It Tools — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.13.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.
{
"tool": {
"name": "mcptrustchecker",
"version": "1.13.0",
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"target": {
"id": "it-tools-mcp",
"source": {
"kind": "package",
"origin": "it-tools-mcp"
},
"server": {
"name": "it-tools-mcp"
}
},
"grade": "A",
"score": {
"score": 94,
"threatScore": 100,
"grade": "A",
"band": "A",
"categorySubtotals": {
"injection": 0,
"exfiltration": 0,
"permissions": 0,
"supply-chain": 0,
"network": 0,
"hygiene": 0
},
"vector": [
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "capability-exposure",
"level": "high",
"label": "capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated",
"appliedPenalty": 6
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "verification-discount",
"level": "source",
"label": "publisher verification (provenance) — cryptographic build provenance ties the artifact to its source",
"appliedPenalty": 0
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "coverage-honesty",
"level": "source",
"label": "inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see",
"appliedPenalty": 0
}
],
"gatesFired": [],
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"capability": {
"level": "high",
"reasons": [
"can send data / act on an external service",
"reads sensitive or local data",
"has a read → egress path (a data-exfiltration surface)",
"can execute shell commands or code"
],
"tags": [
"sensitive-source",
"external-sink",
"code-exec"
]
},
"coverage": {
"level": "source",
"inputs": {
"toolSurface": true,
"implementationSource": true,
"packageMetadata": true,
"liveTransport": false
},
"caveats": [
"Tools were statically extracted from the published source (119 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
]
},
"findings": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-FLOW-004",
"title": "Sensitive-source and external-sink co-exist",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "Tools that read sensitive data ([generate_otp, format_sql]) and tools that can send data out ([curl, ssh]) are exposed together. An agent can move private data to the sink.",
"remediation": "Keep secret-reading and egress capabilities on separate, separately-approved servers.",
"location": {
"kind": "flow",
"name": "generate_otp → curl"
},
"evidence": "sources [generate_otp, format_sql] → sinks [curl, ssh]",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"references": [],
"data": {
"sources": [
"generate_otp",
"format_sql"
],
"sinks": [
"curl",
"ssh"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-006",
"title": "Reads a sensitive credential path or dumps the environment (build/tools/network/scp/index.js)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`build/tools/network/scp/index.js:10`): Reading private keys / cloud credentials, or serializing the whole environment, is a sensitive-data source that becomes exfiltration when combined with any egress. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "build/tools/network/scp/index.js"
},
"evidence": "ath.join(home, '.ssh', 'id_rsa'), path.join(home, '.ssh', 'id_ed25519'), ]; for (const keyPa",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-006",
"file": "build/tools/network/scp/index.js",
"line": 10,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-006",
"title": "Reads a sensitive credential path or dumps the environment (build/tools/network/ssh/index.js)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`build/tools/network/ssh/index.js:11`): Reading private keys / cloud credentials, or serializing the whole environment, is a sensitive-data source that becomes exfiltration when combined with any egress. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "build/tools/network/ssh/index.js"
},
"evidence": "ath.join(home, '.ssh', 'id_rsa'), path.join(home, '.ssh', 'id_ed25519'), ]; for (const keyPa",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-006",
"file": "build/tools/network/ssh/index.js",
"line": 11,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-001",
"title": "Tool \"ssh\" exposes command/code execution",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "Tool \"ssh\" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (parameter \"command\"). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.",
"remediation": "Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "ssh"
},
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"tags": [
"code-exec"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-003",
"title": "Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (build/tools/crypto/generate_basic_auth/index.js)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`build/tools/crypto/generate_basic_auth/index.js:33`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "build/tools/crypto/generate_basic_auth/index.js"
},
"evidence": "le.com Usage in fetch: fetch('https://api.example.com', { headers: { 'Authorization': '${authHeader}' } })`,",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-003",
"file": "build/tools/crypto/generate_basic_auth/index.js",
"line": 33,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-007",
"title": "Unconstrained URL/host parameter \"url\" on \"curl\"",
"category": "network",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"curl\" takes a URL/host parameter \"url\" with no allowlist/pattern. An outbound-request tool with an unbounded destination enables SSRF and cloud-metadata access (e.g. 169.254.169.254).",
"remediation": "Allowlist destinations or constrain the parameter; block private/link-local addresses server-side.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "curl",
"field": "inputSchema.properties.url"
},
"owasp": "LLM06:2025 Excessive Agency",
"data": {
"param": "url"
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-006",
"title": "Unconstrained command parameter \"command\" on \"ssh\"",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"ssh\" takes a command-shaped parameter \"command\" with no enum/pattern constraint. Free-form, model- or attacker-controlled arguments reaching a shell is the command-injection precondition.",
"remediation": "Constrain the parameter (enum/pattern), or build the command from a fixed template with escaped args.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "ssh",
"field": "inputSchema.properties.command"
},
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"param": "command"
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-005",
"title": "Mutating tool \"ssh\" declares no destructiveHint",
"category": "hygiene",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"ssh\" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.",
"remediation": "Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "ssh"
},
"data": {
"tags": [
"code-exec"
]
}
}
],
"toxicFlows": [
{
"id": "flow-1",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"untrustedInput": [],
"sensitiveSource": [
"generate_otp",
"format_sql"
],
"externalSink": [
"curl",
"ssh"
],
"selfContained": false,
"path": [
"format_sql",
"curl"
],
"pathWired": true,
"description": "A sensitive-source → external-sink chain exists: format_sql ⇒ curl."
}
],
"capabilities": [
{
"tool": "logging_setLevel",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "logging_status",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "system_info",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "decrypt_ansible_vault",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "encrypt_ansible_vault",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "generate_ansible_inventory",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "parse_ansible_inventory",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "show_ansible_reference",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "validate_ansible_playbook",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "convert_hex_to_rgb",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "convert_rgb_to_hex",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "decode_jwt",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "generate_basic_auth",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "generate_bip39",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "generate_hmac",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "generate_otp",
"tags": [
"sensitive-source"
],
"reasons": {
"sensitive-source": [
"parameter \"secret\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "generate_password",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "generate_token",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "hash_bcrypt",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "hash_md5",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "hash_sha1",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "hash_sha256",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "hash_sha512",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "compare_json",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "convert_html_to_markdown",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "convert_json_to_csv",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "convert_json_to_toml",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "convert_markdown_to_html",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "convert_toml_to_json",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "format_json",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "format_phone",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "format_sql",
"tags": [
"sensitive-source"
],
"reasons": {
"sensitive-source": [
"parameter \"sql\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "format_xml",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "format_yaml",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "minify_json",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "convert_list",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "format_html",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "format_javascript",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "generate_crontab",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "generate_markdown_toc",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "test_regex",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "convert_docker_compose_to_run",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "convert_docker_run_to_compose",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "generate_traefik_compose",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "show_docker_reference",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "validate_docker_compose",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "convert_text_to_binary",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "decode_base64",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "decode_html",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "decode_url",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "encode_base64",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "encode_html",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "encode_html_entities",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "encode_url",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "decode_safelink",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "fang_url",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "identify_file_type",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "generate_qr_code",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "generate_svg_placeholder",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "generate_ulid",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "generate_uuid",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "calculate_percentage",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "convert_number_base",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "convert_roman_numerals",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "convert_temperature",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "convert_unix_timestamp",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "evaluate_math",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "calculate_ip_subnet",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "calculate_ipv4_subnet",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "calculate_ipv6_subnet",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "cat",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "convert_cidr_to_ip_range",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "convert_ip_range_to_cidr",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "curl",
"tags": [
"external-sink"
],
"reasons": {
"external-sink": [
"keyword \"http_request\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "dig",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "generate_ipv6_ula",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "generate_mac_address",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "generate_random_port",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "grep",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "head",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "nslookup",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "parse_url",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ping",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ps",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "scp",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ssh",
"tags": [
"code-exec"
],
"reasons": {
"code-exec": [
"parameter \"command\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "tail",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "telnet",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "top",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "validate_iban",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "convert_angle",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "convert_energy",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "convert_power",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "analyze_distinct_words",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "analyze_text_stats",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "capitalize_text",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "compare_text",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "convert_text_to_camelcase",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "convert_text_to_kebabcase",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "convert_text_to_lowercase",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "convert_text_to_nato",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "convert_text_to_pascalcase",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "convert_text_to_unicode",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "convert_text_to_uppercase",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "generate_ascii_art",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "generate_lorem_ipsum",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "generate_numeronym",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "obfuscate_string",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "search_emoji",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "show_unicode_names",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "slugify_text",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "text_snakecase",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "convert_rem_px",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "format_css",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "lookup_http_status",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "lookup_mime_types",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "lookup_port_numbers",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "normalize_email",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "show_device_info",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
}
],
"surfaceDigest": "8ad920dfe37de091daa174a74f96e1b14061a18a1a0b1a7a1b89b312fcebf07c",
"stats": {
"tools": 119,
"prompts": 0,
"resources": 0,
"findingsBySeverity": {
"critical": 0,
"high": 4,
"medium": 3,
"low": 1,
"info": 0
}
}
}