Ira Researcher — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.13.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.
{
"tool": {
"name": "mcptrustchecker",
"version": "1.13.0",
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"target": {
"id": "ira-researcher",
"source": {
"kind": "package",
"origin": "ira-researcher"
},
"server": {
"name": "ira-researcher"
}
},
"grade": "D",
"score": {
"score": 67,
"threatScore": 78,
"grade": "D",
"band": "D",
"categorySubtotals": {
"injection": 21.7,
"exfiltration": 0,
"permissions": 0,
"supply-chain": 0,
"network": 0,
"hygiene": 0
},
"vector": [
{
"kind": "threat",
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-009",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"rawWeight": 9,
"confidenceMult": 0.7,
"diminishingFactor": 1,
"appliedPenalty": 6.3
},
{
"kind": "threat",
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-011",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"rawWeight": 22,
"confidenceMult": 0.7,
"diminishingFactor": 1,
"appliedPenalty": 15.4
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "capability-exposure",
"level": "critical",
"label": "capability blast radius (critical) — client exposure if the model is manipulated",
"appliedPenalty": 10
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "verification-discount",
"level": "repo",
"label": "publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable",
"appliedPenalty": 1
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "coverage-honesty",
"level": "source",
"label": "inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see",
"appliedPenalty": 0
}
],
"gatesFired": [],
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"capability": {
"level": "critical",
"reasons": [
"ingests untrusted external content (a prompt-injection entry point)",
"can execute shell commands or code",
"untrusted input can reach code execution"
],
"tags": [
"untrusted-input",
"code-exec"
]
},
"coverage": {
"level": "source",
"inputs": {
"toolSurface": true,
"implementationSource": true,
"packageMetadata": true,
"liveTransport": false
},
"caveats": [
"Tools were statically extracted from the published source (44 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
]
},
"findings": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-010",
"title": "Dynamic evaluation of a non-literal value (src/tools/debug.js)",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/tools/debug.js:49`): Evaluating a runtime value as code (rather than a fixed literal) executes whatever reaches it — a direct RCE primitive, and almost never necessary in legitimate code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/tools/debug.js"
},
"evidence": "{ const value = eval(c); if (value === undefined) return \"undefined\"; if (value === null) return",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-010",
"file": "src/tools/debug.js",
"line": 49,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-011",
"title": "Assembled command execution and dynamic evaluation in the same server",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "The implementation both builds shell commands out of runtime values (`src/browser.js`) and evaluates runtime values as code (`src/tools/debug.js`). Each is a separate arbitrary-execution primitive; a server exposing both gives anything that reaches either one a direct path to running attacker-chosen code. These two sinks are in different files — confirm whether they are actually connected, or are unrelated code paths (e.g. a vendored bundle plus a CLI wrapper).",
"remediation": "Remove the dynamic eval, and pass command arguments as an argv array instead of building a shell string. If both are genuinely required, constrain and validate every value that can reach them.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "implementation"
},
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rules": [
"MTC-SRC-009",
"MTC-SRC-010"
],
"commandFile": "src/browser.js",
"evalFile": "src/tools/debug.js",
"sameFile": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-001",
"title": "Dynamic code execution in server code (src/tools/debug.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/tools/debug.js:49`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/tools/debug.js"
},
"evidence": "{ const value = eval(c); if (value === undefined) return \"undefined\"; if (value === null) return",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-001",
"file": "src/tools/debug.js",
"line": 49,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (src/browser.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/browser.js:21`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/browser.js"
},
"evidence": "execSync, exec } from \"child_process\"; import fs from \"fs\"; import path from \"path\"; import { ghostScript } from \"./gho",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "src/browser.js",
"line": 21,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-009",
"title": "Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (src/browser.js)",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/browser.js:89`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/browser.js"
},
"evidence": "rm === \"win32\") { execSync(`tasklist /FI \"PID eq ${pid}\"`, { stdio: \"pipe\" }); return true; } proces",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-009",
"file": "src/browser.js",
"line": 89,
"nonRuntime": false
}
}
],
"toxicFlows": [],
"capabilities": [
{
"tool": "ira_navigate",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ira_go_back",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ira_go_forward",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ira_reload",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ira_click",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ira_type",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ira_hover",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ira_drag",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ira_upload",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ira_select",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ira_keyboard",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ira_screenshot",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ira_element_screenshot",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ira_extract_images",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ira_get_state",
"tags": [
"untrusted-input"
],
"reasons": {
"untrusted-input": [
"keyword \"get_page\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "ira_read_page",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ira_find",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ira_extract_text",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ira_extract_table",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ira_get_html",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ira_tabs",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ira_switch_tab",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ira_close_tab",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ira_new_tab",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ira_console",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ira_network",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ira_javascript",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ira_inspect_element",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ira_get_styles",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ira_performance",
"tags": [
"untrusted-input"
],
"reasons": {
"untrusted-input": [
"keyword \"get_page\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "ira_storage",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ira_network_timing",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ira_audit_accessibility",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ira_wait",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ira_scroll",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ira_cookies",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ira_set_viewport",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ira_pdf",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ira_intercept",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ira_shutdown",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ira_instances",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ira_kill_instance",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ira_kill_all",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ira_health",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
}
],
"surfaceDigest": "f96f4d7495b9199e627c97da29a5c479f35d2807569c0a725f10f77697c0793f",
"stats": {
"tools": 44,
"prompts": 0,
"resources": 0,
"findingsBySeverity": {
"critical": 0,
"high": 4,
"medium": 1,
"low": 0,
"info": 0
}
}
}