Ithz MCP Server
ithz-mcp
PyPI
v0.1.0a2
Published by an unidentified publisher — no publish provenance and no public repository, so the publisher could not be verified and the source cannot be independently located.
Local-first deterministic project memory for AI coding agents and MCP workflows.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 8 = 92. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −2 | publisher verification (unlinked) — no provenance/repo link, but the shipped source was fully read |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 10
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/ithz_mcp/__init__.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/ithz_mcp/__init__.py:22`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: try: result = subprocess.run( ["git", "-C", str(root), "rev-parse", "--short=12", "HEAD"],
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/ithz_mcp/__init__.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/ithz_mcp/agent_history_import.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/ithz_mcp/agent_history_import.py:98`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: try: name = subprocess.run(["git", "-C", str(project), "config", "user.name"], capture_output=True, text=Tru
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/ithz_mcp/agent_history_import.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/ithz_mcp/agent_intake.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/ithz_mcp/agent_intake.py:593`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: try: result = subprocess.run( command, input=prompt, text=True,
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/ithz_mcp/agent_intake.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/ithz_mcp/events.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/ithz_mcp/events.py:234`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: -> str: return subprocess.check_output(["git", *args], cwd=str(project), text=True, stderr=subprocess.STDOUT).s
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/ithz_mcp/events.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/ithz_mcp/git_merge_driver.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/ithz_mcp/git_merge_driver.py:399`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: if not dry_run: subprocess.run(["git", "config", "merge.ithz.name", "ITHZ semantic merge driver"], cwd=str(repo)
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/ithz_mcp/git_merge_driver.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/ithz_mcp/mcp_config.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/ithz_mcp/mcp_config.py:216`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: , Any]] = [] proc = subprocess.Popen([command, *args], stdin=subprocess.PIPE, stdout=subprocess.PIPE, stderr=subproc
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/ithz_mcp/mcp_config.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/ithz_mcp/native_archive_store.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/ithz_mcp/native_archive_store.py:1089`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: try: return subprocess.run([str(native_exe), *args], text=True, capture_output=True, check=False, cwd=str(cw
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/ithz_mcp/native_archive_store.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/ithz_mcp/project_installer.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/ithz_mcp/project_installer.py:44`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: try: result = subprocess.run(["git", "-C", str(project), *args], text=True, capture_output=True, check=False)
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/ithz_mcp/project_installer.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/ithz_mcp/selftest.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/ithz_mcp/selftest.py:330`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: _project") subprocess.run(["git", "init"], cwd=str(gp), text=True, capture_output=True, check=True)
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/ithz_mcp/selftest.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/ithz_mcp/task_checkpoint.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/ithz_mcp/task_checkpoint.py:306`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: as log: proc = subprocess.Popen( cmd, cwd=str(Path(payload["project"])), st
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/ithz_mcp/task_checkpoint.py
What this scan could not see
- No tools were enumerated, so prompt-injection, capability and toxic-flow analysis had no tool surface to inspect. To grade a package’s real runtime tools, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.1.0a2 latest |
A 92/100 | 10 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-25 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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