Gittensory MCP Server
@jsonbored/gittensory-mcp
npm
v0.7.0
Source verified
Published by jsonbored — publish provenance cryptographically ties this package to that repository. That is proof of origin, not an official vendor package.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 10 = 90. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −10 | capability blast radius (critical) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| ✓ | publisher verification (provenance) — cryptographic build provenance ties the artifact to its source |
| ✓ | inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 1
high Shell/command execution in server code (lib/local-branch.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`lib/local-branch.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: child_process
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server lib/local-branch.js
Tools 31
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
gittensory_agent_get_runingests untrusted inputgittensory_agent_explain_next_actionno sensitive capabilitygittensory_agent_plan_next_workno sensitive capabilitygittensory_agent_prepare_pr_packetno sensitive capabilitygittensory_agent_start_runno sensitive capabilitygittensory_check_before_startno sensitive capabilitygittensory_check_issue_slopno sensitive capabilitygittensory_check_slop_riskno sensitive capabilitygittensory_compare_local_variantsno sensitive capabilitygittensory_compare_pr_variantsno sensitive capabilitygittensory_explain_local_blockersno sensitive capabilitygittensory_explain_repo_decisionno sensitive capabilitygittensory_explain_score_breakdownno sensitive capabilitygittensory_find_opportunitiesno sensitive capabilitygittensory_get_decision_packno sensitive capabilitygittensory_get_registry_changesno sensitive capabilitygittensory_get_repo_contextno sensitive capabilitygittensory_lint_pr_textno sensitive capabilitygittensory_local_statusno sensitive capabilitygittensory_local_status_structuredno sensitive capabilitygittensory_preflight_current_branchno sensitive capabilitygittensory_preflight_local_diffno sensitive capabilitygittensory_preflight_prno sensitive capabilitygittensory_prepare_pr_packetno sensitive capabilitygittensory_preview_current_branch_scoreno sensitive capabilitygittensory_preview_local_pr_scoreno sensitive capabilitygittensory_rank_local_next_actionsno sensitive capabilitygittensory_remediation_planno sensitive capabilitygittensory_review_pr_before_pushno sensitive capabilitygittensory_validate_configno sensitive capabilitygittensory_validate_linked_issueno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (31 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.7.0 latest |
A 90/100 | 1 | 1.8.0 | 2026-07-23 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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