Iranti MCP Server
iranti
npm
v0.4.1
Source verified
Published by nfemmanuel — publish provenance cryptographically ties this package to that repository. That is proof of origin, not an official vendor package.
Memory infrastructure for multi-agent AI systems
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 6 = 94. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 12
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/src/lib/commandInvocation.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/src/lib/commandInvocation.js:29`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: require("path")); const child_process_1 = require("child_process"); function windowsNodeToolScript(name) { const nod
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/src/lib/commandInvocation.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/src/lib/runtimeDependencies.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/src/lib/runtimeDependencies.js:27`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: (require("net")); const child_process_1 = require("child_process"); function runCommandCapture(executable, args, cwd) {
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/src/lib/runtimeDependencies.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/src/lib/runtimeLifecycle.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/src/lib/runtimeLifecycle.js:52`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: require("path")); const child_process_1 = require("child_process"); const fileMutation_1 = require("./fileMutation"); fu
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/src/lib/runtimeLifecycle.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/src/lib/test-copilot-bootstrap.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/src/lib/test-copilot-bootstrap.js:13`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: _state in DB. */ const child_process_1 = require("child_process"); const path_1 = __importDefault(require("path")); con
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/src/lib/test-copilot-bootstrap.js
medium Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (dist/src/lib/providers/gemini.js)MTC-SRC-003
In the server's implementation (`dist/src/lib/providers/gemini.js:26`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: const response = await fetch(`https://generativelanguage.googleapis.com/v1beta/models/${model}:generateContent?key=${th
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/src/lib/providers/gemini.js
medium Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (dist/src/lib/providers/groq.js)MTC-SRC-003
In the server's implementation (`dist/src/lib/providers/groq.js:26`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: const response = await fetch('https://api.groq.com/openai/v1/chat/completions', { method: 'POST',
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/src/lib/providers/groq.js
medium Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (dist/src/lib/providers/mistral.js)MTC-SRC-003
In the server's implementation (`dist/src/lib/providers/mistral.js:26`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: const response = await fetch('https://api.mistral.ai/v1/chat/completions', { method: 'POST', he
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/src/lib/providers/mistral.js
medium Dynamic module load from a non-literal (bin/iranti-mcp-server.js)MTC-SRC-005
In the server's implementation (`bin/iranti-mcp-server.js:22`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: xistsSync(distMcp)) { require(distMcp); return; } try { require('ts-node/register/transpile-only'); require(src
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server bin/iranti-mcp-server.js
medium Dynamic module load from a non-literal (bin/iranti.js)MTC-SRC-005
In the server's implementation (`bin/iranti.js:12`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: xistsSync(distCli)) { require(distCli); return; } try { require('ts-node/register/transpile-only'); require(src
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server bin/iranti.js
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (dist/scripts/iranti-cli.js)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`dist/scripts/iranti-cli.js:31`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: require("path")); const child_process_1 = require("child_process"); const https_1 = __importDefault(require("https")); c
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/scripts/iranti-cli.js
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (dist/scripts/setup.js)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`dist/scripts/setup.js:15`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: "dotenv/config"); const child_process_1 = require("child_process"); const fs_1 = __importDefault(require("fs")); const p
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/scripts/setup.js
low Dynamic module load from a non-literal in packaging/dev tooling (dist/scripts/iranti-cli.js)MTC-SRC-005
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`dist/scripts/iranti-cli.js:1059`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: int/no-var-requires require(serverEntry); } async function stopRuntimeProcess(pid, timeoutMs) { if (!(0, runtime
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/scripts/iranti-cli.js
Tools 19
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
iranti_attendingests untrusted inputiranti_checkpointno sensitive capabilityiranti_forgetno sensitive capabilityiranti_handshakeno sensitive capabilityiranti_historyno sensitive capabilityiranti_ingestno sensitive capabilityiranti_observeno sensitive capabilityiranti_queryno sensitive capabilityiranti_recallno sensitive capabilityiranti_relateno sensitive capability
Show 9 more tools ↓
iranti_relatedno sensitive capabilityiranti_related_deepno sensitive capabilityiranti_rememberno sensitive capabilityiranti_remember_responseno sensitive capabilityiranti_searchno sensitive capabilityiranti_who_knowsno sensitive capabilityiranti_writeno sensitive capabilityiranti_write_issueno sensitive capabilityiranti_write_ruleno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (19 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.4.1 latest |
A 94/100 | 12 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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