jlink-mcp
PyPI
v0.1.1
Published by cyj0920 — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
AI 与 JLink 调试器的桥梁 - MCP 服务器
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 6.3 = 94. What the published surface and source actually contain:
| Points | What was found | Category |
|---|---|---|
| −6.3 | Unsafe deserialization MTC-SRC-007 | permissions |
2. Client adoption risk — 94 − 7 = 87. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
In the server's implementation (`src/jlink_mcp/gdb_server.py:125`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: self._process = subprocess.Popen( cmd, stdout=subprocess.PIPE, s
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/jlink_mcp/gdb_server.py
In the server's implementation (`src/jlink_mcp/svd_manager.py:126`): Deserializing untrusted data with these APIs can execute arbitrary code (a well-known RCE gadget class). This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: device = pickle.load(f) logger.info(f"从缓存加载 SVD: {device_name}") return d
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/jlink_mcp/svd_manager.py
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
clear_breakpointno sensitive capabilityconnect_deviceno sensitive capabilitydisconnect_deviceno sensitive capabilityerase_flashno sensitive capabilityget_best_practicesno sensitive capabilityget_connection_statusno sensitive capabilityget_cpu_stateno sensitive capabilityget_forbidden_operationsno sensitive capabilityget_gdb_server_statusno sensitive capabilityget_svd_peripheralsno sensitive capabilityget_svd_registersno sensitive capabilityget_system_promptno sensitive capabilityget_target_infono sensitive capabilityget_target_voltageno sensitive capabilityget_usage_guidanceno sensitive capabilityhalt_cpuno sensitive capabilitylist_device_patchesno sensitive capabilitylist_jlink_devicesno sensitive capabilitylist_scenariosno sensitive capabilitylist_svd_devicesno sensitive capabilitymatch_chip_nameno sensitive capabilityparse_register_valueno sensitive capabilityprogram_flashno sensitive capabilityread_memoryno sensitive capabilityread_register_with_fieldsno sensitive capabilityread_registersno sensitive capabilityreset_targetno sensitive capabilityrtt_get_statusno sensitive capabilityrtt_readno sensitive capabilityrtt_startno sensitive capabilityrtt_stopno sensitive capabilityrtt_writeno sensitive capabilityrun_cpuno sensitive capabilityscan_target_devicesno sensitive capabilityset_breakpointno sensitive capabilitystart_gdb_serverno sensitive capabilitystep_instructionno sensitive capabilitystop_gdb_serverno sensitive capabilityverify_flashno sensitive capabilitywrite_memoryno sensitive capabilitywrite_registerno sensitive capabilityScan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.1.1 latest |
B 87/100 | 2 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-25 |
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan jlink-mcp --online --registry pypi
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