Itechsmart — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.13.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.
{
"tool": {
"name": "mcptrustchecker",
"version": "1.13.0",
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"target": {
"id": "@itechsmart/mcp-server",
"source": {
"kind": "package",
"origin": "@itechsmart/mcp-server"
},
"server": {
"name": "@itechsmart/mcp-server"
}
},
"grade": "A",
"score": {
"score": 93,
"threatScore": 100,
"grade": "A",
"band": "A",
"categorySubtotals": {
"injection": 0,
"exfiltration": 0,
"permissions": 0,
"supply-chain": 0,
"network": 0,
"hygiene": 0
},
"vector": [
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "capability-exposure",
"level": "high",
"label": "capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated",
"appliedPenalty": 6
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "verification-discount",
"level": "repo",
"label": "publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable",
"appliedPenalty": 1
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "coverage-honesty",
"level": "source",
"label": "inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see",
"appliedPenalty": 0
}
],
"gatesFired": [],
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"capability": {
"level": "high",
"reasons": [
"ingests untrusted external content (a prompt-injection entry point)",
"can send data / act on an external service",
"can execute shell commands or code"
],
"tags": [
"untrusted-input",
"code-exec",
"external-sink"
]
},
"coverage": {
"level": "source",
"inputs": {
"toolSurface": true,
"implementationSource": true,
"packageMetadata": true,
"liveTransport": false
},
"caveats": [
"Tools were statically extracted from the published source (68 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
]
},
"findings": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-001",
"title": "Tool \"trmm_run_script\" exposes command/code execution",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "Tool \"trmm_run_script\" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword \"run_script\" in tool name, parameter \"script\"). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.",
"remediation": "Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "trmm_run_script"
},
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"tags": [
"code-exec"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/index.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/index.js:68`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/index.js"
},
"evidence": "require(\"http\")); const child_process_1 = require(\"child_process\"); const API_KEYS = new Map(); function loadApiKeys(raw",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/index.js",
"line": 68,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-FLOW-005",
"title": "Untrusted input can drive an external action",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "Untrusted-input tools ([get_receipt_chain, get_incident_details]) co-exist with external-action tools ([trmm_run_script, ghl_send_email, itsm_register_webhook]). A prompt injection could cause unwanted external actions, though no direct sensitive-data leak path was found.",
"remediation": "Require confirmation for state-changing/egress actions triggered after processing untrusted content.",
"location": {
"kind": "flow",
"name": "get_receipt_chain → trmm_run_script"
},
"evidence": "untrusted [get_receipt_chain, get_incident_details] → sinks [trmm_run_script, ghl_send_email, itsm_register_webhook]",
"owasp": "LLM06:2025 Excessive Agency",
"references": [],
"data": {
"untrusted": [
"get_receipt_chain",
"get_incident_details"
],
"sinks": [
"trmm_run_script",
"ghl_send_email",
"itsm_register_webhook"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-003",
"title": "Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (dist/index.js)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/index.js:1947`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/index.js"
},
"evidence": "const res = await fetch('http://172.18.0.1:8210/api/v1/cluster'); const data = await res.json();",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-003",
"file": "dist/index.js",
"line": 1947,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-007",
"title": "Unconstrained URL/host parameter \"url\" on \"itsm_register_webhook\"",
"category": "network",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"itsm_register_webhook\" takes a URL/host parameter \"url\" with no allowlist/pattern. An outbound-request tool with an unbounded destination enables SSRF and cloud-metadata access (e.g. 169.254.169.254).",
"remediation": "Allowlist destinations or constrain the parameter; block private/link-local addresses server-side.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "itsm_register_webhook",
"field": "inputSchema.properties.url"
},
"owasp": "LLM06:2025 Excessive Agency",
"data": {
"param": "url"
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-006",
"title": "Unconstrained command parameter \"script_id\" on \"trmm_run_script\"",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"trmm_run_script\" takes a command-shaped parameter \"script_id\" with no enum/pattern constraint. Free-form, model- or attacker-controlled arguments reaching a shell is the command-injection precondition.",
"remediation": "Constrain the parameter (enum/pattern), or build the command from a fixed template with escaped args.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "trmm_run_script",
"field": "inputSchema.properties.script_id"
},
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"param": "script_id"
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-005",
"title": "Mutating tool \"trmm_run_script\" declares no destructiveHint",
"category": "hygiene",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"trmm_run_script\" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.",
"remediation": "Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "trmm_run_script"
},
"data": {
"tags": [
"code-exec"
]
}
}
],
"toxicFlows": [
{
"id": "flow-1",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"untrustedInput": [
"get_receipt_chain",
"get_incident_details"
],
"sensitiveSource": [],
"externalSink": [
"trmm_run_script",
"ghl_send_email",
"itsm_register_webhook"
],
"selfContained": false,
"description": "Untrusted input can drive an external action even though no sensitive source is exposed."
}
],
"capabilities": [
{
"tool": "verify_prooflink_receipt",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_receipt_chain",
"tags": [
"untrusted-input"
],
"reasons": {
"untrusted-input": [
"keyword \"fetch\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "prooflink.verify_chain",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "prooflink.verify_receipt",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "prooflink.search_receipts",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "mission.list_incidents",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "mission.cluster_health",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "compliance.audit_summary",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "query_uaio_status",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_incident_details",
"tags": [
"untrusted-input"
],
"reasons": {
"untrusted-input": [
"keyword \"fetch\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "list_recent_incidents",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "simulate_infrastructure_attack",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "invoke_octoai_pipeline",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_platform_briefing",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_sie_queue",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_compliance_status",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "dispatch_ag2_incident",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "search_platform_logs",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "approve_sie_finding",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "trigger_sie_scan",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_iself_journal",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "integration_status",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "langfuse_health",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "langfuse_trace",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ragflow_health",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ragflow_query",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "shuffle_health",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "shuffle_trigger",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "trmm_health",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "trmm_agents",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "trmm_summary",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "trmm_run_script",
"tags": [
"code-exec"
],
"reasons": {
"code-exec": [
"keyword \"run_script\" in tool name",
"parameter \"script\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "mesh_health",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "mesh_devices",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "probo_health",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "probo_controls",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "probo_risks",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "probo_summary",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_learning_queue",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "approve_learning_item",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_learning_metrics",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ghl_create_contact",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ghl_trigger_workflow",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ghl_book_appointment",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ghl_send_email",
"tags": [
"external-sink"
],
"reasons": {
"external-sink": [
"keyword \"send_email\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "ghl_update_contact",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ghl_move_pipeline",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "deepgram_tts",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "deepgram_transcribe",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "deepgram_blog_audio",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "itsm_create_ticket",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "itsm_get_ticket",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "itsm_list_tickets",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "itsm_close_ticket",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "itsm_run_loop",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "itsm_run_test",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "itsm_get_mttr_stats",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "itsm_embed_receipt",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "itsm_verify_receipt",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "itsm_list_open_incidents",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "itsm_get_incident_timeline",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "itsm_trigger_detection",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "itsm_get_detection_sources",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "itsm_get_remediation_history",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "itsm_register_webhook",
"tags": [
"external-sink"
],
"reasons": {
"external-sink": [
"keyword \"webhook\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "itsm_dashboard_summary",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "x-itechsmart-mcp-key",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "iTechSmart UAIO Agent",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
}
],
"surfaceDigest": "4cff7738a76dd4a42dac2e9bb4d6c352228b08a8a039b3fa9ddda3be9540ef29",
"stats": {
"tools": 68,
"prompts": 0,
"resources": 0,
"findingsBySeverity": {
"critical": 0,
"high": 2,
"medium": 4,
"low": 1,
"info": 0
}
}
}