Jdocmunch MCP Server
jdocmunch-mcp
PyPI
v1.139.1
Published by jgravelle — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
Token-efficient MCP server for structured documentation retrieval via section-level indexing
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 13
high Reads a sensitive credential path or dumps the environment (src/jdocmunch_mcp/security.py)MTC-SRC-006
In the server's implementation (`src/jdocmunch_mcp/security.py:84`): Reading private keys / cloud credentials, or serializing the whole environment, is a sensitive-data source that becomes exfiltration when combined with any egress. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: "*secret*", "id_rsa", "id_rsa.*", "id_ed25519", "id_ed25519.*", "id_dsa", "id_ecdsa"
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/jdocmunch_mcp/security.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/jdocmunch_mcp/cli/hooks.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/jdocmunch_mcp/cli/hooks.py:298`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: [attr-defined] subprocess.Popen( ["jdocmunch-mcp", "hook-reindex", resolved], **kwarg
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/jdocmunch_mcp/cli/hooks.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/jdocmunch_mcp/cli/init.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/jdocmunch_mcp/cli/init.py:222`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: try: result = subprocess.run( ["claude", "mcp", "add", "jdocmunch", "uvx", "jdocmunch-mcp"],
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/jdocmunch_mcp/cli/init.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/jdocmunch_mcp/embeddings/provider.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/jdocmunch_mcp/embeddings/provider.py:1068`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ry: proc = subprocess.run( [sys.executable, "-c", "import sentence_transformers"],
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/jdocmunch_mcp/embeddings/provider.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/jdocmunch_mcp/embeddings/worker.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/jdocmunch_mcp/embeddings/worker.py:267`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: . self._proc = subprocess.Popen( self._build_command(), stdin=subprocess.PIPE,
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/jdocmunch_mcp/embeddings/worker.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/jdocmunch_mcp/service_installer.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/jdocmunch_mcp/service_installer.py:124`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: """ result = subprocess.run( ["schtasks", "/Query", "/TN", SERVICE_NAME, "/FO", "LIST", "/V"],
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/jdocmunch_mcp/service_installer.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/jdocmunch_mcp/tools/_git.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/jdocmunch_mcp/tools/_git.py:99`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: try: proc = subprocess.run( ["git", *args], cwd=str(cwd), stdin=subpr
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/jdocmunch_mcp/tools/_git.py
low Dynamic code execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_verify_index_unhashed.py)MTC-SRC-001
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_verify_index_unhashed.py:206`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: x", ) exec(compile(stripped, vi.__file__ + " (pre-fix)", "exec"), mod.__dict__) return mod
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/test_verify_index_unhashed.py
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (scripts/evidence_receipt.py)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`scripts/evidence_receipt.py:39`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: try: return subprocess.run( ["git", *args], capture_output=True, text=True, encoding="utf-8", e
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server scripts/evidence_receipt.py
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (scripts/generate_changelog.py)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`scripts/generate_changelog.py:32`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: %b"]) + sep proc = subprocess.run( ["git", "log", f"--pretty=format:{fmt}", "--date=short"], cwd=
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server scripts/generate_changelog.py
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_brief_bindings.py)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_brief_bindings.py:330`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: try: prev = subprocess.run( ["git", "show", "HEAD:CLAUDE.md"], cwd=ROOT, capture_o
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/test_brief_bindings.py
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_claude_md_size.py)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_claude_md_size.py:103`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: try: rc = subprocess.run( ["git", "ls-files", "--error-unmatch", ARCHIVE], cwd=R
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/test_claude_md_size.py
low Dynamic module load from a non-literal in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_embedding_sidecar_preservation.py)MTC-SRC-005
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_embedding_sidecar_preservation.py:417`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ) store_obj = __import__( "jdocmunch_mcp.storage", fromlist=["DocStore"] ).DocStore(base_path=st
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/test_embedding_sidecar_preservation.py
Tools 64
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
analyze_perfno sensitive capabilitycheck_embedding_driftno sensitive capabilitycheck_section_delete_safeno sensitive capabilitycount_sectionsno sensitive capabilitydefine_repo_groupno sensitive capabilitydelete_indexno sensitive capabilitydescribe_sectionno sensitive capabilitydiff_doc_health_radarno sensitive capabilitydoc_health_radarno sensitive capabilitydoc_index_repono sensitive capability
Show 54 more tools ↓
doc_list_reposno sensitive capabilitydoc_resolve_repono sensitive capabilityfinalize_handoffno sensitive capabilityfind_code_examplesno sensitive capabilityfind_endpointno sensitive capabilityfind_operations_using_schemano sensitive capabilityfind_similar_sectionsno sensitive capabilityget_all_rolesno sensitive capabilityget_all_tagsno sensitive capabilityget_backlinksno sensitive capabilityget_broken_linksno sensitive capabilityget_docno sensitive capabilityget_doc_coverageno sensitive capabilityget_doc_healthno sensitive capabilityget_doc_pr_risk_profileno sensitive capabilityget_document_outlineno sensitive capabilityget_index_overviewno sensitive capabilityget_orphan_sectionsno sensitive capabilityget_recent_changesno sensitive capabilityget_related_sectionsno sensitive capabilityget_schema_graphno sensitive capabilityget_sectionno sensitive capabilityget_section_blast_radiusno sensitive capabilityget_section_contextno sensitive capabilityget_section_descendantsno sensitive capabilityget_section_diffno sensitive capabilityget_section_excerptno sensitive capabilityget_section_excerptsno sensitive capabilityget_section_pathno sensitive capabilityget_section_summariesno sensitive capabilityget_section_summaryno sensitive capabilityget_sectionsno sensitive capabilityget_session_statsno sensitive capabilityget_stale_pagesno sensitive capabilityget_tocno sensitive capabilityget_toc_treeno sensitive capabilityget_tutorial_pathno sensitive capabilityget_undocumented_symbolsno sensitive capabilityget_watch_statusno sensitive capabilityget_wiki_statsno sensitive capabilityindex_localno sensitive capabilityjdocmunch_guideno sensitive capabilitylink_code_to_symbolsno sensitive capabilitylist_docsno sensitive capabilitylist_endpoints_by_tagno sensitive capabilitylist_repo_groupsno sensitive capabilitylist_termsno sensitive capabilitylookup_termno sensitive capabilityresolve_related_code_reposno sensitive capabilitysearch_sectionsno sensitive capabilitysearch_titlesno sensitive capabilitysection_neighborsno sensitive capabilitytune_weightsno sensitive capabilityverify_indexno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (64 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 10
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.139.1 latest |
A 93/100 | 13 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-04 |
v1.139.0 |
A 93/100 | 13 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-01 |
v1.138.0 |
A 93/100 | 13 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-30 |
v1.137.1 |
A 93/100 | 13 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-29 |
v1.136.1 |
A 93/100 | 13 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-27 |
Show 5 more versions ↓
v1.136.0 |
A 93/100 | 12 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-25 |
v1.135.1 |
A 93/100 | 12 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-21 |
v1.135.0 |
A 93/100 | 12 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-19 |
v1.134.1 |
A 93/100 | 12 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-17 |
v1.133.0 |
A 93/100 | 12 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-14 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan jdocmunch-mcp --online --registry pypiMore in Learning & Documentation
stdio compatibility bridge for the hosted AgentMail MCP server
MCP server for Alfa documentation retrieval
MCP server providing Alpine.js documentation and reference
Search the official Astro framework documentation.
MCP server providing ATAG 2.0 (Authoring Tool Accessibility Guidelines) guidance for authoring tool developers
Aurais Research Reader as an MCP server — paste a paper or article, get a structured read with verbatim-verified quotes + a signed Vorion proof chain (via @vorionsys/aurais-core).