Jdocmunch — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.13.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.
{
"tool": {
"name": "mcptrustchecker",
"version": "1.13.0",
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"target": {
"id": "jdocmunch-mcp",
"source": {
"kind": "package",
"origin": "jdocmunch-mcp"
},
"server": {
"name": "jdocmunch-mcp"
}
},
"grade": "A",
"score": {
"score": 93,
"threatScore": 100,
"grade": "A",
"band": "A",
"categorySubtotals": {
"injection": 0,
"exfiltration": 0,
"permissions": 0,
"supply-chain": 0,
"network": 0,
"hygiene": 0
},
"vector": [
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "capability-exposure",
"level": "high",
"label": "capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated",
"appliedPenalty": 6
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "verification-discount",
"level": "repo",
"label": "publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable",
"appliedPenalty": 1
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "coverage-honesty",
"level": "source",
"label": "inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see",
"appliedPenalty": 0
}
],
"gatesFired": [],
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"capability": {
"level": "high",
"reasons": [
"reads sensitive or local data",
"has a read → egress path (a data-exfiltration surface)",
"can execute shell commands or code"
],
"tags": [
"sensitive-source",
"code-exec"
]
},
"coverage": {
"level": "source",
"inputs": {
"toolSurface": true,
"implementationSource": true,
"packageMetadata": true,
"liveTransport": false
},
"caveats": [
"Tools were statically extracted from the published source (64 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
]
},
"findings": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-006",
"title": "Reads a sensitive credential path or dumps the environment (src/jdocmunch_mcp/security.py)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/jdocmunch_mcp/security.py:84`): Reading private keys / cloud credentials, or serializing the whole environment, is a sensitive-data source that becomes exfiltration when combined with any egress. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/jdocmunch_mcp/security.py"
},
"evidence": "\"*secret*\", \"id_rsa\", \"id_rsa.*\", \"id_ed25519\", \"id_ed25519.*\", \"id_dsa\", \"id_ecdsa\"",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-006",
"file": "src/jdocmunch_mcp/security.py",
"line": 84,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (src/jdocmunch_mcp/cli/hooks.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/jdocmunch_mcp/cli/hooks.py:298`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/jdocmunch_mcp/cli/hooks.py"
},
"evidence": "[attr-defined] subprocess.Popen( [\"jdocmunch-mcp\", \"hook-reindex\", resolved], **kwarg",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "src/jdocmunch_mcp/cli/hooks.py",
"line": 298,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (src/jdocmunch_mcp/cli/init.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/jdocmunch_mcp/cli/init.py:222`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/jdocmunch_mcp/cli/init.py"
},
"evidence": "try: result = subprocess.run( [\"claude\", \"mcp\", \"add\", \"jdocmunch\", \"uvx\", \"jdocmunch-mcp\"],",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "src/jdocmunch_mcp/cli/init.py",
"line": 222,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (src/jdocmunch_mcp/embeddings/provider.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/jdocmunch_mcp/embeddings/provider.py:1068`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/jdocmunch_mcp/embeddings/provider.py"
},
"evidence": "ry: proc = subprocess.run( [sys.executable, \"-c\", \"import sentence_transformers\"],",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "src/jdocmunch_mcp/embeddings/provider.py",
"line": 1068,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (src/jdocmunch_mcp/embeddings/worker.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/jdocmunch_mcp/embeddings/worker.py:267`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/jdocmunch_mcp/embeddings/worker.py"
},
"evidence": ". self._proc = subprocess.Popen( self._build_command(), stdin=subprocess.PIPE,",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "src/jdocmunch_mcp/embeddings/worker.py",
"line": 267,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (src/jdocmunch_mcp/service_installer.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/jdocmunch_mcp/service_installer.py:124`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/jdocmunch_mcp/service_installer.py"
},
"evidence": "\"\"\" result = subprocess.run( [\"schtasks\", \"/Query\", \"/TN\", SERVICE_NAME, \"/FO\", \"LIST\", \"/V\"],",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "src/jdocmunch_mcp/service_installer.py",
"line": 124,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (src/jdocmunch_mcp/tools/_git.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/jdocmunch_mcp/tools/_git.py:99`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/jdocmunch_mcp/tools/_git.py"
},
"evidence": "try: proc = subprocess.run( [\"git\", *args], cwd=str(cwd), stdin=subpr",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "src/jdocmunch_mcp/tools/_git.py",
"line": 99,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-001",
"title": "Dynamic code execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_verify_index_unhashed.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_verify_index_unhashed.py:206`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "tests/test_verify_index_unhashed.py"
},
"evidence": "x\", ) exec(compile(stripped, vi.__file__ + \" (pre-fix)\", \"exec\"), mod.__dict__) return mod",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-001",
"file": "tests/test_verify_index_unhashed.py",
"line": 206,
"nonRuntime": true
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (scripts/evidence_receipt.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`scripts/evidence_receipt.py:39`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "scripts/evidence_receipt.py"
},
"evidence": "try: return subprocess.run( [\"git\", *args], capture_output=True, text=True, encoding=\"utf-8\", e",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "scripts/evidence_receipt.py",
"line": 39,
"nonRuntime": true
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (scripts/generate_changelog.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`scripts/generate_changelog.py:32`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "scripts/generate_changelog.py"
},
"evidence": "%b\"]) + sep proc = subprocess.run( [\"git\", \"log\", f\"--pretty=format:{fmt}\", \"--date=short\"], cwd=",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "scripts/generate_changelog.py",
"line": 32,
"nonRuntime": true
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_brief_bindings.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_brief_bindings.py:330`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "tests/test_brief_bindings.py"
},
"evidence": "try: prev = subprocess.run( [\"git\", \"show\", \"HEAD:CLAUDE.md\"], cwd=ROOT, capture_o",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "tests/test_brief_bindings.py",
"line": 330,
"nonRuntime": true
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_claude_md_size.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_claude_md_size.py:103`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "tests/test_claude_md_size.py"
},
"evidence": "try: rc = subprocess.run( [\"git\", \"ls-files\", \"--error-unmatch\", ARCHIVE], cwd=R",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "tests/test_claude_md_size.py",
"line": 103,
"nonRuntime": true
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-005",
"title": "Dynamic module load from a non-literal in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_embedding_sidecar_preservation.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_embedding_sidecar_preservation.py:417`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "tests/test_embedding_sidecar_preservation.py"
},
"evidence": ") store_obj = __import__( \"jdocmunch_mcp.storage\", fromlist=[\"DocStore\"] ).DocStore(base_path=st",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-005",
"file": "tests/test_embedding_sidecar_preservation.py",
"line": 417,
"nonRuntime": true
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SUP-012",
"title": "Package has no license",
"category": "hygiene",
"severity": "info",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "\"jdocmunch-mcp\" has no declared license. This is a legal/reuse concern, not a security finding.",
"location": {
"kind": "package",
"name": "jdocmunch-mcp"
}
}
],
"toxicFlows": [],
"capabilities": [
{
"tool": "index_local",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "doc_index_repo",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "doc_list_repos",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_index_overview",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_doc",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_docs",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_toc",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_toc_tree",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_document_outline",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "search_sections",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "count_sections",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "search_titles",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_section",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_sections",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_section_context",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "describe_section",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "section_neighbors",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_recent_changes",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_all_roles",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_all_tags",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_section_descendants",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_section_excerpts",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_section_excerpt",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_section_path",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_orphan_sections",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_section_summary",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_section_summaries",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "delete_index",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_broken_links",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_doc_coverage",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_backlinks",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_stale_pages",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_wiki_stats",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "analyze_perf",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_session_stats",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_watch_status",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "finalize_handoff",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "find_code_examples",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "link_code_to_symbols",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "resolve_related_code_repos",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "doc_resolve_repo",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "find_endpoint",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_endpoints_by_tag",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "find_operations_using_schema",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_schema_graph",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "lookup_term",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_terms",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_related_sections",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_section_diff",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_doc_health",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "doc_health_radar",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_doc_pr_risk_profile",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "diff_doc_health_radar",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_tutorial_path",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_undocumented_symbols",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_repo_groups",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "define_repo_group",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "tune_weights",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "verify_index",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "check_embedding_drift",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "find_similar_sections",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_section_blast_radius",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "check_section_delete_safe",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "jdocmunch_guide",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
}
],
"surfaceDigest": "73864d567f0b8d3400c390c27cbbdefddf74c659cbe27981c0118af14e525593",
"stats": {
"tools": 64,
"prompts": 0,
"resources": 0,
"findingsBySeverity": {
"critical": 0,
"high": 7,
"medium": 0,
"low": 6,
"info": 1
}
}
}