Codeplane Server Inventory MCP Server
@isogonic/codeplane-server-inventory
npm
v0.5.6
Published by @isogonic — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 16.3 = 84. What the published surface and source actually contain:
| Points | What was found | Category |
|---|---|---|
| −16.3 | Reference to a credential-exfiltration path in metadata ×3 MTC-INJ-TARGET-1 | injection |
2. Client adoption risk — 84 − 11 = 73. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −10 | capability blast radius (critical) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 9
critical Completed toxic-flow trifecta across toolsMTC-FLOW-002
This server (without client built-ins) exposes a complete data-exfiltration chain: list_secrets → get_secret → exec_on. Untrusted input is ingested, private data is read, and it can be sent to an external sink via the agent composing the tools (→). Static analysis proves the primitive exists, not that a specific run will occur.
Fix: Remove one leg of the trifecta: isolate untrusted-input tools from secret-reading tools and from egress tools, or require human approval between them.
Location: flow list_secrets → get_secret → exec_on
high Reference to a credential-exfiltration path in metadataMTC-INJ-TARGET-1
Reference to a credential-exfiltration path in metadata detected in the description of tool "validate_inventory". Instruction-like content in tool metadata is executed by the model, not the human, and is the primary tool-poisoning vector.
Evidence: ~/.ssh
Fix: Tool descriptions should describe behavior, not instruct the assistant. Treat imperative / secrecy / sequencing language in metadata as hostile.
Location: tool validate_inventory · description
high Tool "exec_on" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "exec_on" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "exec" in tool name, parameter "command"). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool exec_on
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/secrets.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/secrets.js:28`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { execFile } from "node:child_process"; import { promisify } from "node:util"; import { homedir, platform } from "node:o
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/secrets.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/ssh.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/ssh.js:21`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { execFile } from "node:child_process"; import path from "node:path"; import { expandHome } from "./paths.js"; /** Map a
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/ssh.js
medium Unconstrained command parameter "command" on "exec_on"MTC-CAP-006
Tool "exec_on" takes a command-shaped parameter "command" with no enum/pattern constraint. Free-form, model- or attacker-controlled arguments reaching a shell is the command-injection precondition.
Fix: Constrain the parameter (enum/pattern), or build the command from a fixed template with escaped args.
Location: tool exec_on · inputSchema.properties.command
low Mutating tool "exec_on" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "exec_on" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool exec_on
low Reference to a credential-exfiltration path in metadataMTC-INJ-TARGET-1
Reference to a credential-exfiltration path in metadata detected in the description of tool "add_server". Instruction-like content in tool metadata is executed by the model, not the human, and is the primary tool-poisoning vector.
Evidence: ~/.ssh
Fix: Tool descriptions should describe behavior, not instruct the assistant. Treat imperative / secrecy / sequencing language in metadata as hostile.
Location: tool add_server · description
low Reference to a credential-exfiltration path in metadataMTC-INJ-TARGET-1
Reference to a credential-exfiltration path in metadata detected in the description of tool "paths_report". Instruction-like content in tool metadata is executed by the model, not the human, and is the primary tool-poisoning vector.
Evidence: ~/.ssh
Fix: Tool descriptions should describe behavior, not instruct the assistant. Treat imperative / secrecy / sequencing language in metadata as hostile.
Location: tool paths_report · description
Tools 20
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
list_secretsingests untrusted inputreads sensitive dataexec_onruns code / shellget_secretreads sensitive dataadd_serverno sensitive capabilityaudit_tailno sensitive capabilitydelete_secretno sensitive capabilityget_serverno sensitive capabilityinventory_infono sensitive capabilitylist_all_secretsno sensitive capabilitylist_groupsno sensitive capability
Show 10 more tools ↓
list_serversno sensitive capabilitylist_tagsno sensitive capabilitypaths_reportno sensitive capabilityremove_serverno sensitive capabilitysecrets_infono sensitive capabilityset_secretno sensitive capabilityssh_checkno sensitive capabilityssh_target_forno sensitive capabilityupdate_serverno sensitive capabilityvalidate_inventoryno sensitive capability
Toxic flows 1
Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (20 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.5.6 latest |
C 73/100 | 9 | 1.9.0 | 2026-07-24 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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