Ira Researcher MCP Server

In the server's implementation (`src/tools/debug.js:49`): Evaluating a runtime value as code (rather than a fixed literal) executes whatever reaches it — a direct RCE primitive, and almost never necessary in legitimate code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.

Evidence: { const value = eval(c); if (value === undefined) return "undefined"; if (value === null) return

Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.

Location: server src/tools/debug.js

The implementation both builds shell commands out of runtime values (`src/browser.js`) and evaluates runtime values as code (`src/tools/debug.js`). Each is a separate arbitrary-execution primitive; a server exposing both gives anything that reaches either one a direct path to running attacker-chosen code. These two sinks are in different files — confirm whether they are actually connected, or are unrelated code paths (e.g. a vendored bundle plus a CLI wrapper).

Fix: Remove the dynamic eval, and pass command arguments as an argv array instead of building a shell string. If both are genuinely required, constrain and validate every value that can reach them.

Location: server implementation

In the server's implementation (`src/tools/debug.js:49`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.

Evidence: { const value = eval(c); if (value === undefined) return "undefined"; if (value === null) return

Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.

Location: server src/tools/debug.js

In the server's implementation (`src/browser.js:21`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.

Evidence: execSync, exec } from "child_process"; import fs from "fs"; import path from "path"; import { ghostScript } from "./gho

Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.

Location: server src/browser.js

In the server's implementation (`src/browser.js:89`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.

Evidence: rm === "win32") { execSync(`tasklist /FI "PID eq ${pid}"`, { stdio: "pipe" }); return true; } proces

Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.

Location: server src/browser.js