it-tools-mcp
npm
v5.10.8
Source verified
Published by wrenchpilot — publish provenance cryptographically ties this package to that repository. That is proof of origin, not an official vendor package.
MCP-compliant server access to over 100 IT tools and utilities commonly used by developers, system administrators, and IT professionals.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 6 = 94. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Tools that read sensitive data ([generate_otp, format_sql]) and tools that can send data out ([curl, ssh]) are exposed together. An agent can move private data to the sink.
Evidence: sources [generate_otp, format_sql] → sinks [curl, ssh]
Fix: Keep secret-reading and egress capabilities on separate, separately-approved servers.
Location: flow generate_otp → curl
In the server's implementation (`build/tools/network/scp/index.js:10`): Reading private keys / cloud credentials, or serializing the whole environment, is a sensitive-data source that becomes exfiltration when combined with any egress. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ath.join(home, '.ssh', 'id_rsa'), path.join(home, '.ssh', 'id_ed25519'), ]; for (const keyPa
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server build/tools/network/scp/index.js
In the server's implementation (`build/tools/network/ssh/index.js:11`): Reading private keys / cloud credentials, or serializing the whole environment, is a sensitive-data source that becomes exfiltration when combined with any egress. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ath.join(home, '.ssh', 'id_rsa'), path.join(home, '.ssh', 'id_ed25519'), ]; for (const keyPa
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server build/tools/network/ssh/index.js
Tool "ssh" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (parameter "command"). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool ssh
In the server's implementation (`build/tools/crypto/generate_basic_auth/index.js:33`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: le.com Usage in fetch: fetch('https://api.example.com', { headers: { 'Authorization': '${authHeader}' } })`,
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server build/tools/crypto/generate_basic_auth/index.js
Tool "curl" takes a URL/host parameter "url" with no allowlist/pattern. An outbound-request tool with an unbounded destination enables SSRF and cloud-metadata access (e.g. 169.254.169.254).
Fix: Allowlist destinations or constrain the parameter; block private/link-local addresses server-side.
Location: tool curl · inputSchema.properties.url
Tool "ssh" takes a command-shaped parameter "command" with no enum/pattern constraint. Free-form, model- or attacker-controlled arguments reaching a shell is the command-injection precondition.
Fix: Constrain the parameter (enum/pattern), or build the command from a fixed template with escaped args.
Location: tool ssh · inputSchema.properties.command
Tool "ssh" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool ssh
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
curlnetwork egressformat_sqlreads sensitive datagenerate_otpreads sensitive datasshruns code / shellanalyze_distinct_wordsno sensitive capabilityanalyze_text_statsno sensitive capabilitycalculate_ip_subnetno sensitive capabilitycalculate_ipv4_subnetno sensitive capabilitycalculate_ipv6_subnetno sensitive capabilitycalculate_percentageno sensitive capabilitycapitalize_textno sensitive capabilitycatno sensitive capabilitycompare_jsonno sensitive capabilitycompare_textno sensitive capabilityconvert_angleno sensitive capabilityconvert_cidr_to_ip_rangeno sensitive capabilityconvert_docker_compose_to_runno sensitive capabilityconvert_docker_run_to_composeno sensitive capabilityconvert_energyno sensitive capabilityconvert_hex_to_rgbno sensitive capabilityconvert_html_to_markdownno sensitive capabilityconvert_ip_range_to_cidrno sensitive capabilityconvert_json_to_csvno sensitive capabilityconvert_json_to_tomlno sensitive capabilityconvert_listno sensitive capabilityconvert_markdown_to_htmlno sensitive capabilityconvert_number_baseno sensitive capabilityconvert_powerno sensitive capabilityconvert_rem_pxno sensitive capabilityconvert_rgb_to_hexno sensitive capabilityconvert_roman_numeralsno sensitive capabilityconvert_temperatureno sensitive capabilityconvert_text_to_binaryno sensitive capabilityconvert_text_to_camelcaseno sensitive capabilityconvert_text_to_kebabcaseno sensitive capabilityconvert_text_to_lowercaseno sensitive capabilityconvert_text_to_natono sensitive capabilityconvert_text_to_pascalcaseno sensitive capabilityconvert_text_to_unicodeno sensitive capabilityconvert_text_to_uppercaseno sensitive capabilityconvert_toml_to_jsonno sensitive capabilityconvert_unix_timestampno sensitive capabilitydecode_base64no sensitive capabilitydecode_htmlno sensitive capabilitydecode_jwtno sensitive capabilitydecode_safelinkno sensitive capabilitydecode_urlno sensitive capabilitydecrypt_ansible_vaultno sensitive capabilitydigno sensitive capabilityencode_base64no sensitive capabilityencode_htmlno sensitive capabilityencode_html_entitiesno sensitive capabilityencode_urlno sensitive capabilityencrypt_ansible_vaultno sensitive capabilityevaluate_mathno sensitive capabilityfang_urlno sensitive capabilityformat_cssno sensitive capabilityformat_htmlno sensitive capabilityformat_javascriptno sensitive capabilityformat_jsonno sensitive capabilityformat_phoneno sensitive capabilityformat_xmlno sensitive capabilityformat_yamlno sensitive capabilitygenerate_ansible_inventoryno sensitive capabilitygenerate_ascii_artno sensitive capabilitygenerate_basic_authno sensitive capabilitygenerate_bip39no sensitive capabilitygenerate_crontabno sensitive capabilitygenerate_hmacno sensitive capabilitygenerate_ipv6_ulano sensitive capabilitygenerate_lorem_ipsumno sensitive capabilitygenerate_mac_addressno sensitive capabilitygenerate_markdown_tocno sensitive capabilitygenerate_numeronymno sensitive capabilitygenerate_passwordno sensitive capabilitygenerate_qr_codeno sensitive capabilitygenerate_random_portno sensitive capabilitygenerate_svg_placeholderno sensitive capabilitygenerate_tokenno sensitive capabilitygenerate_traefik_composeno sensitive capabilitygenerate_ulidno sensitive capabilitygenerate_uuidno sensitive capabilitygrepno sensitive capabilityhash_bcryptno sensitive capabilityhash_md5no sensitive capabilityhash_sha1no sensitive capabilityhash_sha256no sensitive capabilityhash_sha512no sensitive capabilityheadno sensitive capabilityidentify_file_typeno sensitive capabilitylogging_setLevelno sensitive capabilitylogging_statusno sensitive capabilitylookup_http_statusno sensitive capabilitylookup_mime_typesno sensitive capabilitylookup_port_numbersno sensitive capabilityminify_jsonno sensitive capabilitynormalize_emailno sensitive capabilitynslookupno sensitive capabilityobfuscate_stringno sensitive capabilityparse_ansible_inventoryno sensitive capabilityparse_urlno sensitive capabilitypingno sensitive capabilitypsno sensitive capabilityscpno sensitive capabilitysearch_emojino sensitive capabilityshow_ansible_referenceno sensitive capabilityshow_device_infono sensitive capabilityshow_docker_referenceno sensitive capabilityshow_unicode_namesno sensitive capabilityslugify_textno sensitive capabilitysystem_infono sensitive capabilitytailno sensitive capabilitytelnetno sensitive capabilitytest_regexno sensitive capabilitytext_snakecaseno sensitive capabilitytopno sensitive capabilityvalidate_ansible_playbookno sensitive capabilityvalidate_docker_composeno sensitive capabilityvalidate_ibanno sensitive capabilityCross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v5.10.8 latest |
A 94/100 | 8 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan it-tools-mcp --online
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