Codeplane Server Inventory — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.9.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.
{
"tool": {
"name": "mcptrustchecker",
"version": "1.9.0",
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.9"
},
"target": {
"id": "@isogonic/codeplane-server-inventory",
"source": {
"kind": "package",
"origin": "@isogonic/codeplane-server-inventory"
},
"server": {
"name": "@isogonic/codeplane-server-inventory"
}
},
"grade": "C",
"score": {
"score": 73,
"threatScore": 84,
"grade": "C",
"band": "C",
"categorySubtotals": {
"injection": 16.3,
"exfiltration": 0,
"permissions": 0,
"supply-chain": 0,
"network": 0,
"hygiene": 0
},
"vector": [
{
"kind": "threat",
"ruleId": "MTC-INJ-TARGET-1",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"rawWeight": 22,
"confidenceMult": 0.7,
"diminishingFactor": 1,
"appliedPenalty": 15.4
},
{
"kind": "threat",
"ruleId": "MTC-INJ-TARGET-1",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"rawWeight": 3,
"confidenceMult": 0.4,
"diminishingFactor": 0.5,
"appliedPenalty": 0.6
},
{
"kind": "threat",
"ruleId": "MTC-INJ-TARGET-1",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"rawWeight": 3,
"confidenceMult": 0.4,
"diminishingFactor": 0.25,
"appliedPenalty": 0.3
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "capability-exposure",
"level": "critical",
"label": "capability blast radius (critical) — client exposure if the model is manipulated",
"appliedPenalty": 10
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "verification-discount",
"level": "repo",
"label": "publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable",
"appliedPenalty": 1
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "coverage-honesty",
"level": "source",
"label": "inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see",
"appliedPenalty": 0
}
],
"gatesFired": [],
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.9"
},
"capability": {
"level": "critical",
"reasons": [
"ingests untrusted external content (a prompt-injection entry point)",
"reads sensitive or local data",
"has a read → egress path (a data-exfiltration surface)",
"can execute shell commands or code",
"untrusted-input, sensitive-source and egress co-exist across tools (toxic-flow surface)",
"untrusted input can reach code execution"
],
"tags": [
"sensitive-source",
"untrusted-input",
"code-exec"
]
},
"coverage": {
"level": "source",
"inputs": {
"toolSurface": true,
"implementationSource": true,
"packageMetadata": true,
"liveTransport": false
},
"caveats": [
"Tools were statically extracted from the published source (20 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
]
},
"findings": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-FLOW-002",
"title": "Completed toxic-flow trifecta across tools",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "critical",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "This server (without client built-ins) exposes a complete data-exfiltration chain: list_secrets → get_secret → exec_on. Untrusted input is ingested, private data is read, and it can be sent to an external sink via the agent composing the tools (→). Static analysis proves the primitive exists, not that a specific run will occur.",
"remediation": "Remove one leg of the trifecta: isolate untrusted-input tools from secret-reading tools and from egress tools, or require human approval between them.",
"location": {
"kind": "flow",
"name": "list_secrets → get_secret → exec_on"
},
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"references": [],
"data": {
"untrusted": [
"list_secrets"
],
"sources": [
"get_secret",
"list_secrets"
],
"sinks": [
"exec_on"
],
"path": [
"list_secrets",
"get_secret",
"exec_on"
],
"edges": [
{
"from": "list_secrets",
"to": "get_secret",
"kind": "agent-mediated"
},
{
"from": "get_secret",
"to": "exec_on",
"kind": "agent-mediated"
}
],
"wired": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-INJ-TARGET-1",
"title": "Reference to a credential-exfiltration path in metadata",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "Reference to a credential-exfiltration path in metadata detected in the description of tool \"validate_inventory\". Instruction-like content in tool metadata is executed by the model, not the human, and is the primary tool-poisoning vector.",
"remediation": "Tool descriptions should describe behavior, not instruct the assistant. Treat imperative / secrecy / sequencing language in metadata as hostile.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "validate_inventory",
"field": "description"
},
"evidence": "~/.ssh",
"owasp": "LLM01:2025 Prompt Injection",
"data": {
"kind": "sensitive-target"
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-001",
"title": "Tool \"exec_on\" exposes command/code execution",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "Tool \"exec_on\" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword \"exec\" in tool name, parameter \"command\"). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.",
"remediation": "Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "exec_on"
},
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"tags": [
"code-exec"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/secrets.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/secrets.js:28`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/secrets.js"
},
"evidence": "{ execFile } from \"node:child_process\"; import { promisify } from \"node:util\"; import { homedir, platform } from \"node:o",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/secrets.js",
"line": 28,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/ssh.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/ssh.js:21`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/ssh.js"
},
"evidence": "{ execFile } from \"node:child_process\"; import path from \"node:path\"; import { expandHome } from \"./paths.js\"; /** Map a",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/ssh.js",
"line": 21,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-006",
"title": "Unconstrained command parameter \"command\" on \"exec_on\"",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"exec_on\" takes a command-shaped parameter \"command\" with no enum/pattern constraint. Free-form, model- or attacker-controlled arguments reaching a shell is the command-injection precondition.",
"remediation": "Constrain the parameter (enum/pattern), or build the command from a fixed template with escaped args.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "exec_on",
"field": "inputSchema.properties.command"
},
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"param": "command"
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-005",
"title": "Mutating tool \"exec_on\" declares no destructiveHint",
"category": "hygiene",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"exec_on\" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.",
"remediation": "Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "exec_on"
},
"data": {
"tags": [
"code-exec"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-INJ-TARGET-1",
"title": "Reference to a credential-exfiltration path in metadata",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Reference to a credential-exfiltration path in metadata detected in the description of tool \"add_server\". Instruction-like content in tool metadata is executed by the model, not the human, and is the primary tool-poisoning vector.",
"remediation": "Tool descriptions should describe behavior, not instruct the assistant. Treat imperative / secrecy / sequencing language in metadata as hostile.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "add_server",
"field": "description"
},
"evidence": "~/.ssh",
"owasp": "LLM01:2025 Prompt Injection",
"data": {
"kind": "sensitive-target"
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-INJ-TARGET-1",
"title": "Reference to a credential-exfiltration path in metadata",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Reference to a credential-exfiltration path in metadata detected in the description of tool \"paths_report\". Instruction-like content in tool metadata is executed by the model, not the human, and is the primary tool-poisoning vector.",
"remediation": "Tool descriptions should describe behavior, not instruct the assistant. Treat imperative / secrecy / sequencing language in metadata as hostile.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "paths_report",
"field": "description"
},
"evidence": "~/.ssh",
"owasp": "LLM01:2025 Prompt Injection",
"data": {
"kind": "sensitive-target"
}
}
],
"toxicFlows": [
{
"id": "flow-1",
"severity": "critical",
"confidence": "strong",
"untrustedInput": [
"list_secrets"
],
"sensitiveSource": [
"get_secret",
"list_secrets"
],
"externalSink": [
"exec_on"
],
"selfContained": false,
"path": [
"list_secrets",
"get_secret",
"exec_on"
],
"pathWired": false,
"description": "A cross-tool exfiltration chain exists: list_secrets → get_secret → exec_on."
}
],
"capabilities": [
{
"tool": "list_servers",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_server",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_groups",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_tags",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ssh_target_for",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "add_server",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "update_server",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "remove_server",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "inventory_info",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "paths_report",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "validate_inventory",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "secrets_info",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "set_secret",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_secret",
"tags": [
"sensitive-source"
],
"reasons": {
"sensitive-source": [
"keyword \"get_secret\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "list_secrets",
"tags": [
"untrusted-input",
"sensitive-source"
],
"reasons": {
"untrusted-input": [
"keyword \"fetch\""
],
"sensitive-source": [
"keyword \"list_secrets\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "list_all_secrets",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "delete_secret",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "audit_tail",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ssh_check",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "exec_on",
"tags": [
"code-exec"
],
"reasons": {
"code-exec": [
"keyword \"exec\" in tool name",
"parameter \"command\""
]
}
}
],
"surfaceDigest": "24fab2ba0b2150eab7f4e599272352cb647c92a00e5bcf6f40a2d9fefcafcc30",
"stats": {
"tools": 20,
"prompts": 0,
"resources": 0,
"findingsBySeverity": {
"critical": 1,
"high": 4,
"medium": 1,
"low": 3,
"info": 0
}
}
}