Gittensory — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.8.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.
{
"tool": {
"name": "mcptrustchecker",
"version": "1.8.0",
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.8"
},
"target": {
"id": "@jsonbored/gittensory-mcp",
"source": {
"kind": "package",
"origin": "@jsonbored/gittensory-mcp"
},
"server": {
"name": "@jsonbored/gittensory-mcp"
}
},
"grade": "A",
"score": {
"score": 94,
"threatScore": 100,
"grade": "A",
"band": "A",
"categorySubtotals": {
"injection": 0,
"exfiltration": 0,
"permissions": 0,
"supply-chain": 0,
"network": 0,
"hygiene": 0
},
"vector": [
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "capability-exposure",
"level": "high",
"label": "capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated",
"appliedPenalty": 6
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "verification-discount",
"level": "source",
"label": "publisher verification (provenance) — cryptographic build provenance ties the artifact to its source",
"appliedPenalty": 0
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "coverage-honesty",
"level": "source",
"label": "inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see",
"appliedPenalty": 0
}
],
"gatesFired": [],
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.8"
},
"capability": {
"level": "high",
"reasons": [
"ingests untrusted external content (a prompt-injection entry point)",
"can execute shell commands or code"
],
"tags": [
"untrusted-input",
"code-exec"
]
},
"coverage": {
"level": "source",
"inputs": {
"toolSurface": true,
"implementationSource": true,
"packageMetadata": true,
"liveTransport": false
},
"caveats": [
"Tools were statically extracted from the published source (31 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
]
},
"findings": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (lib/local-branch.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`lib/local-branch.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "lib/local-branch.js"
},
"evidence": "ecFileSync } from \"node:child_process\"; import { realpathSync } from \"node:fs\"; import { dirname, isAbsolute, join, rela",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "lib/local-branch.js",
"line": 1,
"nonRuntime": false
}
}
],
"toxicFlows": [],
"capabilities": [
{
"tool": "gittensory_get_repo_context",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "gittensory_preflight_pr",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "gittensory_validate_linked_issue",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "gittensory_check_before_start",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "gittensory_find_opportunities",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "gittensory_lint_pr_text",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "gittensory_validate_config",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "gittensory_check_slop_risk",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "gittensory_check_issue_slop",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "gittensory_preflight_local_diff",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "gittensory_get_registry_changes",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "gittensory_preview_local_pr_score",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "gittensory_explain_score_breakdown",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "gittensory_get_decision_pack",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "gittensory_explain_repo_decision",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "gittensory_compare_pr_variants",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "gittensory_local_status",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "gittensory_preflight_current_branch",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "gittensory_review_pr_before_push",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "gittensory_preview_current_branch_score",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "gittensory_rank_local_next_actions",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "gittensory_explain_local_blockers",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "gittensory_remediation_plan",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "gittensory_prepare_pr_packet",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "gittensory_compare_local_variants",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "gittensory_agent_plan_next_work",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "gittensory_agent_start_run",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "gittensory_agent_get_run",
"tags": [
"untrusted-input"
],
"reasons": {
"untrusted-input": [
"keyword \"fetch\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "gittensory_agent_explain_next_action",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "gittensory_agent_prepare_pr_packet",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "gittensory_local_status_structured",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
}
],
"surfaceDigest": "fef2150af5b313959f0f766d1eff65dfdc6dcac9df944d3c543892ca8fe7ad5e",
"stats": {
"tools": 31,
"prompts": 0,
"resources": 0,
"findingsBySeverity": {
"critical": 0,
"high": 1,
"medium": 0,
"low": 0,
"info": 0
}
}
}