Jlink (Klievan) MCP Server
jlink-mcp
npm
v0.7.0
Published by klievan — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
MCP server for SEGGER J-Link debug probes — LLM-driven embedded debugging with RTT, GDB server, and Trice/Pigweed support
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 10
high Dynamic code execution in server code (out/mcp/standalone.js)MTC-SRC-001
In the server's implementation (`out/mcp/standalone.js:2943`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: const makeValidate = new Function(`${names_1.default.self}`, `${names_1.default.scope}`, sourceCode); const v
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server out/mcp/standalone.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (out/extension.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`out/extension.js:167`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: const proc = (0, import_child_process3.spawn)(jlinkExe, args, { stdio: ["pipe", "pipe", "pipe"] }); let st
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server out/extension.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (out/gdb/gdb-client.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`out/gdb/gdb-client.js:4`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: BClient = void 0; const child_process_1 = require("child_process"); const logger_1 = require("../utils/logger"); /** *
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server out/gdb/gdb-client.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (out/jlink/commander.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`out/jlink/commander.js:6`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: = flashFirmware; const child_process_1 = require("child_process"); const config_1 = require("../utils/config"); const l
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server out/jlink/commander.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (out/mcp/standalone.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`out/mcp/standalone.js:32176`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: obe/jlink.ts var import_child_process = require("child_process"); var path2 = __toESM(require("path")); var fs2 = __toES
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server out/mcp/standalone.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (out/probe/blackmagic.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`out/probe/blackmagic.js:4`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: Backend = void 0; const child_process_1 = require("child_process"); const backend_1 = require("./backend"); const logger
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server out/probe/blackmagic.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (out/probe/jlink.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`out/probe/jlink.js:37`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: Backend = void 0; const child_process_1 = require("child_process"); const backend_1 = require("./backend"); const logger
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server out/probe/jlink.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (out/probe/openocd.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`out/probe/openocd.js:37`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: Backend = void 0; const child_process_1 = require("child_process"); const net = __importStar(require("net")); const back
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server out/probe/openocd.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (out/utils/gdb-server-probe.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`out/utils/gdb-server-probe.js:44`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: renderGdbStatus; const child_process_1 = require("child_process"); const net = __importStar(require("net")); /** * Is
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server out/utils/gdb-server-probe.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (out/utils/process-manager.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`out/utils/process-manager.js:4`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: Manager = void 0; const child_process_1 = require("child_process"); const logger_1 = require("./logger"); const events_1
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server out/utils/process-manager.js
Tools 47
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
read_memoryreads sensitive datasnapshotreads sensitive datacheck_setupno sensitive capabilityclear_breakpointsno sensitive capabilitydecode_registerno sensitive capabilitydevice_infono sensitive capabilitydiagnose_crashno sensitive capabilityeraseno sensitive capabilityflashno sensitive capabilitygdb_backtraceno sensitive capability
Show 37 more tools ↓
gdb_commandno sensitive capabilitygdb_connectno sensitive capabilitygdb_disconnectno sensitive capabilitygdb_loadno sensitive capabilitygdb_server_startno sensitive capabilitygdb_server_statusno sensitive capabilitygdb_server_stopno sensitive capabilitygdb_waitno sensitive capabilityget_configno sensitive capabilityhaltno sensitive capabilitylist_devicesno sensitive capabilitylist_peripheralsno sensitive capabilityprobe_commandno sensitive capabilityread_peripheralno sensitive capabilityread_registerno sensitive capabilityread_registersno sensitive capabilityresetno sensitive capabilityresumeno sensitive capabilityrtt_clearno sensitive capabilityrtt_connectno sensitive capabilityrtt_disconnectno sensitive capabilityrtt_readno sensitive capabilityrtt_searchno sensitive capabilityrtt_sendno sensitive capabilityrtt_statusno sensitive capabilitysearch_devicesno sensitive capabilityset_breakpointno sensitive capabilityset_deviceno sensitive capabilityset_rtt_addressno sensitive capabilityset_svd_pathno sensitive capabilitystart_debug_sessionno sensitive capabilitystepno sensitive capabilitytelnet_proxy_readno sensitive capabilitytelnet_proxy_startno sensitive capabilitytelnet_proxy_statusno sensitive capabilitytelnet_proxy_stopno sensitive capabilitywrite_memoryno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (47 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 3
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.7.0 latest |
A 93/100 | 10 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
v0.4.0 |
A 93/100 | 9 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-28 |
v0.1.3 |
A 93/100 | 8 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-25 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan jlink-mcp --onlineOther implementations of Jlink 1
Independent packages implementing the same tool, scanned with the same engine. Compare all 2 side by side →
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