action tools ([kage_observe]). A prompt injection could cause unwanted external actions, though no direct sensitive-data leak path was found.",
"remediation": "Require confirmation for state-changing/egress actions triggered after processing untrusted content.",
"location": {
"kind": "flow",
"name": "kage_fetch → kage_observe"
},
"evidence": "untrusted [kage_fetch] → sinks [kage_observe]",
"owasp": "LLM06:2025 Excessive Agency",
"references": [],
"data": {
"untrusted": [
"kage_fetch"
],
"sinks": [
"kage_observe"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-003",
"title": "Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (dist/daemon.js)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/daemon.js:1012`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/daemon.js"
},
"evidence": "const res = await fetch(`http://${host}:${restPort}${path}`, { headers: { host: `${host}:${res",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-003",
"file": "dist/daemon.js",
"line": 1012,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-003",
"title": "Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (dist/delegation/app-daemon.js)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/delegation/app-daemon.js:34`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/delegation/app-daemon.js"
},
"evidence": "const res = await fetch(`http://${host}:${port}/app`, { signal: AbortSignal.timeout(2000) }); return res.s",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-003",
"file": "dist/delegation/app-daemon.js",
"line": 34,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-006",
"title": "Unconstrained command parameter \"command\" on \"kage_observe\"",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"kage_observe\" takes a command-shaped parameter \"command\" with no enum/pattern constraint. Free-form, model- or attacker-controlled arguments reaching a shell is the command-injection precondition.",
"remediation": "Constrain the parameter (enum/pattern), or build the command from a fixed template with escaped args.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "kage_observe",
"field": "inputSchema.properties.command"
},
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"param": "command"
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-006",
"title": "Unconstrained command parameter \"exit_code\" on \"kage_observe\"",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"kage_observe\" takes a command-shaped parameter \"exit_code\" with no enum/pattern constraint. Free-form, model- or attacker-controlled arguments reaching a shell is the command-injection precondition.",
"remediation": "Constrain the parameter (enum/pattern), or build the command from a fixed template with escaped args.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "kage_observe",
"field": "inputSchema.properties.exit_code"
},
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"param": "exit_code"
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-005",
"title": "Dynamic module load from a non-literal (dist/kernel.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/kernel.js:11316`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/kernel.js"
},
"evidence": "? [`${imports} outgoing import(s)`] : []), ]; return { path: file.path, kind: file.kind, language: file.",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-005",
"file": "dist/kernel.js",
"line": 11316,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-005",
"title": "Mutating tool \"kage_observe\" declares no destructiveHint",
"category": "hygiene",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"kage_observe\" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.",
"remediation": "Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "kage_observe"
},
"data": {
"tags": [
"code-exec"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (dist/bench/run.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`dist/bench/run.js:19`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/bench/run.js"
},
"evidence": "ue: true }); const node_child_process_1 = require(\"node:child_process\"); const node_path_1 = require(\"node:path\"); funct",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/bench/run.js",
"line": 19,
"nonRuntime": true
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SUP-011",
"title": "Package declares no source repository",
"category": "supply-chain",
"severity": "info",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "\"@kage-core/kage-graph-mcp\" declares no repository URL, so its published artifact cannot be compared against reviewable source.",
"remediation": "Prefer packages that link to public, reviewable source.",
"location": {
"kind": "package",
"name": "@kage-core/kage-graph-mcp"
}
}
],
"toxicFlows": [
{
"id": "flow-1",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"untrustedInput": [
"kage_fetch"
],
"sensitiveSource": [],
"externalSink": [
"kage_observe"
],
"selfContained": false,
"description": "Untrusted input can drive an external action even though no sensitive source is exposed."
}
],
"capabilities": [
{
"tool": "kage_context",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "kage_search",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "kage_fetch",
"tags": [
"untrusted-input"
],
"reasons": {
"untrusted-input": [
"keyword \"fetch\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "kage_list_domains",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "kage_recall",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "kage_graph",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "kage_graph_registry",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "kage_risk",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "kage_dependency_path",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "kage_cleanup_candidates",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "kage_reviewers",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "kage_contributors",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "kage_profile",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "kage_xray",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "kage_capabilities",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "kage_context_slots",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "kage_context_slot_set",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "kage_context_slot_delete",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "kage_decisions",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "kage_code_index",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "kage_structural_index",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "kage_docs_search",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "kage_metrics",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "kage_memory_access",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "kage_module_health",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "kage_graph_insights",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "kage_workspace",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "kage_workspace_recall",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "kage_audit",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "kage_inbox",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "kage_refresh",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "kage_pr_summarize",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "kage_pr_check",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "kage_memory_reconcile",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "kage_quality",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "kage_memory_lifecycle",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "kage_memory_timeline",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "kage_memory_lineage",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "kage_memory_audit",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "kage_memory_handoff",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "kage_supersede",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
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{
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